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Abstract 
In 1997 the New Labour government instigated a period of radical reform for 
the National Health Service, a key element of which was the establishment 
across England of Primary Care Groups (PCGs), which subsequently became 
Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). These were local statutory governance bodies with 
responsibility to deliver and develop primary care and to improve the health of 
their local population: complex functions requiring collaboration with a range 
of organisations and agencies. 
The central aim of this study was to investigate whether and how PCG/Ts 
developed and facilitated collaboration within primary care, and between it and 
other NHS and non-NHS bodies, and to identify factors which enabled and 
inhibited collaboration. Using a theoretical framework which draws on a critical 
realist tradition, an approach was adopted to the analysis of organisational 
change which was attentive not only to rational, incremental processes of 
change but which took into account the political, cultural and economic 
context in which PCG/Ts operated. A key element of this context was the 
strong resemblance between New Labour's prominent `third way' discourse of 
collaboration and the defining characteristics of a network mode of 
governance: trust, loyalty, reciprocity and voluntariness. Inductive and 
deductive approaches were combined to test and develop theory about the 
interactions between context and organisational form, using multiple 
qualitative methods within a longitudinal nested case study. 
The study demonstrated that the locality-wide base of PCG/Ts, their explicit 
health improvement remit, budgetary arrangements and the presence of 
clinicians on their governing bodies were aspects of their organisational forms 
which equipped them to facilitate collaboration. However, over time, certain 
contradictions became apparent in New Labour's approach to organising the 
NHS which undermined many of the PCG/T's collaborative processes. This 
thesis argues that the alignment of the third way discourse with a network 
mode of governance exemplified 'symbolic politics. ' What was presented as a 
rational response to complex social problems and fragmentation of public 
services, was in fact largely a pragmatic political manoeuvre designed to 
distance itself from the perceived failure of previous administrations' hierarchy 
and market modes of governance. 
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Chapter one: Introduction, context and overview 
1.1 Background to this study 
Following the election of the New Labour government in 1997, the National 
Health Service (NHS), and primary care in particular, underwent a period of 
radical reform. The policy discourse of collaboration surrounding these 
reforms was both ubiquitous and ambiguous. Exhortations to collaborate were 
presented as a response to complex social problems, and the fragmentation 
and inefficiency of public services. It was asserted that collaborative working 
would result in better services for patients. 
A key feature of the reforms, details of which were published in the White 
Paper The New NHS: Modern, Dependable (Secretary of State for Health, 1997), 
was the introduction of Primary Care Groups (PCGs) and, subsequently, Primary 
Care Trusts (PCTs). PCGs and PCTs were local statutory governance bodies 
which were expected to facilitate collaborative working within elements of their 
primary care community, with other parts of the NHS and other organisations 
and agencies whose work related to health in its broadest sense. 
Interest in this raft of collaborative healthcare policy and legislation was high, 
and presented an opportunity to examine its implementation. A bid for 
research funding was supported jointly by academics at Oxford Brookes 
University and strategic level public sector workers from health services and 
the local authority: a non-executive director of Oxfordshire Health Authority 
(OHA), a senior officer from Oxford City Council and an assistant director of 
the local social services department (SSD). The Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) funded a CASE studentship to examine the effect of the 
implementation of New Labour's new policy initiatives on collaborative 
working. This joint bid, and wide-ranging commitment to support the project, 
underlined the shared academic and applied interest in this area of research. 
The present study, which looked at the effectiveness of policy changes in 
developing collaborative primary care services and collaborative efforts to 
improve health, began in the autumn of 1999 following the introduction of the 
PCG in April of 1999. The transition from PCG to PCT took place earlier than 
had been anticipated at the outset of the study, and changed the nature of the 
research: what originally set out to be a case study of one organisation became 
a study of two organisations and the process of transition between them. 
1.2 The PCG and PCT 
PCGs and PCTs were introduced as the basic building bricks of The New NHS 
(Klein, 2001), as mechanisms through which collaboration would be built for 
the delivery of primary care and the improvement of health. PCGs were set up 
throughout England and went live on PStApril 1999. These new primary care 
organisations were statutory local governance bodies which connected primary 
care providers in a locality and served an average population of 100,000. They 
were led by a governing board made up largely of primary care practitioners 
and a representative of the local social services department (SSD). By 2002, 
PCGs had all been superseded by PCTs which were organisationally more 
complex with more extensive responsibilities, powers and budgets. 
The three main duties of both PCGs and PCTs were: 
" delivering and developing primary care 
" commissioning secondary care 
" improving the health of their population (Department of Health, 1997) 
This research examines collaboration in relation to the first and third of these 
duties. The delivery and development of primary care, and health 
improvement, were complex functions and required the co-ordinated input of 
a range of organisations and agencies, including primary health care teams 
(PHCTs), other NHS bodies and local authority departments as well as non- 
statutory agencies. The structures and remits of the PCG and PCT implied a 
capacity and responsibility to develop, promote, facilitate and enhance 
collaboration between these organisations in a variety of ways, and 
Department of Health (DH) guidance emphasised the responsibilities of PCGs 
and PCTs to do so. According to the White Paper The New NHS: Modern, 
Dependable, PCGs were to "better integrate primary and community health 
services and work more closely with Social Services on both planning and 
delivery" (Secretary of State for Health, 1997 para 5.9). The following year, the 
NHS Executive stated that "the involvement of local government in the 
governance of PCGs will underpin the establishment of new partnership 
between primary and social care" (NHSE, 1998 para 21) and that PCG boards 
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were to "bring together lay members, Social Services managers with doctors 
and nurses for the first time to share the governing responsibilities. A Primary 
Care Group will also need to build up its partnership with the wider local 
government authorities" (NHSE, 1998, para 24). PCGs' and PCTs' pre-eminent 
position within New Labour's collaborative agenda was unequivocal. 
1.3 Collaboration 
The New Labour government's rhetoric was peppered with references to 
collaboration, partnership, alliances and co-operation, but these terms were 
rarely defined in policy documents. A variety of such terms are used 
inconsistently and almost interchangeably by policy-makers and researchers to 
capture the notion of working together. Commentators such as Miller & Ahmad 
(2000), Powell & Glendinning (2002) and Sullivan & Skelcher (2002) have 
concluded there is no uncontested definition of partnership (Dowling et al, 
2004). Many authors focus on the terminology's persistent defiance of a single 
definition. Ling, for example, claims the literature on partnership amounts to 
"methodological anarchy and definitional chaos" (Ling, 2000: 82). 
Fewer authors have committed themselves to explicit definitions of the terms. 
One who has is Hudson whose definition of collaboration is that "separate but 
related organisations adjust their behaviour in some way that takes account of 
each other's interests" (Hudson 1999: 187). 
Another is Glendinning who defines partnership as: 
a particular type of relationship in which one or more common goals, 
interests and/or dependencies are identified, acknowledged and acted 
upon, but in which the autonomy and separate accountabilities of the 
partner organisations can remain largely untouched (Glendinning, 
2002: 118). 
On balance, collaboration is used to connote a broader range of relationships 
than partnership. In this study, I adopt the term collaboration and, drawing on 
elements of the two definitions above, define it as: 
a relationship in which two or more individuals or groups (which may be 
professional, occupational or organisational) adjust their behaviour in 
some way to pursue common goals, interests or dependencies. 
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This definition accommodates the challenges inherent in identifying the 
organisational boundaries of primary care and the PCG/T itself. It also allows 
that among the collaborative aims of the PCG and PCT were precisely to 
compromise the separateness of organisations' and professional groups' 
autonomy and accountability and to foster a sense of corporacy. 
1.4 Aims and research questions 
The aim of this research is to investigate whether and how the PCG and PCT 
developed, promoted, facilitated and enhanced collaboration within primary 
care, and between it and other NHS and non-NHS bodies. It involves a case 
study of two organisations - the PCG and the PCT in Oxford city - over a 
period of three years, focusing on collaborative working towards development 
and delivery of primary care, and health improvement. It sets out to evaluate 
the PCG and PCT as collaborative mechanisms, as well as to measure the 
outcomes of their collaborative efforts in terms of health outcomes or service 
developments. 
The main research questions are: 
RQ1. How far did Oxford City PCG and PCT act as collaborative mechanisms 
to develop and deliver primary care and to improve the health of its 
population? 
RQ2. Which factors enabled collaboration to come about, and which factors 
inhibited collaboration? 
These are developed into more specific research questions later in this chapter. 
1.5 Theoretical framework 
To address these questions, the study adapts Sullivan and Skelcher's (2002) 
framework which identifies three interdependent elements of the examination 
of a collaborative mechanism: 
a) the context in which the PCG and PCT operate, in particular the driving 
forces for and against collaboration 
b) their organisational forms (structures and processes) 
c) their capacity for, and practice of, collaboration. 
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Figure 1: Realist theoretical framework 
This study examines the driving forces for New Labour's collaborative agenda 
as manifest in the PCG and PCT, drawing on conceptual literature from two 
areas: first, political science to illuminate the national political, social and 
historical context in which New Labour was elected; and second, 
organisational science and sociology to identify the factors which exert more 
proximal influence on collaborative activity. Next I examine New Labour's 
policy response to the driving forces through government documents and 
guidance which set out the organisational forms of PCGs and PCTs, insofar as 
they were nationally prescribed. I then examine the organisations' 
collaborative capacity and practice through case studies of the PCG and PCT 
in Oxford. 
Using this framework, the study asks how effective the two organisations were 
in achieving collaboration. What forms of collaboration were appropriate to the 
context in which they operated and their remits? Which factors of their 
organisational forms and the context within which they operated influenced 
how effectively they fostered collaboration both within primary care, and 
between primary care and other bodies for health improvement and primary 
care development? 
1.6 Structure of thesis 
Chapter two examines the first element of the theoretical framework. First I 
explore the context in which the concept of collaboration rose to such 
prominence in health policy and practice. I explore the driving forces behind 
the formation of the PCG and PCT as well as the forces which acted against the 
development of collaboration. Second, I examine the literature on the factors 
that distinguish different approaches to collaboration, and which influence 
whether and how collaborations work. 
I ask why and how collaboration and the new primary care organisations came 
to be seen as the answers to the problems of the NHS at this time. Statutory 
bodies were disjointed, primary care was highly fragmented and many health 
problems were multifaceted, complex and associated with social issues which 
extended beyond the traditional remit of the NHS. I argue that the outer 
context which acted to bring about a strong collaborative discourse and the 
introduction of PCGs and PCTs consisted largely in the role of the state which 
was changing in response to fragmentation and complex health and social 
problems. The perceived failure of hierarchies and the unacceptability of 
markets as mechanisms for co-ordinating healthcare delivery prompted 
government to aspire to a different form of governance: policy networks 
characterised by an enabling rather than coercing central government and 
relationships based on altruism, trust and reciprocity. I argue that the rhetoric 
of New Labour's "third way" resonated closely with policy networks as a form 
of governance, and examine the extent to which a paradigm shift from 
hierarchy to market to network actually accounts for New Labour's 
collaborative policies and interventions. 
Finally I turn to the literature on collaboration and identify more proximal 
factors - the inner context - which may determine the effectiveness of PCGs' 
and PCTs' collaborative work. Individual factors, such as the role of the 
boundary-spanner, and organisational factors, such as the importance of trust 
and a shared vision and sense of purpose, are considered separately. 
Chapter three explores the organisational forms of the PCG and PCT, the 
second element of the theoretical framework. I examine government policy and 
guidance documents in order to describe the 'generic' PCG and PCT, i. e. the 
structures and processes of these bodies as they were prescribed centrally and 
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which were common to all PCGs and PCTs. I also examine research evidence 
about the introduction of PCGs and PCTs and how they developed 
collaboration. 
I describe three radical features of the generic PCG and PCT. 
" First, this new model of primary care organisation provided a structure 
which had a locality-wide reach, and acted as an umbrella organisations 
for primary care in a locality. 
" Second, professional clinicians occupied positions on the governing 
board, challenging the traditional manager-professional dichotomy. 
" Third, a social services department (SSD) manager was to occupy a place 
on the governing board of an NHS body, a challenge to the established 
structural divides between health and social care organisations. 
This chapter then describes the centrally prescribed processes through which 
PCGs' and PCTs' responsibilities to deliver primary care and to improve the 
health of their populations were to be met. These included 
" clinical governance 
" new budgetary arrangements 
" the Health Improvement Plan (HImP). 
Finally, on the basis of chapter two's analysis of the context in which PCGs and 
PCTs were introduced, and chapter three's assessment of their organisational 
forms and remits, I construct an analytical framework. Through this analytical 
framework, I identify four more specific research questions through which the 
main research questions are addressed: 
RQ3: How far did the PCG's and PCT's organisational forms allow them to 
bring about a collaborative approach to improving the health of their 
population? 
RQ4: How far did the PCG's and PCT's organisational forms equip them to 
develop a sense of corporacy and collaboration within the primary care 
community to develop and deliver primary care? 
RQ5: Did the PCG and PCT's collaborative capacity manifest in collaborative 
processes and outcomes between primary care and other organisations 
at operational levels to promote independent living in older people and 
to tackle substance misuse? 
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Chapter four details how the study design, methodology and sample were 
intended to address the research questions. Inductive and deductive 
approaches were combined to test and develop theory in a longitudinal nested 
case study. Data were collected mainly through semi-structured interviews, 
which were supplemented by documentary and observational evidence. A 
framework (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994) approach to data analysis was used, 
assisted by NUD*IST computer software. The challenges of researching elite 
groups and of researching rapidly changing policy and implementation are 
documented. The limitations of the research methods are identified and 
discussed. 
The findings from the case studies are presented in chapters five, six and 
seven which, between them, address the four specific research questions. 
As chapter three set out, PCGs and PCTs were charged with improving the 
health of their population. Chapter five addresses RQ3, using the analytic 
framework set out in chapter three to examine whether and how four main 
features of Oxford City PCG's and PCT's organisational form equipped them 
with the collaborative capacity to advance a more public health-based 
approach to improving health. These features were common to both the PCG 
and the PCT but manifest differently in each. They were 
" the locality-wide base of the primary care bodies 
" their health improvement responsibilities 
" the election of practising clinicians to their governing bodies 
" the inclusion of an SSD representative on the governing bodies. 
It draws on interview data to illuminate the experiences and perspectives of 
participants from different professional groups from the PCG and PCT and 
from the wider primary care community, as well as from participants whose 
main work lay outside the NHS. It also uses documentary and observational 
evidence. 
PCGs and PCTs also had responsibility for developing and delivering primary 
care. They were expected to assure the quality as well as contain the cost of 
primary care services. Chapter six addresses RQ4, exploring Oxford City 
PCG's and PCT's capacity to bring together primary care workers to develop 
and deliver high quality primary care services and manage a budget for all 
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healthcare. The framework identified three features of the organisations' forms 
which were likely to facilitate this: 
" the locality-wide base of the primary care bodies 
" their budgetary and clinical governance responsibilities 
9 the election of practising clinicians to their governing bodies. 
This chapter asks whether these features equipped them to bring about a more 
collaborative, corporate approach to the delivery and development of primary 
care in the city. 
Chapter seven addresses RQs 5&6 examining how the two organisations 
facilitated collaboration locally at operational level through the two nested case 
studies: tackling substance misuse and promoting independence in older 
people. It explores the effects of organisational turbulence caused by the 
introduction of the PCG and the transition from PCG to PCT on collaborative 
working. 
Chapter eight brings together the evidence and theory accumulated over the 
course of this study. It returns to the two main research questions and critically 
evaluates Oxford City PCG and PCT as mechanisms for collaboration by 
drawing together the key findings from the empirical research presented in 
chapters five, six and seven. 
It then reconsiders and modifies the analytical framework in the light of the 
evaluations of the PCG and PCT, and relates the findings to debates in political 
science about the extent to which the third way can be thought of as a quasi- 
network mode of governance. 
Finally, it considers the strengths and limitations of the study. In particular, I 
reflect on the design and methodology of the study, and consider the 
implications of carrying out research in such a rapidly changing policy 
environment. 
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Chapter two: Context for collaboration 
2.1 Overview 
In the late 1990s, collaboration became prominent in New Labour policies, and 
their predilection for it was manifest in their restructuring of the NHS, 
including the introduction of PCGs and PCTs. 
Chapter one set out Sullivan and Skelcher's three-pronged framework for 
understanding collaborative mechanisms: examinations of the context in 
which collaboration operates, of the organisational form (structures and 
processes) of collaboration, and of the organisations' collaborative capacity 
and practice. 
In this chapter I address the first of the three issues highlighted by this 
framework in relation to the PCG and PCT 
CONTEXT 
INNER 61WI R 
Ekiving tortes FOR 
Driving fcqýo AGAINST; 
callaboldlon 
10 0 
so 0 
Figure 2: Realist theoretical framework - context 
I ask two broad contextual questions. First, at the national level, what were the 
driving forces behind their introduction, their collaborative roles and 
responsibilities (outer context)? Second, given the variations in form and 
effectiveness of collaborative arrangements which come about as national 
policy is interpreted locally, what are the more proximal forces which can act 
locally to drive the development of a particular collaborative relationship, and 
to make it effective or not (inner context)? 
The first of these two questions is answered by drawing on literature from 
political science to explore the context in which the concept of collaboration 
rose to such prominence in healthcare policy and practice and in which it came 
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to be seen as the answer to the problems of the NHS at this time. The second 
is addressed with reference to sociology and organisational science to identify 
the more proximal factors - organisational and individual - which combine to 
shape collaboration, or not, in a particular situation. 
In section 2.2 I argue that it is important to consider the context in which 
social policy operates. I distinguish the 'inner' context (relatively immediate 
factors which influence the local implementation of policy) from the 'outer' 
context (wider social, political, cultural, economic and historical factors). 
Understanding the driving forces behind collaboration in any given situation 
must take both into account. Sections 2.3 to 2.5 go on to address the outer 
context of this study, and 2.6 to 2.8 the inner context. 
The strong collaborative discourse emerged largely from the historical and 
political context in which the New Labour government was elected in 1997. In 
section 2.3 I examine this context in terms of the sequence of modes of 
governance - the mechanisms through which the state's responsibilities are 
met - since the inception of the NHS. This has been represented in the 
simplest terms as a paradigm shift from hierarchy (based on 'command and 
control'), to market (based on price competition), to 'network'. Networks, in 
this sense, are characterised by collaborative relationships based on trust, co- 
operation and voluntariness. 
Section 2.4 begins by outlining some of the complex policy problems which 
faced the New Labour government in its first term - the so-called 'wicked 
issues' such as inequalities in health, the chasm between health services and 
social services, and multifaceted social problems. Each of these categories of 
problems called for input from more than one body, sector or organisation. A 
strongly collaborative discourse was attractive to this government as a 
pragmatic approach to dealing with the complexity of these wicked issues. The 
rhetoric of New Labour at the end of the 20th century came to resonate closely 
with policy networks. The notion of networks as a form of governance 
appeared to New Labour to offer a means of overcoming the limitations of 
what they characterised as hierarchies and markets, which led to fragmentation 
within the health service and had failed successfully to co-ordinate services in 
the public sector. Although they did not use the term 'network' itself, they 
made much of the contrast between the collaborative approach of the 'third 
way' and what they characterised as old Labour 'command and control' or 
Conservative 'markets'. Finally, I argue that it was politically expedient for the 
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government to distance itself politically from previous administrations' policies 
and ensure that its third way approach to governance was distinctly New 
Labour. 
In section 2.5 I critically appraise the representation of the changes in modes 
of governance as a sequence of three distinct steps from hierarchy to market 
to network. Although this representation has some heuristic value, it does not 
accurately or completely capture the context in which PCGs and PCTs were 
introduced. Exworthy et al (1999) argue that this assumption of paradigm 
shifts is over-simplistic: that since the inception of the NHS, hierarchy, market 
and network modes of governance have been impure, each co-existing 
alongside elements of the others. They propose that it is more appropriate to 
refer to periods of quasi-hierarchy, quasi-market and quasi-network. In this 
section I assert that governments' capacity to determine the mechanisms 
through which the state's responsibilities are met is limited by professional 
interests and autonomy, organisational and cultural differences and 
managerial-professional tensions. It argues that a more nuanced analysis is 
required which allows for the influence of culture, profession and status on all 
modes of governance. 
New Labour's implicit claims of a network style of governance given the 
political and cultural realities of the public sector - particularly the NHS - at the 
beginning of the 215 century caused tensions, which I explore in section 2.6. 
Since hierarchies, markets and networks do not exist as pure forms of 
governance in a political world suffused with power differentials, political 
interests and professional autonomy, the adoption of a political philosophy 
based on such ideal types led to conflicts and tensions. It highlights some of 
the resulting tensions and contradictions, for example, between centralisation 
and devolution of power, between voluntary collaboration and attempts to 
enforce it, and between building long-term, trusting relationships and 
organisational turbulence. 
Section 2.7 discusses the inner context - driving forces which act at a more 
local level. I distinguish individual and organisational factors, identified by 
organisational science and sociology, which drive or inhibit collaboration in a 
particular situation. These influence the implementation of national policy at 
local level and can determine whether or not a collaborative venture achieves 
what it set out to. 
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Section 2.8 explores two important features of the inner context in relation to 
collaboration. Investigation of these features requires the adoption of 
ethnomethodological and ethnological approaches. Both act primarily at the 
individual, rather than organisational level. First is the boundary-spanner, an 
individual with a multi-faceted role who develops complex perspectives on 
social problems and their solutions, initiates and maintains collaboration, and 
influences and motivates people over whom they have little control. Secondly 
the section examines the importance of trust in collaborative relationships. 
In section 2.9 I consider shared vision, clarity of purpose, ownership and 
accountability: features which are identified in the literature as key drivers of 
collaboration acting at an organisational level. 
Finally, section 2.10 summarises the argument of chapter two. I first set out 
the key aspects of the national driving forces behind the collaborative agenda 
of New Labour and the introduction of PCGs and PCTs. Second. I show that 
local factors also drive collaborative activity in particular directions. 
2.2 Importance of understanding the context 
Pettigrew et al (1992) make a forceful appeal for a "... contextual mode of 
research where the organisation is seen as embedded in its social, political and 
historical context. " Various authors distinguish, implicitly or explicitly, two 
types of context: the domain or task environment (Thompson, 1967) and the 
general political, economic, sociological and technological environment 
(Jurkovich, 1974). Similarly, Pettigrew et al (1992) distinguish the inner from 
the outer context. 
The inner context is made up of relatively immediate factors such as the local 
organisational landscape, including these organisations' ongoing strategy, 
structure, culture, human resources, management and political processes 
which influence organisational change and the local implementation of policy. 
The outer context encompasses the national political, economic and social 
circumstances in which policies are introduced as well as the "perception, 
action and interpretation of policies and events at national and regional 
levels... Social movements and long-term professionalisation or 
de professional isation processes" (Pettigrew et at, 1992: 7). 
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Pettigrew et al argue that where context has been taken into account in 
research, it has tended to be too heavily reliant on explanations relating to the 
inner context, thus neglecting factors in the outer context. They argue that the 
general lack of attention to political, cultural and historical context has led to a 
distorted or impoverished analysis of the process of change: 
Where the change project is treated as the unit of analysis the focus is 
often on a single event or a set of discrete episodes somehow separate 
from the immediate and more distant antecedents that give those 
events form, meaning and substance. (Pettigrew et al, 1992, p6) 
Given the organisationally and politically turbulent history of the NHS, the 
effects of its past in determining its future development should not be 
underestimated (Lawrence, 1984; Zald, 1987; Selznick, 1957; Stichcombe, 
1965). Public sector organisations in particular, operating as they do in highly 
politicised realms in which professionals closely guard their power and social 
positions, are not amenable to analyses which are limited to formal, rational 
problem-solving and implementation (Pettigrew et al, 1992). They warn that 
explanations for change or lack of change will often be couched in terms of 
rational, incremental processes of organisational change, and call for an 
approach which takes into account political factors, considerations of power 
and vested interest, as well as less predictable factors. 
The relationship between context and organisational change operates in both 
directions: not only does the context shape collaboration, the collaboration 
also shapes the context. As Ling (2000, p85) notes, "Partnerships do not exist 
in a vacuum. They emerge from an existing institutional architecture. Some 
may reinforce and strengthen this architecture while others may undermine 
and challenge it. " 
2.3 Outer context: changing role of the state 
The following sections (2.3 - 2.6) address the outer context in which New 
Labour was elected and introduced its collaborative policies. This section 
examines modes of governance, or the mechanisms through which the state's 
responsibilities are met. 
Political science points to the changing role of the state, the mechanisms 
through which it ensures it meets its responsibilities, and the relationships 
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between it and its institutions and agents, as significant in understanding the 
rise of collaboration in public policy. Sullivan and Skelcher (2002), for example, 
describe the development of the collaborative agenda in the context of the 
changing institutional structure of the public sector and the emergence of new 
philosophies of public management and governance. They chronicle the 
progression of the role of the state in Britain from the 1970s to the present 
day in terms of three phases: overload, hollowing out and congestion. The shift 
over time in the co-ordination of governance is alternatively presented in 
terms of a progression through hierarchies and markets to a networked mode 
of governance (Thompson et al, 1991; Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1997,2000; 
Clarke & Glendinning, 2002; Powell & Exworthy, 2002). The two accounts of 
change use different terminology to describe corresponding periods of 
government. 
2.3.1 Hierarchy 
A hierarchical mode of governance is characterised by highly centralised 
policy-making and resource allocation, with limited autonomy at the periphery 
and an effective transmission belt implementing central directions (Exworthy et 
al, 1999). Under it, government departments are organised hierarchically in 
silos, often with a strong professional orientation, each with a particular 
approach to the way problems are defined and solutions prescribed (Hudson, 
1987). The NHS from its inception in 1948 to the election of a Conservative 
government in 1979 is generally considered to have been hierarchical and 
bureaucratic (Harrison, 1993) with central government making policies at a 
national level then exerting strong control over their transmission to the 
periphery (Saltman & Von Otter, 1992). 
King (1975) describes the Labour government of the 1970s as overloaded with 
responsibilities. The underlying design principles of this overloaded welfare 
state were its large welfare bureaucracies, professional rather than managerial 
control, reliance on representative forms of democracy and the notion of a 
passive community (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002: 16). Authority for jurisdictional 
responsibilities, which would sometimes overlap, was divided between 
separate government empires, unable to implement policy and losing 
legitimacy. 
Both of these accounts underline the bureaucratic character of the NHS in its 
first three decades, although where a hierarchical model assumes that central 
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government controls the bureaucracy, the notion of the overloaded state 
allows that professionals held considerable power. 
2.3.2 Markets 
The Conservative government's response to the overloaded hierarchical state 
was major restructuring of the public sector, and what has been described as 
the injection of market mechanisms to the NHS (Walshe, 1995; Salter, 1998, in 
Exworthy et al, 1999). Most commentators point to the purchaser-provider 
split as the most important aspect of marketisation in this period (Exworthy et 
al, 1999). 
Sullivan and Sketcher term this phase hollowing-out, one aspect of which was 
the new public management of the 1980s. At the heart of new public 
management was a set of beliefs that government should be smaller, more 
concerned with identifying what services needed to be provided and less with 
delivering them itself, and that market forces had a key role to play in this 
respect. It was argued that exposing people in the public sector to market 
forces would improve the economy and efficiency of activities and, if markets 
could be created in which users had choices, increase the responsiveness and 
consumer-orientation of services. This analysis chimed with the emerging 
political dominance of the New Right (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). 
During the process of hollowing out, the activities of the state were slimmed- 
down, leaving it with the policy-making functions of the core executive, 
regulatory functions for contracted and privatised services, and the oversight 
of residual direct provision functions. It meant that the role of service 
commissioning and purchasing was separated from that of provider, and that 
authority within state bureaucracies was decentralised to manage these new 
relationships. These complex relationships and contractual arrangements, 
often overseen by appointed boards, resulted in diminished transparency. In 
the 1990s, these so-called markets emphasized competition and the exercise 
of purchasing leverage rather than collaboration, and led to increased 
fragmentation (Wistow & Hardy, 1996). This meant that local authorities had to 
deal with a potentially large number of primary care purchasers and service 
commissioners (Glendinning et al, 2003). Hollowing out ".... produces an 
environment of organisational and political fragmentation in which the old 
certainties about the location of responsibility, accountability and authority for 
public action are lost. " (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002: 18) 
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2.3.3 Networks 
The introduction of market forces to the public sector, and the attendant 
division of organisational responsibilities and authority, acted to stimulate the 
collaborative agenda. The hollowing out of large welfare bureaucracies 
generated a need for the "... application of significant resources to negotiate 
the development and delivery of public programmes" (Skelcher, 2000: 12). 
From here, a new phase, that of the congested state, was entered. This was 
characterised by network modes of governance. 
The focus of policy networks theory is the manner in which the steering and 
regulation of societies takes place given the multiplicity of organisational 
actors, highly differentiated policy sectors and absence of centralised 
authority. It is used to analyse the structure of governance: the pattern of 
interorganisational relationships as a whole, the linkages, their intensity and 
standardisation. From this perspective, the policy network comprises: 
... all actors involved in the formulation and implementation of policy in 
a policy sector. They are characterised by predominantly informal 
interactions between public and private actors with distinctive, but 
interdependent interests who strive to solve problems of collective 
action on a central, non-hierarchical level. (Borzel, 1998: 20; italics in 
original) 
The network mode of governance: 
... arises from a view that actors are able to identify complementary 
interests. The development of interdependent relationships based on 
trust, loyalty and reciprocity enables collaborative activity to be 
developed and maintained. Being voluntary, networks maintain the 
loyalty of members over the longer term (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998: 
319-20). 
If it is price competition that is the central co-ordinating mechanism of 
the market and administrative orders that of hierarchies, then it is trust 
and co-operation that centrally articulates networks (Thompson et al, 
1991: 15). 
Network governance has been characterised as a move away from the old left 
statism and the new right markets (Clarke & Glendinning, 2002). Rummery & 
Coleman (2003: 1773) locate the emergence of a networked mode of 
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governance in "... a loosening of statist, bureaucratic forms of welfare delivery 
and a simultaneous recognition of the failure of markets... to provide an 
acceptable alternative in welfare delivery". 
2.4 Outer context: wicked issues and the third way 
2.4.1 Wicked issues 
When the new Labour government was elected, it inherited a number of what 
were termed 'wicked issues' because they "... defy efforts to delineate their 
boundaries and to identify their causes, and thus to expose their problematic 
nature" (Rittel and Weber, 1973: 167). These policy problems were attributed 
to deeply embedded problems such as longstanding cultural, sectoral and 
organisational divides, complex interactions between social, economic, 
environmental factors, and the fragmentation of the NHS due to GP 
fundholding (GPFH) and the internal market. They required collaboration not 
only between NHS bodies and organisations outside of the NHS, but also within 
primary care and between primary care and other NHS bodies. 
These wicked issues took various forms, but three broad categories may be 
discerned: health inequalities, the chasm between the NHS and social services 
departments, and complex social problems such as social exclusion and crime. 
Inequalities in health 
Health improvement and the reduction of inequalities in health was one of the 
most prominent themes in the 1997 white paper The New NHS: Modern, 
Dependable (Secretary of State for Health 1997; Klein, 2001). 'Health 
improvement' has a variety of meanings, which can be distinguished according 
to the degree to which NHS activity is seen as central (Abbot & Gillam, 2000) 
and distinct from developing primary care and community care and 
commissioning hospital services. It includes health promoting activities which 
take place outside the NHS (for example in schools and workplaces) and efforts 
to address the broader social, economic and environmental factors which 
contribute to health such as social exclusion, pollution, transport, housing and 
poverty (Gillam et al, 2001). The NHS itself did not have the necessary 
resources to improve health and reduce health inequalities alone; it had to 
become a partner in a wider social engineering project (Klein, 2001). 
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The government's commitment to raising the profile of public health was 
further demonstrated in the publication of the consultative green paper Our 
Healthier Nation: A Contract for Health (Secretary of State for Health, 1998) 
and the white paper Saving Lives (Secretary of State for Health, 1999), as well 
as in commissioning of the Acheson Inquiry into Inequalities in Health 
(Acheson, 1998) and its response (DH, 1999) in which it broadly accepted the 
Inquiry's analysis and recommendations, only three out of 39 of which 
focussed specifically on the NHS (Evans, 2004). The government 
acknowledged the complexity of the challenge of reducing inequalities and the 
wide influences on health status, the solutions to which lay far beyond the 
scope of the NHS. It signalled an approach which would require collaboration 
between a range of agencies, government departments and sectors. 
Health-social services divide 
A second problem was the so-called 'Berlin Wall' (Hudson, 1999a) between 
health and social services. The health and social care boundary is 
organisational, functional, professional and political, and has been on the 
political and professional agenda for some time. These structural service 
boundaries are built into the architecture of the post-war welfare state. They 
were created and are reinforced by organisational structures and by different 
modes of governance and accountability. Collaboration between health and 
social care therefore requires negotiation of a number of sensitive issues 
(Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). Tensions between medical and social models of 
care are reflected in different organisational cultures and modes of working 
(Hudson, 1987). The NHS is hierarchical, and the local delivery of services is 
ultimately accountable through a management structure to the Secretary of 
State for Health, while social services departments are accountable, through 
elected councillors, to the electorate (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). 
A failure of co-ordination of health and social services affects some groups 
disproportionately. An important example is older people, for whom the failure 
of co-ordination of health and social services can lead to gaps in services and 
undermine independence (O'Hagan, 1999)1. The outcomes of such failures 
See chapter seven, where a nested case study of the health improvement priority to 
promote independent living in older people is reported 
19 
were clearly manifest in situations such as the vicious cycle of `bed-blocking' 
(Audit Commission, 2000a), the occupation of beds on acute hospital wards by 
(usually elderly) patients due to a lack of social care services to facilitate their 
discharge although they no longer required a high level of intervention. Rising 
hospital admissions and falling lengths of stay meant reduced rehabilitation, 
placing greater demands on social services which absorbed funds which were 
consequently unavailable to be spent on preventive services in the community 
to help contain the rising hospital admissions. This failure to invest in low- 
level, preventive services meant the overuse of acute and residential care. Co- 
ordination failure also meant costly duplication of assessments and services 
(DH, 2000; Rummery & Coleman, 2003). There was growing recognition on 
both sides of the NHS-social services divide of their interdependence in order 
to address such failures of service co-ordination. 
The commitment to reducing waiting lists required the prevention of 
unnecessary hospital admissions and prompt discharge of people who did not 
need medical care. This depended on adequate funding in social services and 
also partnership with housing and other local authority departments and the 
non-statutory sector to promote independent living and prevent ill health. 
Various items of legislation and policy recognised the need for greater 
collaboration and were put in place in an effort to remedy these problems. The 
1999 Health Act flexibilities, for example, allowed health and local authority 
organisations to pool budgets, delegate commissioning responsibilities to a 
single 'lead' organization and integrate front-line health and social services 
staff in one organization. 
National Service Frameworks (NSFs) set minimum standards for delivery and 
monitoring in particular areas of care. The NSF for Older People (DH, 2001) was 
a service level model which set standards for the delivery and monitoring of 
health services for older people and emphasised collaboration between NHS 
services and local authorities in improving services for older people 
(Glendinning et al, 2001). 
Complex health and social problems 
Many challenges facing communities, countries and governments are 
sufficiently complex in scope and scale as to require the involvement of a 
range of actors with complementary perspectives, expertise and resources 
(Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). As the report of the Acheson Inquiry into 
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inequalities in health found, health in its broadest sense is influenced by 
environmental, social, economic and other factors. Such complex health and 
social problems manifest in a wide variety of ways, including the problems 
associated with substance misuse. 
The prevalence of substance misuse increased dramatically through the 1990s 
and the social and health-related problems associated with it nudged their way 
up the political agenda'. The multi-faceted nature of these problems meant the 
solutions required to tackle them were wide ranging - from health, crime, 
prevention, education - and required input from a correspondingly diverse 
range of services and agencies. Early in its first term, the New Labour 
government announced a ten-year drugs strategy: 1998-2008: Tackling Drugs 
Together to Build a Better Britain (Home Office, 1998). Models of Care, a de 
facto National Service Framework for drug treatment, was published in 2002 by 
the National Treatment Agency for Substance Misuse, a special health authority 
created by the Government in 2001 whose aim was to improve the availability, 
capacity and effectiveness of treatment for drug misuse in England. 
2.4.2 Political pragmatism 
As well as the policy problems such as the three above which drove the 
renewed rhetoric of collaboration, there were political reasons for ratcheting- 
up the collaborative discourse. Klein's (2001) analysis locates its origins in New 
Labour's determination to distinguish itself from previous administrations, 
including `old Labour' whose appeals to working class solidarity were no 
longer electorally viable in the socio-economic climate of the late 20th century, 
characterised by globalisation, the decline of industry, and dominated by 
consumer, rather than producer, politics. 
The NHS Plan set out the government's policy for continuing NHS reforms. It 
heralded changes which would distance New Labour's approach from those of 
previous administrations: 
Until the 1990s the NHS was run hierarchically with little room for local 
innovation or independence. In the 1990s the internal market 
I See chapter seven, where a nested case study of the health improvement priority to 
tackle substance misuse is reported 
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introduced competition but failed to bring improvements. A new model 
is needed. (Secretary of State for Health, 2000: 30) 
New Labour's pragmatics in government became known as the `third way'. 
2.4.3 Third Way 
New Labour's modernisation project, termed the 'third way', was pragmatically, 
rather than ideologically, driven. It was closely associated with the work of the 
sociologist, Giddens (1998), who argued that the distinctions between left and 
right were unhelpful in addressing contemporary problems. It claimed to do 
away with allegedly outdated notions of ideological purity, and to move 
"beyond left and right" to a political philosophy embodied by the phrase "what 
counts is what works" (Labour Party Manifesto, General Election 1997; Bond 
and Le Grand, 2003). Third way rhetoric was peppered with references to 
collaboration and partnership and, through it, New Labour sought to reconcile 
previously antagonistic forces such as social justice and a strong economy 
(Klein, 2001). 
The collaborative rhetoric of the third way can be seen as both a pragmatic 
response to the 'wicked issues' they faced in government, and also a political 
manoeuvre which aimed to distance New Labour from the perceived failure of 
governance based on hierarchy or market forces successfully to overcome 
them. The infusion of the third way to health policy can be felt strongly in the 
White Paper, The New NHS: Modern, Dependable (Secretary of State for Health, 
1997) which presented an approach to the problems of providing and co- 
ordinating health care and improving health in which trust, partnership and 
collaboration were strong themes. 
The resemblance between the new government's third way, with its adopted 
terminology of collaboration, and the defining characteristics of a network 
mode of governance was strong. It was reflected in the government's many 
references to the key characteristics of networks such as altruism, trust, co- 
operation, collaboration, partnership, alliances, and inter-agency work, even 
though politicians rarely used the term 'network' itself (Exworthy et al, 1999). 
Collaboration exemplified New Labour's 'pragmatic modernisation' (Clarke & 
Glendinning, 2002: 33), and the policy network, characterised by an enabling, 
rather than a coercing, central government (Newman, 2001), embodied the 
pragmatic 'between and beyond' spirit of its third way (Clarke & Glendinning, 
2002). 
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2.5 Outer context: cultural and political complexity 
The proposition that a sequence can be traced from hierarchy to market and 
then to a network mode of governance has some substance, credibility and 
theoretical value. And, politically, it suited New Labour to present it that way. 
However, it does not account fully for the history of the emergence of the 
`third way, ' and even as a partial explanation, it is not uncontested. The 
sequence is challenged by Exworthy et al (1999) on the grounds that these 
ideal types fail to recognise the political and organisational complexities of the 
NHS. They argue that it overlooks the differences in power, culture and 
accountability between different professions and between professionals and 
managers. Elements of hierarchy, market and network were all evident in each 
of the three phases and the terms quasi-hierarchy, quasi-market and quasi- 
network are more appropriate. 
2.5.1 Quasi-hierarchy 
Exworthy et al (1999) argue that the NHS was never a pure command-and- 
control hierarchy: prior to the 1974 reorganisation, there was a deficient 
transmission belt between centre and periphery. Central government had 
considerable formal responsibility with little authority. 
Hierarchies, planning and strategy were established in the period which 
followed the 1974 NHS reorganisation, with the introduction of Health 
Authorities. However, the so-called hierarchy was limited by the autonomy 
afforded to professionals. GPs, in particular, resisted becoming a part of a 
hierarchically managed NHS by fighting to retain their independent contractor 
status. As Klein (1995) put it, the politicians set the size of the budgets, but 
the doctors controlled how they were spent. 
Rhodes (1997) argues that professionalized policy networks were a strong 
feature of the NHS during the so-called hierarchical period. These 
professionalized networks consisted of medical professionals demonstrating a 
high degree of independence and a high degree of insulation from other 
networks or interests. These contrast with third way networks which purport to 
be more inclusive and embrace private, voluntary and informal links (Exworthy 
et al, 1999). 
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2.5.2 Quasi-market 
Neither was the NHS ever fully marketised, partly because it was considered 
politically impossible to allow market mechanisms to have full rein (Klein, 
1998). Rather, it became a quasi-market which exhibited a mix of private 
sector ideas and practices with public sector funding and regulation (Exworthy 
et al, 1999). In some areas, GPs chose to enter into this quasi-marketplace by 
becoming GP fundholders, a system introduced to promote bettervalue for 
money and to improve consumer choice. Practices, or groups of practices 
could opt to hold a budget to pay for specific hospital care, drugs, staffing in 
the practice and community services. Various collective commissioning 
arrangements emerged whereby groups of practices purchased together, 
allowing economy of scale in commissioning. Practices could also optfor total 
purchasing, in which practices could buy any type of NHS care (Dixon & 
Glennerster, 1995). 
Further, community health services, in place during the so-called market 
period, were said to exhibit many of the attributes characteristic of network 
structures (Flynn et al, 1996). They represented networks of intersecting 
interests, through which information about the quality of services was 
transmitted informally. These networks became essential sources of 
information on which purchasers could base transactions in the quasi-market. 
2.5.3 Quasi-network 
While New Labour was liberal in its use of collaborative rhetoric in ways which 
resonated with policy networks, there were also strong indications that 
elements of market and hierarchy were to continue. In 1997 the New NHS 
claimed to reject both "... the old centralised command and control systems of 
the 1970s" and the "... divisive internal market system of the 1990s" (Secretary 
of State for Health, 1997: 10), yet by 2000 New Labour's NHS contained 
substantial elements of both. The contradictions which arose are highlighted 
by Dowling & Glendinning (2003). The NHS Plan stated that the "NHS cannot be 
run from Whitehall... Clinicians and managers want the freedom to run local 
services around patients' needs" but also that "... standards cannot simply be 
set locally... Inspection, incentives, information and intervention, operating 
under the umbrella of clear national standards, will help reshape services 
around the patient" (Secretary of State for Health, 2000: 30). PCGs and PCTs 
were required to be involved in the creation and strengthening of devolved, 
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local organisational and service networks, as well as more directive, 
hierarchical forms of steering (Glendinning et al, 2003) 
2.5.4 Interprofessional and professional-managerial tensions 
The ideal types of hierarchy, market and network cannot be applied strictly to 
governance in the NHS partly because of the historical and political forces 
which shaped the NHS, particularly the struggles between managerialism and 
professionalism within it, and also the interprofessional tribalism arising from 
differentials of power and status between professions. 
Managerialism and professionalism 
The manager-professional distinction has been the subject of a considerable 
literature, characterised by Exworthy & Halford (1999) as a 'pastiche of popular 
and academic images. ' In this, the stereotypical manager is committed to 
running bureaucracies, to establishing and applying rules, and depends on his 
or her position in the bureaucratic hierarchy and on their knowledge of 
organisational politics and practice, acquired through experience in a 
particular organisation. He or she is seen to be conformist, self-interested and 
career motivated. Professionals, in contrast, are committed to the provision of 
expert services and advice, depend for their power and authority on specialist 
knowledge which supersedes the confines of any single organisation, and are 
creative, altruistic and driven by ethical commitment to their expertise. The 
professional autonomy of medicine has been highly prized, particularly in 
primary care where GPs have held onto their status as independent contractors 
and have not become employees. GPs have generally held to a medically- 
oriented approach to the health of individuals compared to some other 
members of a primary health care team (PHCT), such as district nurses 
(although many GPs consider themselves to be less medically- and 
individually-oriented than specialist clinicians). 
Differences between the two groups are problematic for hierarchies and 
networks. A hierarchical system depends on management structures which 
ensure local implementation of central government policy, but the tensions 
arising from their different motivations mean professionals may resist 
implementing policy as dictated by managers. They also present challenges to 
networks, since trust and reciprocity are not easily built between groups or 
individuals with different values. 
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Professional and managerial roles have been blurred. Managerial- 
professionals, evident in the acute sector in the form of, for example, medical 
directors, were viewed by some as not simply an effort to control 
professionals, but as an opportunity for new patterns of compromise between 
managerialism and professionalism (Harrison and Pollit, 1994). Hoggett 
identified the conversion of professionals into managers as a distinctive 
feature of change in the early 1990s: 
Rather than attempt to strengthen 'management' in order to control 
professionals, the strategy shifts towards creating managers out of 
professionals. A new generation of unit managers begins to emerge who 
combine technical expertise with managerial competence (Hoggett, 
1991: 254). 
This professional-managerialism did not emerge in primary care beyond the 
introduction by the Conservative government in the 1990s of GP fundholding 
and associated primary care commissioning models, a scheme under which 
GPs took on a limited managerial role for their own spending or that of a 
group. There was no precedent for compulsory managerialism for GPs at a 
local level. As I will elaborate in chapter three, the PCG and PCT model 
challenged the manager-professional distinction through the position of GPs 
and community nurses on their governing bodies, with strategic 
responsibilities at a local level. 
Interprofessional divides and tribalism 
Organisational culture consists of informal networks of co-operation and 
conflict, created and sustained by collective norms and values of its members 
and individuals' actions and beliefs (Macklan, 2002). Organisational and 
cultural chasms existed between professional groups, presenting difficulties 
for all modes of governance, not least networks. The role of culture is often 
seen as central to the development of collaborative capacity within 
organisations and across sectors (Newman, 1994). Hiscock & Pearson (1999, 
cited in Macklan, 2002: 215) warn that collaboration can be hindered by a lack 
of understanding of organisational cultures. According to McGann and Gray 
(1986), in order to develop the cultural awareness required for collaboration, 
there must be a widespread understanding of the concerns of particular actors 
combined with the appropriate leadership and strategic intervention in order to 
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secure the required culture and organisational ownership of collaboration as a 
way of working. 
Traditionally, organisations within primary care (mainly general practice) had 
tended to operate in isolation from others and had little history of 
collaboration: the primary care of the 1990s was characterised by the 
development of services in isolation and a culture of competition brought 
about by quasi-internal market forces in the health system. The vision for the 
'new' NHS was for a more integrated primary care community at local level 
which would work together to deliver and develop primary care for its 
population. It would also work more closely with social care, which it had not 
done historically. 
According to Hudson's (1999) analysis, policy on collaboration (in this case, 
the relationships between health and social services) was based on a hugely 
optimistic model for most of the post-war period. When central governments' 
approach of pointing out the benefits of collaboration and exhorting agencies 
to work together had been unsuccessful, they had clung to an optimistic 
perspective on collaboration which assumed that organisations simply lacked 
the technical know-how to collaborate, so responded by issuing instructions 
on how to do it better. This approach failed to take into account the cultural 
differences between professions within primary care and between them and 
social services. 
Under New Labour, efforts were made to lessen the structural differences in 
accountability and management hierarchies between NHS and SSDs through 
the 1999 Health Act flexibilities. While New Labour's early white papers and 
legislation focussed on structural change, the Modernisation Agency was 
tasked with promoting cultural change (STBOP, DH, 2001), and Local Strategic 
Plan (LSP) development was to focus on partners' capacity to work together 
more effectively (DETR, 2001). However, a "legacy of interorganisational 
divides" remained (Rummery & Coleman, 2003: 1773), and they have been 
complemented by interprofessional boundaries between social workers, 
doctors and nurses, characterised as professional tribalism (Dailey, 1989). 
On managing organisational cultures, Pettigrew observes that the values of 
established and defensive professional groups are deeply rooted, shaped by 
socialisation processes outside the control of managers, and likely to survive 
attempts at top-down restructuring, even if driven underground. Whether 
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culture can, in reality, be managed is doubtful, but it should at least be 
considered when advocating changes that may challenge them (Hatch, 1997). 
Hudson takes New Labour's approach to collaboration - the removal of 
constraints, introduction of incentives and closer monitoring - to indicate the 
adoption of a more realistic perspective. Exhortations to agencies to be decent 
about joint working have been replaced by a panoply of sanctions, incentives 
and threats (Hudson, 1999a, in Powell & Glendinning, 2002: 9). 
To summarise, an analysis of the role of the state which describes a sequence 
from hierarchy, to market, to network is oversimplified and does not account 
for the effects of important contextual factors which lead to the impurity of, 
and overlap between, these forms of governance. An analysis of PCG's and 
PCT's collaborative endeavours must take into consideration such complexities 
as the professional autonomy of doctors and the independent contractor status 
of GPs (Klein, 2001); the presence of attributes characteristic of network 
structures during the hierarchy and market modes of governance (Flynn et at, 
1996); interorganisational divides (Rummery & Coleman, 2003); and 
interprofessional boundaries or professional tribalism (Dailey, 1989) between 
social workers, nurses and doctors. 
A government's capacity to determine the mechanisms through which the 
state's responsibilities are met is limited by professional interests and 
autonomy, cultural differences and managerial-professional tensions. More 
nuanced policy making is required which allows for the influence of culture, 
profession and power on all modes of governance. As will be seen in chapter 
three, New Labour was sensitive to these issues to some extent in its plans for 
the introduction of PCGs and PCTs. 
2.6 Outer context: tensions in the third way 
Political scientists' characterisation of the role of the state under previous 
administrations as hierarchies and markets, and of the position of the third 
way, were over-simplified. Over time, certain contradictions became apparent 
in New Labour's approach to organising the NHS. There were tensions 
between, on the one hand, a rhetoric which suggested collaboration based on 
voluntarism, trust, reciprocity and loyalty and devolution of power to managers 
and practitioners locally and, on the other hand, a reality which saw an 
increase in national targets, monitoring and central control. A further tension 
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was that between the exhortations to build collaborative relationships and the 
turbulence caused by fast-paced modernisation, restructuring and 
organisational change. 
2.6.1 Statutory voluntarism 
Powell et al (2001) questioned whether partnerships can be enforced by 
statute, and doubted that successful partnerships would result simply because 
stakeholders are told to work together. Benson (1975) warns that the nature of 
authority and resource relationships between organisations can become 
imbalanced when a superordinate body such as a government legislates that 
organisations should work together to maximise efficiency and effectiveness, 
when agreement amongst participating organisations about their roles and 
scope is low. In the search for scarce resources such as authority and money, 
organisations may enter into imposed rather than voluntary collaborations for 
which they are not fully equipped. 
To many, the strengthening of central control through performance 
management and targets sat uncomfortably with the collaborative discourse of 
trust, participation and inclusion (Newman, 2000). The trust-based 
relationships were at risk of being undermined by heavy-handed regulation 
and performance management, under which each organisation tries to meet 
separate targets. 
This central control extended to imposing a'duty' to co-operate, as the NHS 
Plan (Secretary of State for Health, 2000) warned that action would be taken 
against ineffective health and social care partnerships, and they would be 
compelled to use the new Health Act flexibilities. Powell et al (2001) conclude 
that neither the sanctions nor incentives within the NHS Plan were sufficiently 
strong to elevate partnerships towards the top of the policy agenda. Statutory 
voluntarism is the term coined by Paton (1999: 69) to describe the top-down 
pressure, even sometimes coercion, to work in partnership. Notwithstanding 
the strengths of sanctions and incentives, statutory voluntarism appears at 
odds with how sustained partnership activity is seen to exist in the voluntary 
co-operation of individuals for the common good (Baum, 1999 and Champlin, 
1999). 
Decentralisation must be balanced with accountability and the plethora of 
initiatives, targets - and the PCG and PCT themselves - did not evolve in an 
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organic, spontaneous way. The question is not "was the collaboration entirely 
voluntary" but "was the balance between voluntariness and accountability right 
and consistent with the rhetoric of networks, and was it effective for 
collaboration? " 
There is potentially a tension between such hierarchical modes of policy 
implementation and the local ownership and commitment likely to sustain local 
collaboration. Priorities set out in the NHS Plan and NSFs drove much of the 
organisations' work and suggested a hierarchical rather than network approach 
to collaboration. External pressure to work in partnership can undermine trust 
in collaborations (Rummery, 2002). Glendinning et al (2003) note that many 
areas of collaborative activity were determined primarily by national priorities 
such as NSFs (DH, 1999g, 2000a, 2001b) and the NHS Plan (Secretary of state 
for Health, 2000). The national priorities which drove the work of PCG/Ts and 
some of their collaborative partners frequently diverted attention from external 
collaborative relationships and sometimes undermined them (Glendinning et 
al, 2003). Indeed, separate performance management systems emerged for 
PCGs and local authorities. 
Wide acceptance of partnerships to reduce health inequalities was found to be 
impeded by the stick of vertical performance management by Powell et al 
(2001). Powell and Glendinning (2002: 6) argue that enforced partnerships 
"may be incompatible with the whole notion of partnership, which is implicitly 
associated with some degree of choice and autonomous action. " Trust, in 
particular, may be jeopardised in such circumstances (Rummery, 2002). The 
sanctions and incentives in the NHS Plan (Secretary of State for Health, 
2000)appeared to be a case of overt steering rather than the hands-off 
enabling which would characterise a networked governance of welfare 
(ohansson & Borell, 1999; Rhodes, 1997, cited in Rummery & Coleman, 2003). 
2.6.2 Decentralisation 
The New Labour government's talk of a decentralised NHS was consistent with 
a network mode of governance. A decentralised public service is one in which 
significant decision-making is made by operational level managers and staff 
who are closer to the people receiving services. When responsibility for 
budgetary control is held at this level, services can be more responsive to need 
(Pollitt and Harrison, 1992). Decentralisation was a theme of The New NHS, 
which claimed that, "For the first time in the history of the NHS all the primary 
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care professionals, who do the majority of the prescribing, treating and 
referring, will have control over how resources are best used to benefit 
patients" (Secretary of State for Health, 1997, p37). 
The white paper Shifting the Balance of Power within the NHS claimed 
responsibility would be devolved from Whitehall to those closer to the delivery 
of services: "Because we trust people on the frontline, the centre will do only 
what it needs to do; then there will be maximum devolution of power to local 
doctors and health professionals" (DH 2000, p57). Central government's 
intentions to "devolve decisions to frontline staff' (p9) and "to reduce 
hierarchies and develop self-managed teams" (p25) was reiterated in 
Delivering the NHS Plan (Secretary of State for Health, 2002). Indeed, it 
announced that Health Authorities, which had supported PCGs and manage the 
performance of PCTs, were to be abolished in April 2002 and many of their 
responsibilities, and 75% of the NHS budget would be devolved to PCGs and 
PCTs. Strategic Health Authorities were established with responsibility to 
performance manage all local NHS organisations (Glendinning & Dowling, 
2003). 
Decentred governance must, of course, strike a balance between on the one 
hand devolution and participation and on the other, central control and formal 
accountability (Bevir & Rhodes, 2001). However, Deeming (2004) asserts that 
most health policy analysts consider the NHS under New Labour to be over- 
centralised. While making the case for devolution, New Labour simultaneously 
imposed a high level of central direction over the NHS. 
Clarence and Painter (1998: 15), for example, argue that New Labour's 
collaborative discourse was countered by a conflicting and contradictory 
discourse of centralisation and demands for performance. Bond & Le Grand 
(2003) question whether local responsibility is compatible with the 
development of national standards and regulatory bodies. The NHS Plan 
(Secretary of State for Health, 2002) set out extensive plans for performance 
monitoring, audit and management that would be applied to the NHS, 
including primary care (Glendinning & Dowling, 2003). 
Two national bodies were set up to support the new managerial accountability, 
and the benchmarking and performance management system within the new 
NHS (Rouse & Smith, 2002). The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
would tackle widespread and unpopular variations in health services by setting 
standards and benchmarks, and the Commission for Health Improvement 
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(CHI), later to become the Healthcare Commission, would inspect services to 
ensure the targets in the NHS Plan were met. National Service Frameworks 
(NSFs) and clinical governance were also introduced. Clinical governance was 
the system through which the quality health services was to be monitored, 
safeguarded and improved (see 3.5). Together with the NHS Plan, a 
performance rating system for health services, NICE, CHI and NSFs formed a 
strong performance management framework. 
2.6.3 Organisational change and transition processes 
In the years following the election of the New Labour government, the pace of 
change in the structures, directives and relationships within the NHS and local 
government was tremendous. As this chapter has shown, the context in which 
PCGs and PCTs were introduced was fast-moving and challenging on many 
fronts. 
The New NHS: Modern, Dependable (Secretary of State for Health, 1997) 
appeared to acknowledge the potential cost of ongoing reorganisations in 
terms of staff capacity and morale and pledged to minimise upheaval. 
This White Paper marks a watershed for the NHS... But it will not mean a 
wholesale structural upheaval, generating costs and disruption that get 
in the way of patient care. The NHS has had all too much of that. There 
is no appetite amongst patients or staff for such an upheaval. But there 
is an appetite for change that goes with the grain of the NHS and its 
traditional values. (Secretary of State for Health, 1997: para 10.1) 
These promises echoed hollow in the ensuing raft of policy and legislation. The 
costs of this organisational turbulence were found to be considerable. The 
development and maintenance of collaboration with external organisations is 
liable to be impeded by organisational change (Regen et al, 1999). It may 
disrupt relationships between key individuals in collaboration, and can 
encourage organisations to be inward- rather than outward-looking. New 
targets and directives may divert attention from, and even undermine, external 
collaborative relationships (Glendinning et al, 2003). 
The swift transition from PCG to PCT allowed insufficient time for PCGs to 
progress through their stages of development to maturity. To some extent 
they came to be regarded as transitional organisational forms rather than 
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organisations in their own right. Rummery & Coleman (2003) found that clarity 
and realism of purpose, commitment to and ownership of partnership, had 
been particularly affected by the organisational instability experienced by the 
PCGs in their study, as had the establishment of clear and robust joint 
commissioning structures. Hunter (2003) attributed the limits in the 
effectiveness of HImPs to the lack of time for adequate consultation and 
involvement processes during their production, and the lack of time to mature 
before they transmogrified to HIMPs. 
Paradoxically, change, which is implicit in almost all interagency working, is 
easier to bed down where there is continuity of personnel in key management 
positions (Pettigrew et al, 1992) a situation that is difficult to achieve in the 
prevailing climate of organisational turbulence (Sullivan & Sketcher 2002). 
However, as Bond and Le Grand (2003) argue, one feature of the PCG and PCT 
mitigated the effects of organisational change. GPs are more embedded in 
their communities than are managers so their occupation of key roles in PCG/T 
was advantageous - as the others came and went, they often provided 
continuity. 
2.7 Inner context: local driving forces 
The first part of this chapter presented an account of the national political and 
historical context in which PCGs and PCTs were introduced, but more proximal 
factors also bear on the effectiveness of collaborative relationships. Evidence 
from Forsgarde et al (2000) and Withington & Giler (2001) suggests that 
interprofessional barriers are not overcome by creating 'joint' organisations. 
Mackian (2002: 212) identifies a disjuncture between policy environments and 
structures which theoretically enable positive change, and on-the-ground 
realities of implementation within complex social and cultural settings. The 
remainder of this chapter (2.7 to 2.9) turns to the 'inner context, ' the locally 
variable factors identified by organisational science and sociology, wherein 
other driving forces for collaboration lie. 
Studies of collaborative practice refer to local organisational success factors as 
well as key individuals who bring particular skills and play particular roles in 
the collaborative effort (Friend et al, 1974). According to Poxton, 
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a new policy environment and new organizational arrangements should 
make co-operation and collaboration easier than it has been in the past. 
But real success will depend on the determination and creativity of 
practitioners and managers as it will on Government edict and structural 
change (Poxton, 1999: 3). 
The capacity of individuals to act is partially informed by the local 
organisational context within which they operate. Individuals' determination 
and creativity are insufficient if not supported by a wider commitment to 
developing new ways of working and organising for collaboration (Sullivan & 
Skelcher, 2002). Williams (2002) argues that theoretical and empirical fixations 
with the effectiveness and sustainability of interorganisational structures and 
mechanisms understates and neglects the pivotal contribution of individual 
actors in the collaborative process. 
A host of factors have been identified which are supposed either to inhibit or 
facilitate collaboration, along with advice on how to 'do partnership' (Ling, 
2000). Department of Health guidance (1999) itemises the ingredients deemed 
to be important: recognition and resolution of areas of conflict; agreement on 
a shared approach; development of strong leadership; continuous adaptation 
to reflect lessons learned; and incentives to reward good partnership work. 
Evans & Killoran's (2000) 'categories of enabling factors' lists: shared strategic 
vision; leadership and management; relations and local ownership; 
accountability; organisational readiness and responsiveness to changing 
environment. In their 'partnership assessment tool' Hardy et al (2000) list the 
following components of successful partnerships: recognise and accept the 
need for partnership; develop clarity and realism of purpose; ensure 
commitment and ownership; develop and maintain trust; create clear and 
robust partnership arrangements; monitor, measure and learn. 
Williamson (2001) and Hardy et al (1992) propose categories of factors which 
may inhibit partnerships, such as : structural (geographical boundaries, 
management hierarchies), procedural (lines of accountability, different degrees 
of discretion); professional (values and cultures), financial (budgetary 
constraints), policy (different priorities, overlaps and gaps in services), 
legitimacy, status and concern with organisational self-preservation. 
Powell et al (2001) reviewed the literature that has sought systematically to 
categorise and analyse the factors thought to facilitate and inhibit 
collaboration, and identified a significant degree of consensus between 
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academics and policy makers that key ingredients are shared vision, ownership 
and trust. Another factor widely considered to be important for collaboration is 
the role of the boundary-spanner (Williams, 2002). 
The significance of these factors is by no means established beyond doubt. 
The lack of thorough evaluation of them as facilitators or inhibitors of 
collaboration is highlighted by Dowling et al (2004). This study aims to 
contribute to the evidence for or against their effectiveness. 
2.8 Inner context: individual factors 
This section examines individual factors of the inner context and why they 
might cultivate or hinder a particular instance of collaboration: the role of the 
boundary-spanner and the importance of trust. 
2.8.1 Boundary-spanner 
In the development of informal collaborative relationships built on trust and 
loyalty, the role of individuals with the personal and interpersonal skills to 
engender these is of key importance. The value of having the right person at 
the right time is a consistent message of interagency working (Hardy et al, 
1992). Various terms are used to capture the qualities of 'the right person, ' 
most frequently used is boundary-spanner. 
Williams (2002) identifies several features of the boundary-spanner. The first 
is the reticulist or networker, defined by Friend et al (1974) as an individual 
who cultivates interpersonal relationships, communication, political skills and 
an appreciation of the interdependencies around the structure of problems and 
their potential solutions. Reticulists are "... especially sensitive to and skilled in 
bridging interests, professions and organisations" (Webb, 1991: 231). They 
play a number of key roles, including convenor, capacity-builder and catalyst 
(Himmelman, 1996). They play a crucial role in establishing and facilitating 
collaboration, taking a leadership role and supporting people within the 
collaboration throughout. They are trusted by a variety of partners, and this 
trust is important for reasons explored in the next section. They are able to 
bring networks together and help others identify relevant linkages between 
them and other actors. They identify where linkages are possible and build 
alliances with other committed and powerful individuals in their own and other 
organisations. 
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The networker's social bonding approach to collaboration can result in a 
blurring of professional and personal relationships which confers both 
advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are that it provides 
opportunities to share values and build trust (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). The 
downsides of such informality, on the other hand, lie in the tensions of 
multiple accountabilities, the inherent fragility of personal relationships and 
the potential for exclusivity when in-groups are formed (LGMB, 1997). 
Other facets of the boundary-spanner role are of the 'entrepreneur of power' 
with a strong commitment to change (Degeling, 1995), and the innovator who 
can engender "creativity, lateral thinking and an 'unlearning' of professional 
and organizational conventions and norms" (Williams, 2002: 110). He or she 
has the capacity to develop a more complex notion of social problems and 
broader, more inclusive solutions than the restrictive perspectives of any one 
profession or agency. They see the big picture and are able to identify the 
contributions different partners can make to shared goals. They are also able 
to see the opportunities and constraints offered by different contexts and how 
this might affect the behaviour of people within them. 
Another is the 'cultural broker' (Trevillion, 1991) who invests effort in 
empathising with and respecting others' values and perspectives, and who is 
motivated to understand and value differences of culture, profession, role and 
'gaze' (Williams, 2002). Related to this is the boundary spanner's skill as 
communicator, able to talk the right language whatever situation they are in. 
They empathise well, and this ability to see things from others' perspectives 
makes them good negotiators (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). 
As leaders, boundary spanners are facilitative or catalytic rather than directive, 
asking the right questions and providing a spark for action rather than having 
the right answers and taking charge (Luke, 1998). They are able to influence 
and motivate others over whom they have little control, build trust between 
partners with different interests, perspectives and organisational imperatives, 
keep members committed to partnership while moving the wider agenda 
forward and maintain relationships and communication networks across 
agencies at a variety of levels (Ranade, 1998). 
As is demonstrated In chapter three, the PCG's form and remit implied an array 
of circumstances in which reticulist skills would be of value in facilitating 
collaboration between different professional and occupational groups, within 
the PCG/T governing bodies and staff, across the primary care community and 
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in the wider organisational context. The variety of professions, interests and 
values was huge, as was the scope for misunderstanding and conflict. The 
benefit of boundary spanners' understanding of diverse viewpoints, 
engendering of trust and negotiating of collaborative actions is clear. 
Equally clear is the need for innovator, cultural broker and leadership skills in 
the work of the PCG/T. Professional and managerial cultures in the PCG/T itself 
and within the primary care community are very different. The problem of 
health inequalities is a highly complex and challenging one which traditional 
processes and linear thinking are ill-suited to tackle. As was argued in section 
2.4.1, the NHS alone cannot control all the factors which determine health in 
the broad sense: improving the health of a local population requires input from 
a range of organisations and agencies with very different cultures, perspectives 
and values. These skills are important too in negotiating collaboration between 
the very different values and cultures of the primary care professions and the 
managers involved with the PCG/T in developing primary care. 
Where individuals are key to driving collaboration, the risk of losing energy, 
purpose, commitment and action along with the unplanned departure of those 
individuals is real (Hardy et al, 1996). However, despite this array of critical 
skills for the PCG and the PCT and in any situation where a complex policy 
problem is to be addressed, boundary spanners are often undervalued. In 
Ranade's (1998) research, boundary spanners from statutory organisations 
complained that time taken to perform their "network caretaking" role was 
never acknowledged or supported by their bosses. The value of this work was 
only acknowledged when illness or maternity leave disrupted it. 
2.8.2 Trust 
Trust is a defining feature of policy networks. Ling (2000: 83) distinguishes 
collaborations based on "... very trusting relationships, a sense of generosity of 
spirit, long-term reciprocity and a delight in the success of other partners" 
from those based on "cautious, short-term alliances which will be broken as 
soon as narrow sectional interests are compromised". Trust is widely cited as a 
crucial ingredient to begin and sustain collaboration (Himmelman, 1996). 
Webb asserts that: 
Attitudes of mistrust and suspicion are a primary barrier to co- 
operation between organisations and professional boundaries. 
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Collaborative behaviour is hardly conceivable where trusting attitudes 
are absent (Webb, 1991: 237). 
Trust is important in collaborative relationships because it provides a way of 
coping with risk or uncertainty in relationships with others, which may be high 
between groups of people who have not traditionally worked together (Lane & 
Bachmann, 1998). Yet its definition is contested, and the subject of the 
analysis of a range of disciplines (Williams, 2002). It is "... simultaneously the 
most self-evident and most elusive of the principles which underpin successful 
partnership working" (Hardy et at, 2003: 28). 
Trust has a reputation for fragility, being slow to build and quick to crumble 
(Hudson & Hardy, 2002; Powell & Exworthy, 2002). Alter and Hage (1993) 
understand that the propensity towards trusting relationships is context 
specific and possibly culturally specific. It can be undermined or limited in 
practice, rendering the nature of the collaboration correspondingly limited. 
Identifying the key elements of trusting contexts is important in supporting 
their development and reproducing them in the future (Sullivan & Skelcher, 
2002). 
Williams (2002) identifies similarities between the work of Bachmann (2001) 
who stresses the relationship between trust and control, both mechanisms for 
co-ordinating social interactions, and Hardy et al's (1998) distinction between 
real and simulated trust. Hardy et al attempt to disentangle the notions of trust 
and power, highlighting that "a rhetoric of collaboration can be used to 
promote vested interests through the manipulation and capitulation of weaker 
parties" (1998: 65) 
The literature identifies a number of prerequisites for the establishment and 
maintenance of trust, some of which can be engineered, and some which 
cannot. Mayer et al (1995) identify three antecedents to trust between 
individuals: 
" ability: confidence in the other person's skills, professional expertise 
and knowledge 
" benevolence: a belief that he or she is altruistic and working in the 
public interest 
" and integrity: belief that he or she will adhere to a set of moral 
principles. 
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These will not always be in place at the beginning of a collaborative venture, 
and may need to be developed over time. 
Trust can also operate at an organisational level, where building it is 
dependent on agreement on modes of 'principled conduct' which means 'fair 
dealings' in relation to the distribution of benefits of collaboration, and 
'fairness in procedure' (Cropper et al, 1996). Fair dealings means partners can 
feel confident that their respective contributions will be valued appropriately 
and that the benefits will be shared, and this relates closely to fairness in 
procedure. Cropper argues that collaborations need to agree ways of making 
decisions and working together that are acknowledged to be equitable by all. 
Hudson & Hardy (2002) propose that the development of trust depends on a 
perception that the partners are equal in terms of status, and not necessarily in 
terms of resources. Where partners acknowledge and demonstrate altruism, 
and are prepared to make short-term sacrifices in the interests of the good of 
the partnership, trust is engendered. Hardy et al (2003) suggest that the 
resources which each organisation brings may appear to be unequal, but are 
different and not always readily quantifiable. Trust is fostered where each 
partner's contribution is equally recognised and valued. They claim that where 
trust is built in this way, openness, honesty and the acknowledgement of 
altruism, significant risk-taking is encouraged, and the partnership is likely to 
survive external problems. 
Rummery (2002) argues that it evolves best through the experience of 
(preferably successful) joint working, and is developed and maintained more 
readily where the values and goals of organisations or individuals are similar. 
However, in the situations in which collaboration is arguably most needed, the 
values and goals of professions or organisations may not be similar and there 
may be perceptions of great inequalities of status. Until trust is established, 
organisations may be unwilling to make the short term sacrifices required to 
build it. As section 2.5.4 showed, differences in status, culture, values etc 
between different professional groups, agencies and sectors whose input is 
required to deliver primary care and to improve health, are significant and well 
documented. 
Bond & Le Grand (2003) use game theory to explore trust in the relationship 
between GPs as trustors and the PCG/T as trustees, and the factors which will 
determine whether GPs will infer that PCG/Ts are trustworthy. The first factor 
is the likelihood that the relationship will continue in the long term, as a 
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trustee who is likely to move on has a greater incentive to violate trust. Since 
GPs, as independent contractors, have a financial investment in a 
geographically rooted practice, so are less mobile than a manager, they are 
more likely to be trusted on PCG/T boards than are managers. A second factor 
Bond & Le Grand highlight is the extent to which national priorities are subject 
to change. They argue that a stable policy environment should allow levels of 
perceived trustworthiness to rise, and thus that a manager in a stable policy 
environment should be perceived as more trustworthy than one working in a 
constantly changing one. The repetition of interaction is the third factor they 
identify. Again, as doctors are embedded in the local community they are likely 
to have repeated interactions with other GPs and so have more to lose by 
violating trust. 
2.9 Inner context: organisational factors 
2.9.1 Shared vision and clarity of purpose 
Hudson (2000a) and Rummery (1998) highlight the importance of 
organisations and professionals having common, achievable goals. Common 
ground, in terms of a broad set of shared understandings as well as realistic 
aims and objectives are identified by Hardy et al (2003) as crucial for building 
successful partnerships. These may be in place from the beginning, or may be 
developed and refined over time. They concede that absolute clarity of purpose 
may in fact feel threatening early in the relationships, and some ambiguity may 
help generate commitment. But realism of purpose is essential if enthusiasm is 
to be maintained; it is wise to acknowledge that large scale change will not be 
accomplished quickly or simply, and that 'quick, small wins' can be motivating, 
if they are related to 'big wins'. 
The Audit Commission (1998a) warns that partnerships are likely to fail when 
the goal is of interest to one agency only, the main aim is to achieve cost 
savings and shunt costs or blame, and the agencies or professionals have a 
poor history of joint working and little commitment to change this. Processes 
in which decision-making is devolved are likely to foster goals of interest to 
the organisations/agencies, whereas where collaboration is hierarchically 
imposed, it may not feature in anyone's `vision' except insofar as they are 
incentivised to meet targets. 
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2.9.2 Ownership and accountability 
Powell et al (2001) identify two ideal types of policy ownership: a'dedicated' 
approach where responsibility for developing collaboration rests with a small 
group of key individuals and a'diffuse' approach where responsibility is widely 
devolved through the agencies. They found evidence of some trade-off 
between seniority of leadership and width of ownership, and speculated that 
the attendance of senior managers at meetings, rather than more junior staff 
who would have to seek authority before committing to a decision, would lead 
to reliance on a few individual partnership champions. This, in turn could 
result in low ownership of the collaboration at junior levels. 
Structural and organisational accountability systems may also impede 
partnerships between health and social care. For example, while the NHS is 
funded by national taxation, social services are funded through a combination 
of local and national taxation. Both are accountable upwards to central 
government, but accountability arrangements are more complex for social 
services departments, which are also accountable to local councillors. 
2.10 Summary 
The nature of transformations of the role of the state provides an illuminating 
backdrop to the proliferation of collaboration in the late 20th century. This 
chapter developed an account of shifts in the definition of the state's 
responsibilities - in the cohesion, concentration, fragmentation and co- 
ordination of the mechanisms which ensure they are met - to contextualise the 
introduction of the PCG and PCT. 
From the inception of the NHS until the late 1990s, these changes led from an 
overloaded state, or quasi-hierarchy, to a hollowed-out state or quasi-market- 
driven mode of governance. Throughout these changes in the mode of 
governance in the public sector, GPs had fought to retain their independence. 
They resisted being part of a quasi-hierarchy and, where they had been 
involved in the quasi-marketplace, it had been voluntary. Their history was 
characterised by professional and organisational autonomy, an absence of 
collaboration or collective responsibility, and higher professional status than 
that of nurses or social workers. 
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By 1997 when the Labour government came to power, public services were in a 
state of fragmentation and ambiguous accountability. At the same time, the 
political focus was on "wicked issues" (Rittel and Weber, 1973) such as health 
inequalities, which cut across departmental and service boundaries. This 
fragmentation of the state and the complexity of the social problems it faced 
served to motivate collaboration. New Labour's response to these problems 
was to align themselves rhetorically with a collaborative discourse which 
resonated with networks, introducing PCGs and PCTs as part of a wider 
program of reform. But the rhetoric of collaboration and trust sat oddly 
alongside other elements of New Labour's modernisation agenda such as 
heavy managerial accountability and target-driven prescriptions for action. 
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Chapter three: Organisational forms of PCGs and PCTs 
3.1 Overview 
Chapter two provided an overview of the political, social and historical context 
in which New Labour's health and social policy were formulated. A key element 
of this policy was the introduction of the Primary Care Group (PCG) and Primary 
Care Trust (PCT), new primary care organisations which appeared to embody 
many features of New Labour's third way. 
This chapter explores the organisational forms of the PCG and PCT - as they 
were prescribed by the Department of Health and NHS Executive - in the light 
of this context. 
FORM 
Pj PC 
ý II 
Figure 3: Realist theoretical framework - organisational form 
How did they fit with New Labour's collaborative discourse, and how well were 
they suited to meeting their responsibilities to deliver primary care and 
improve health. Organisational form refers to the structures and processes 
within organisations. Structures are the ordering devices (e. g. governance and 
reporting mechanisms) by which organisations produce collective action. 
Processes consist of people in an organisation using its structures both 
officially and unofficially to instigate others to undertake a joint action (Sullivan 
and Skelcher, 2002). 
This chapter asks whether the structures and processes of PCGs and PCTs were 
well suited to address those aspects of the political and professional context 
which had previously militated against collaboration. In what ways would these 
collaborations reinforce and challenge the existing institutional architecture? 
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For example, would they be designed to rectify the organisational 
fragmentation of the primary care community. Would they aim to bridge the 
cultural and organisational divides between the local primary care community 
and the local authority? Would their organisational forms lend them potential 
to facilitate the development of collaborative relationships built on trust, 
loyalty and reciprosity to address complex social problems? 
Section 3.2 provides a brief overview of the introduction of PCGs in England, 
outlining the general remit and more specific organisational responsibilities of 
the generic PCG. Their responsibilities included developing primary care and 
improving their population's health, both of which required collaboration. I 
provide an account of the structure of the generic PCG, as far as this was 
centrally prescribed, highlighting three radical features of this new structure 
which had implications for collaboration: the dominance of clinicians on its 
board, the inclusion of a social services representative on the board and the 
unified budget. 
Section 3.3 outlines the introduction of PCTs, and the differences between 
their collaborative remits and responsibilities and those of PCGs. I describe the 
structure of the generic PCT, and the ways in which it differed from the PCG 
with respect to their respective collaborative responsibilities. 
In section 3.4 I set out the main centrally prescribed process through which 
PCGs and PCTs were to carry out their collaborative responsibilities to improve 
the health of their local populations: the locally determined Health 
Improvement Plans (HImPs), which were superseded by Health Improvement 
and Modernisation Plans (HIMPs), and Local Development Plans (LDPs). 
Section 3.5 examines the process of clinical governance which provided a 
framework for much of PCGs' and PCTs collaborative work to deliver and 
develop primary care services. 
Finally, section 3.6 draws out from chapters two and three the main features 
of the context and organisational forms of the PCG and PCT relating to 
collaboration. From these it develops an analytic framework which points to 
four further research questions which help to structure the enquiry and 
analysis in this research. 
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3.2 PCG structure 
PCGs were the basic building blocks of the new NHS (Klein, 2001), and their 
existence was mandatory. In 1999,481 of these groups brought together, for 
the first time, all the GPs and other primary care providers in a given 
geographical area, covering average populations of around 100,000 (Bojke et 
al, 2001). Their boundaries were to be coterminous, where possible, with local 
authority boundaries. PCGs managed a budget for their population's share of 
all NHS services, although they were formally still part of their local Health 
Authority. 
They were tasked with: providing and developing primary and community 
services; and with improving the health of the community and reducing 
inequalities (DH, 1998b). These duties depended on collaborative working 
predominantly internally within primary care, and externally with other 
organisations respectively. 
This new model of primary care organisation provided a structure which aimed 
to lend cohesion to the primary care community in a locality, and to bring 
primary care together with other local health and social care organisations. 
This was a key change to the way primary care was organised. This model 
sought to address poor collaborative working arrangements, to encourage 
developments in primary and community services and a public health focus. It 
implied an unprecedented 'corporate imperative' in primary care which 
emphasised collective responsibility for delivering services, spending a budget 
and improving health. New budgetary and clinical governance arrangements 
meant the PCG had to persuade its constituent practitioners to operate with a 
sense of shared responsibility, purpose and identity. 
This section examines how PCGs' organisational structures were designed to 
enable collaboration within primary care and between it and other 
organisations. In particular, it examines how, and to what extent, they 
challenged the status quo in ways which would overcome the contextual 
factors which had inhibited collaboration, as set out in chapter two. The very 
existence of a locality-based primary care organisation was new, and had 
implications for the development of a sense of corporacy within the primary 
care community. 
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Board 
Chief Executive 
Chair, elected by GPs (usually GP) 
At least 4 GPs 
I or 2 nurses 
Social Services Department representative 
Health Authority non-executive 
Lay member 
Subgroups of the board 
Managerial staff 
Administrative staff 
Figure 4: Structure of generic Primary Care Group 
The structure of PCGs (figure 4) was broadly prescribed by the Department of 
Health although some elements could be determined locally within certain 
parameters, for example, the size and precise configuration of the board. The 
guidance for PCG board membership emphasised a leadership role for primary 
care professionals: "The composition of Primary Care Group boards reflects the 
need to ensure that family doctors and community nurses will be in the lead" 
(NHSE, 1998b, para 13). 
PCGs were led by a board composed largely of clinicians, most had a number 
of subgroups/working groups to which projects were delegated, and they 
employed a staff team. The PCG structure partially challenged the status quo in 
terms of the relationships between individuals and professional groups. Two 
radical features of the new model of primary care organisation lay in the PCG 
board configuration. First, doctors and nurses occupied positions on the 
governing board. Second, a social services representative was included on the 
governing board. A third change was the organisations' budgetary 
arrangements. These differed significantly from the arrangements which 
preceded them, and had implications for the collaborative relationships within 
the PCG itself and between the PCG and other organisations. 
3.2.1 Locality-based primary care organisation 
The very existence of a locality-based primary care organisation represented 
an attempt to introduce to primary care a corporate culture that emphasised 
collective responsibility (Wilkin et al, 2001). As chapter two showed (see p27), 
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prior to the 1997 NHS (Primary Care) Act no single body was charged with 
representing the diverse primary care organisations in a locality (Glendinning & 
Rummery, 1997). There was a poor record on joint working with other health 
care agencies and especially with social care. Traditionally, organisations 
within primary care (mainly general practice) tended to operate in isolation 
from others, and did not easily engage as a corporate organisation with a 
sense of shared identity and purpose. The primary care culture of the 1990s 
was characterised by the development of services in isolation and a culture of 
competition brought about by quasi-internal market forces in the health 
system. Individual primary care practitioners had developed working 
relationships with workers in these other agencies but there had been little 
development of more structured partnerships (Audit Commission, 1986 and 
Nocon, 1994, cited in Clarke & Glendinning 2002, p35). 
In contrast, the cultural climate of primary care from 1997 was to be more 
corporate, emphasising collaboration. The PCG provided an organisational 
structure which brought together general practices and other health and social 
care organisations. The budgetary and clinical governance arrangements of 
PCGs and PCTs implied a level of interdependency and common interest within 
primary care communities which was quite different from the relationships 
between practices in the past. Their establishment was an attempt to foster 
local ownership and control (DH, 1997; Wilkin et al, 2001). This was a key 
change to the organisation of primary care aimed at addressing poor 
collaborative working arrangements, to encourage developments in primary 
and community services and a public health focus. They provided, for the first 
time, an organisational structure which represented the primary care 
community in a locality, and brought it together with other health and social 
care organisations. The board was expected to take a corporate view which 
went beyond its membership and was inclusive of "all those who have a 
legitimate interest and wish to be involved in the policy and decision making 
process" (NHSE 1998b para 27). 
Cohesion and a sense of local ownership and control in a primary care 
community would have a number of potential advantages over the 
fragmentation of the previous situation. It would mean a more strategic 
approach to improving the quality of primary care, for example allocating the 
budget and sharing good practice across practices and across professional 
groups, allowing strategic decisions to be made more democratically and on 
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the basis of a truer understanding of the local needs and strengths of the 
primary care community as a whole. It would strengthen and unify the voice of 
primary care in negotiations with other organisations such as acute hospital 
trusts and local authority departments in commissioning or co-ordinating 
services, facilitating a more coherent and persuasive voice and allowing 
economies of scale compared with GP fundholding. A cohesive primary care 
community could better manage the proposed shift in health care delivery 
from secondary to primary care in such a way that it was well executed, 
adequately resourced and that primary care was protected from the shifting of 
responsibilities without sufficient resources. It would also locate responsibility, 
accountability and authority for the activities of primary care. 
3.2.2 Clinicians as board members 
As chapter two set out (see 2.5.4), the relationship between professionals and 
managers in the NHS was often characterised by degrees of antagonism, and 
primary care had remained largely unmanaged. Manager-professional roles 
had been blurred prior to the introduction of PCGs, but mainly in secondary 
care. While the majority of GPs were independent contractors and thus, in a 
sense, managed small businesses, these managerial responsibilities had not 
extended beyond their individual practices. However, the vision for a more 
corporate primary care with shared responsibilities, as set out in the New NHS: 
Modern, Dependable (Secretary of State for Health, 1997), implied a need for 
co-ordination on a greater scale. 
New Labour's approach to this was manifestly 'third way'. It avoided 
introducing a new hierarchical level of management. Instead the organisational 
structure of PCGs was designed to facilitate co-operation between 
professionals themselves by allowing them to elect members to strategic 
positions on the board. NHSE guidance (NHSE, 1998a) stipulated that PCGs 
would be led by a board comprising a chief executive, at least four GPs, one or 
two community nurses, a Health Authority non-executive representative, a 
social services representative and a lay member. Thus, New Labour did not 
attempt to change the behaviour of primary care professionals through 
coercion by managers. Instead, the domination of the board by elected 
clinicians gave professionals strategic influence and meant that the primary 
care community was managed at the locality level by professional managers 
rather than by the traditional lay managers. Of course, clinician board 
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members were not managers in the sense that they managed staff, but they 
were Involved in strategic decisions which would normally have been 
considered the remit of NHS managers. 
The PCG's remit for health improvement and development of primary care 
implied that much of the work it undertook would require collaboration in 
some form - whether within the primary care community or with external 
bodies. The composition of its governing board, predominantly professional 
clinicians, appeared to bring a number of potentially advantageous 
implications for its capacity to foster collaboration. First, the professionals who 
shaped local policy would maintain contact with patients and closeness to local 
issues through their practice. The policies, and any collaboration which 
developed to implement them, would thus be responsive to local need as they 
perceived it. Also, they would have current, first hand experience of the 
promises and pitfalls of operational level working (or not) with other agencies. 
At the same time their effectiveness and credibility as 'managers' would be 
enhanced by maintaining identity with their professional peers in the local 
primary care community who had elected them (Peckham, 2003). 
PCG/T chairs recognised that the support of primary care professionals was 
fundamental to the success of their organisations (Dowling et al, 2003). 
According to the National Tracker Survey (Wilkin et al, 2002) 97% of board 
chairs rated the support of local GPs as important to the success of the PCG/T 
and 90% rated the support of nurses as important. Between 1999/2000 and 
2001/02, the proportion of chairs who thought at least half of their local GPs 
were supportive rose from 40% to 61%. The National Tracker Survey also 
examined PCG/T chairs' perceptions of the extent to which the interests of 
different stakeholder groups were represented In the decision-making 
processes of the boards. This declined slightly from 2000/1 to 2001/02 for 
both GPs and community nurses. 
However, this model brought potential disadvantages as well as advantages. 
Practicing clinicians lacked experience of management and strategic 
collaborative working and an understanding of partner organisations' cultures 
(Williamson, 2001). Critics of the PCG model asserted that such management 
skills are distinct from (and may even be incompatible with) clinical skills; GPs 
and other clinicians should not be expected naturally to bring them. Even NHSE 
guidance conceded this was a potential drawback of the model. 
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Primary Care Group Boards will bring together doctors and nurses who 
may have experience of operating in clinical teams and jointly providing 
care packages but for whom the experience of joint governance will be a 
new task. Similarly PCG Boards will also bring together lay members, 
Social Services managers with doctors and nurses for the first time to 
share the governing responsibilities. (NHSE, 1998b, para 24) 
Both doctors and nurses had places on the PCG board and policy guidance for 
the board membership of the PCG prescribed a joint leadership role for doctors 
and nurses. However, traditionally, medicine has wielded greater power and 
status than nursing and the medical profession has held a clear view of the 
subordinate position of nursing in patient care (Drennan, 2004). Accordingly, 
the British Medical Association was able to exert pressure on the Department 
of Health to secure agreement that GPs would constitute the majority group on 
PCG boards, and be allowed to nominate the chair. So, while on one hand the 
inclusion on a board of both professional groups as members with equal status 
challenged the traditional power differential between them, on the other the 
overall composition undermined this challenge, with GPs (traditionally the most 
dominant professional group in primary care) being entitled to up to seven 
places on the board compared to nurses' one or two places. This was 
consistent with the established powerbase of doctors, which remained a crucial 
factor in the organisational context of change in the NHS. Hudson & Hardy 
(2002) suggest a perception of equality of status is a prerequisite of the trust 
required for collaboration, and this was only partially implied by the 
composition of the PCG board. 
3.2.3 Links with social services 
The second radical structural feature of the PCG model was the inclusion on its 
board of a social services department (SSD) representative. According to the 
White Paper The New NHS Modern, Dependable, PCGs were to "... better 
integrate primary and community health services and work more closely with 
Social Services on both planning and delivery" (Secretary of State for Health, 
1997, para 5.9). Guidance published the following year stated that "... the 
involvement of local government in the governance of PCGs will underpin the 
establishment of new partnership between primary and social care" (NHSE, 
1998a, para 21), and that PCG Boards were to: 
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... bring together lay members, Social Services managers with doctors 
and nurses for the first time to share the governing responsibilities. A 
Primary Care Group will also need to build up its partnership with the 
wider local government authorities. (NHSE, 1998a para 24). 
As Glendinning et al (2001) observe, there is evidence that the history of 
partnerships between health and local authorities is patchy (Nocon, 1994; 
House of Commons Health Committee, 1998). 
The inclusion of an SSD representative on a PCG board was primarily designed 
to underpin collaboration between health and social services. The capacity of 
the representative to do so, however, was doubtful, due in part to differences 
between the organisation of primary care and of social services. 
First, differences in organisational structures made it difficult to match the 
clinicians and the SSD representative in terms of their status and strategic 
level. The background and status of the appropriate board representative was 
not prescribed by the Department of Health (Hudson, 2000), although it was 
initially recommended that they should be managers with operational 
responsibilities: 
The choice of officer will depend on the configuration of Primary Care 
Groups and the local circumstances in which social services are 
organised, but in many cases the officer will be an operational manager. 
(NHSE 1998a, para 21) 
This would be consistent with the practitioner status of the nurse and GP 
representative, and would, possibly, facilitate alignment of front line services 
(Glendinning et al, 2003). However, most social services representatives on 
PCG boards had some senior strategic management responsibilities (National 
Tracker survey, Coleman & Glendinning, 2002). While more senior social 
services managers had greater influence within their organisations, they had 
limited client contact so were not practitioners as were their doctor and nurse 
colleagues on the board. More junior SSD managers, on the other hand, had 
operational responsibilities but less authority and strategic influence within 
their department. 
Hudson et al (1999) argue that the more senior the SSD representation, the 
more likely links will be made to other areas of the local authority. About ten 
percent of PCGs had a Chief Officer or Director as SSD representative, and a 
further third had a representative at assistant director level. In such cases the 
51 
representative might be expected to have some remit to speak on behalf of the 
SSD and make decisions without routine referral back to the local authority. 
Second, the differences between the organisation of health and social care led 
initially to uncertainties on both sides about the ways the other worked. The 
national tracker survey of PCGs and PCTs identified a gulf in understanding 
between social services representatives and primary care practitioners of the 
ways the other functioned and their responsibilities. The PCG seemed to have a 
beneficial influence on this interorganisational understanding as the 
proportion of social services representatives who reported an improvement in 
understanding and in their relationships with the other board members rose 
from 58% in 1999 to 77% in 2000 (Coleman & Glendinning, 2002). 
Despite this, evidence of the influence of the inclusion of the SSD 
representative on collaborative work was not promising and the improvement 
in relationships appeared not to be translated into actual collaborative work. 
GPs' perceptions of the influence of SSD representatives on the activities of 
PCGs and PCTs was low: in 1999 54% of GPs, and in 2000 44% reported that 
SSD representatives had little or no influence. This probably reflected the 
clinical and organisational preoccupations of the boards as they established 
themselves (Wilkin et al, 2002). 
NHSE guidance saw the SSD representative as "acting as a conduit between the 
PCG and Social Services" (NHSE, 1998: para 76). However, Hudson et al (1999: 
141) reported that "... it was not possible to discern any specific processes or 
mechanisms which had been developed to ensure the social services 
representative fed back to and consulted wither a professional or 
organisational constituency. " 
The National Tracker Survey findings suggested that the representation of 
social services departments on PCG boards was not effective in joint planning 
and commissioning of services, which seemed surprising given the policy 
emphasis on reducing delays in discharge and preventing admissions to 
hospital (Glendinning et al, 2003). By 2000/01 two thirds of PCGs had a 
subgroup with specific responsibilities for commissioning hospital and 
community health services, but only two fifths of these had social services 
representation (Glendinning et al, 2001a). Most PCGs did not take 
responsibility for commissioning older people's services from their local Health 
Authorities before they were abolished in 2002, at which point commissioning 
responsibilities were transferred to PCTs (Wilkin et al, 2002). In 2002, PCTs 
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were commissioning a range of services jointly with social services partners, 
such as community-based rehabilitation schemes, joint care management, 
rapid response home care services and joint equipment services (Glendinning 
et al, 2003). 
Nationally, legislation, resources, and guidance was introduced to facilitate 
collaboration between NHS bodies and SSDs. National Service Priorities were 
identified for joint working, particularly in relation to services for older and 
disabled people (DH, 1998c). New joint investment plans required joint 
commissioning of services for older people and people with disabilities or 
mental illness (DH, 2000). Resources were earmarked in the Social Services 
Modernisation Fund to foster partnerships between health and social services 
(DH 1999e) 
This approach to facilitating collaboration between health and social care was 
replaced by the announcement in The NHS Plan (Secretary of State for Health, 
2000) of integrated bodies called care trusts: a level of PCT which would 
provide or commission social care as well as health care. They would be 
imposed where the more facilitative approach to encouraging collaboration 
had been unsuccessful. 
The Health Act Flexibilities brought In in 2000 removed some of the structural 
barriers to closer inter-agency collaboration by allowing NHS organisations 
and local authorities to pool budgets for specific services, delegate 
commissioning responsibilities to a single 'lead' organisation and employ 
health and social services staff within the same organisation. PCTs, but not 
PCGs had appropriate status to sign such partnerships (Glendinning et al, 
2003). 
Not only was the SSD representative expected to act as a conduit between the 
PCG/T and social services, early guidance suggested that he or she would be 
"well placed" to advise on how these wider partnerships can be established and 
"... may be able to act as a gateway to other local government departments 
such as environmental health, housing and education" (NHS Executive, 1998: 
para 77). Hudson (2000) found optimism that locality focus of PCGs allows a 
more detailed and localised analysis of the needs of populations. It was 
envisaged that, depending on the organizational structure and communication 
channels of the employing authority, they may also be able to facilitate 
linkages between the PCG and wider local authority services and functions 
which have an impact on the quality of life of local communities (Glendinning 
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et al, 2001: 414). This would be less likely to occur in two-tier than unitary 
local authorities, where scope for working across boundaries would be limited 
(Hudson, 2000). 
PCGs found other ways of connecting with their local authorities: they could 
co-opt other local authority officers to the board as associate members but 
with no right to vote, or board members can share their vote with a colleague 
from the same organisation or profession. About 10% of PCGs had additional 
representation from Local Authority representation from officers other than 
those in SSD. This is an interesting indication of the extent to which the role of 
local government in the health of a locality is recognised to stretch beyond the 
more traditional intersection with social services (Hudson, 2000). 
As section 2.6.3 showed, a degree of organisational stability is conducive to 
building collaborative relationships. The pace of organisational change and 
absence of geographical coterminosity between PCGs and social services 
departments were a barrier to collaboration between the two organisations 
(Glendinning et al, 2003). Even following the mergers of PCGs, boundary 
differences were cited as a barrier to closer partnerships by a fifth of PCG/Ts 
(Coleman & Glendinning, 2002). Organisational turbulence also took its toll: 
The National Tracker Survey found the turnover of social services 
representatives to be high. In 2002, even of those PCG/Ts who had not 
undergone mergers, 39% had social services representatives who had been in 
post less than one year. The detrimental influence of organisational turbulence 
on organisations' capacity to develop collaborative relationships is well 
documented (Hudson et al, 1999; Coleman & Glendinning, 2002) particularly in 
public health activity (Abbott et at, 2001; Gillam et al, 2001). The disruption of 
relationships which occurs when Individuals move to and from organisations 
may be a factor in inhibiting collaborative capacity. 
3.2.4 Budget 
A third feature of the PCG model which differed significantly from the previous 
organisation of primary care, and which had implications for collaboration, was 
that it was to operate within a "single cash-limited envelope. " This meant that 
a budget for each PCG was calculated to cover their population's share of all 
NHS services including prescribing costs, although responsibility for spending 
this budget was devolved gradually to PCGs by district Health Authorities. 
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This arrangement called for collaboration within primary care communities in a 
locality to negotiate and, if necessary, to discipline each other in their 
collective economic behaviour. As chapter two discussed, the GP fundholding 
(GPFH) scheme introduced by the previous Conservative government had set 
some precedent for this. Under GPFH, budgets had been allocated to Individual 
practices which could choose how to spend them on primary and secondary 
care services. Total purchasing pilots (TPPs) had freedoms to buy a wider range 
of services than GPFH. Under some TPP arrangements groups of practices 
would voluntarily pool their budgets to purchase together as a more powerful 
economic unit than they could as individual practices (Mays et al, 1998),. 
However, mandatory arrangements with collective financial responsibilities at 
the locality level were quite unprecedented in primary care. 
Prescribing costs, which had not previously been included in NHS budgets 
because they were considered to be demand-led and thus uncontrollable, had 
been included in the budgets set for GP fundholders, and fundholding had 
shown that prescribing could be controlled. Klein (2001) argues that PCGs' 
unitary budget was the result of New Labour's wish to universalise locality 
commissioning and the budgetary discipline of fundholding, and exemplified 
their 'what works' approach to policy-making. However, a clear collaborative 
mechanism through which budgets would be allocated between practices was 
absent (Bond & Le Grand, 2003). It was up to each PCG to work out for 
themselves how to regulate and discipline the economic behaviour of their 
constituent practices. 
3.3 PCT structure 
It was intended that all PCGs would become PCTs by 2004 (Secretary of State 
for Health, 2000 para 7.8); this transition was universal by 2002. The 
publication of Shifting the Balance of Power (OH, 2001) brought about the 
transition much earlier than the government's original target. In many cases, 
two or more PCGs merged in the transition to become one PCT. PCTs inherited 
PCGs' three main tasks but were freestanding bodies, Independent from, but 
still accountable to, the local Health Authority. They were larger organisations 
than their predecessors with additional responsibilities, and their structures 
were correspondingly more complex and their processes more formal. They 
could employ their own clinical staff, and had responsibility for a greater 
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devolved budget to purchase secondary care for their population and to 
provide a range of community health services. 
Board 
Chief Executive 
Lay Chair 
6 lay members 
Director of Finance 
Chair of Professional Executive Committee 
1 GP from PEC 
1 nurse from PEC 
Director of Public Health 
Subgroups of the board 
Managerial staff 
Administrative staff 
Professional Executive Committee 
Chief Executive 
Chair, elected by GPs (usually GP) 
Social Services Department representative 
Director of Public Health 
Flexibility in clinician membership - up to 
10 clinicians: GPs, local community nurses 
and other community professionals 
Figure 5: Structure of generic Primary Care Trust 
3.3.1 Integration of primary and community services 
Unlike PCGs, PCTs assumed responsibility for running community hospitals 
and employing staff previously employed by the Community Health Trust. The 
integration of primary and community services in PCTs had two potential 
consequences. First, it presented an opportunity to overcome some of the 
problems of collaboration within primary care which stemmed from 
practitioners' historically working for separate organisations, with different 
systems of accountability and remuneration (Clarke & Rummery, 2002). It was 
anticipated that an advantage of directly employing community nursing staff 
and bringing them into the same organisation as practice-based primary care 
professionals was that patients could be brought more cohesive packages of 
care by making best use of specialist skills across all disciplines. 
Second, having greater resources, a wider remit, and more devolved powers 
and responsibilities than a PCG, the PCT was expected to be more influential 
with other organisations when negotiating resources, action and service 
provision. PCTs' unusual status as both provider and commissioner of services 
was potentially a strength in that it could exert influence over organisations 
from which it commissioned services, while its locality base would allow it to 
be flexible enough to respond to local need. 
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3.3.2 Separation of the board from the professional executive committee 
PCTs had a more complex governance structure than PCGs. PCTs were two- 
tiered, as the functions of the PCT board were separated from the professional 
executive committee (PEC). This, to some degree, represented a capitulation 
from the PCG's blurred professional-manager boundaries, handing back 
responsibility for some elements of governance from clinicians to non- 
clinicians. The PCT board was predominantly lay, and was appointed by the 
NHS Appointments Commission rather than elected. It was primarily 
responsible for effective corporate governance, overseeing the work of the PEC 
and for ensuring probity, public involvement and public accountability. It was 
composed of a lay chair, a chief executive, six lay members and a Director of 
Finance. Additionally, it included a nurse representative, a GP representative 
and the chair of the PEC. 
The PEC led the commissioning of services, oversaw the development and 
delivery of primary and community services and managed the PCT's resources. 
It was accountable to the board for complying with NHS regulations, delivering 
the terms of annual accountability agreements, and maintaining an effective 
strategic base. PCTs were allowed "greater flexibility in the balance of 
professional members to reflect the configuration and range of services 
provided by the trust" (NHSE, 1999: 13). It was largely composed of health 
professionals and an SSD representative, but the dominance of GPs was 
reduced compared to PCGs and it included a broader range of primary care 
professionals such as pharmacists. Like PCG boards, PCT PECs and boards 
were expected to have a number of sub-committees and work groups to which 
much of the day-to-day work of the PCT would be delegated. 
However, there were concerns that, as larger organisations, PCTs might 
become more distant, like Health Authorities, arguably undermining some of 
the strengths of PCGs which lay in being local, small and close to the ground. 
There were concerns, too, that the weight of policy initiatives, structural 
changes and centrally imposed targets might reduce PCTs' scope to care for 
patients (Gillam et al, 2001). PCT chief executives recognised that PCTs were 
becoming more remote from key stakeholders, with a loss of local focus, and 
the challenges of managing organisational change (Dowling et al, 2003). 
The survey results also indicated that the transition from PCG to PCT status led 
to an increased concentration of power and influence In the officers of the 
organisation and a corresponding decline In the Influence of broader 
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professional constituencies. A much lower proportion of PCG board chairs 
(12%) than PCT executive committee chairs (30%) rated local GPs as having 
little or no influence (Smith et al, 2002). 
3.4 Processes for health improvement 
As chapter two showed, the New Labour government professed a commitment 
to health improvement and reducing health inequalities, and this was identified 
as one of PCGs' main tasks, distinguished in the PCG guidance from 
developing primary care and community care and commissioning hospital 
services. 
The term "health improvement" indicates an approach to the health of a 
population rather than to illness (Gillam et al 2001). The responsibility to 
improve the population's health required PCGs and PCTs to adopt this new 
perspective to primary care rather than one which focussed on individuals' 
illness. 
Health improvement includes activities to promote health that occur 
outside the NHS (for example, in workplaces and schools) as well as 
activities that address social, economic, and environmental influences 
on health (for example, housing, transport, employment, and 
community development) (Gillam et al, 2001, p323). 
Hunter (2003) identifies a struggle between 'upstream' strategies for health 
improvement, which are concerned with addressing determinants of health, 
and 'downstream' ones which focus on health care. Within the NHS, 
downstream strategies had dominated. Because of this, health improvement 
was perhaps the most radical of the three remits of PCGs and PCTs, as it 
implied a refocusing of general practice from its traditional perspective which 
was a predominantly reactive medical one (Pratt, 1995, Taylor et al, 1998) to a 
broader public health one. The most commonly accepted definition of public 
health in the UK is that adopted by, for example, the Wanless Report on the 
future of public health: "the science and art of preventing disease, prolonging 
life and promoting health through organised efforts of society" (Wanless, 2002) 
This section describes the centrally prescribed collaborative processes through 
which PCGs' and PCTs' responsibilities to improve the health of their local 
population were to be met: the Health Improvement Plan (HImP), the Health 
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Improvement and Modernisation Programme (HIMP) and the Local Development 
Plan (LDP). 
There was renewed recognition that "connected problems require joined-up 
solutions" (Secretary of State for Health, 1998: para 1.12). General practice had 
a particularly poor record of collaboration (Taylor et al, 1998; Meads et al, 
1999). Primary care organisations were required to combine their efforts with 
other health, social care and wider public health organisations. They were 
charged with building better healthy alliances between GPs and the wider 
health community, for example with local schools, voluntary bodies and across 
local government (NHSE, 1998a). The collaborations which were to grow 
around new PCGs were in part a pragmatic response to the complexity of the 
problems they, with their newly broadened health improvement remit, were 
expected to address, as well as to the increasing complexity of society (Casto, 
1994). 
The National Tracker Survey found that in 2000 two thirds of PCGs and PCTs 
had a subgroup that focussed on health improvement (Wilkin et al, 2000). The 
duty of PCGs to improve the health of their populations raised questions about 
the appropriate roles of the public health workforce, of primary care staff and 
of other local workers. The Chief Medical Officer's (2001) report recognised 
the public health role of primary care staff, local authority staff and people in 
the wider community (Peckham, 2003). Popay (2001), however, warned that 
there was little if any evidence from previous research or practice that primary 
care organisations or medical practitioners had the capacity or the inclination 
to do this. Primary care may have a role to play in reducing Inequalities in 
access to primary care and working to diminish the 'inverse care law' which 
states that that the availability of good medical care tends to vary inversely 
with the need of the population served (Tudor-Hart, 1988). Traditional health 
promotion techniques focussed on the behaviour of Individuals while 
neglecting other factors in the environment (Butterfoss, 1993). But to the 
extent that the causes of health inequalities are related also to wider 
socioeconomic or environmental factors, there was a lack of clarity about the 
role that primary care could play in tackling them (Peckham, 2003). 
3.4.1 Health Improvement Plan 
The main process through which PCGs were to Improve the health of their 
community was the Health Improvement Programme (HImP). HImPs were the 
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local plan of action to improve health and modernise services which brought 
together the local NHS with Local Authorities and others including the 
voluntary sector to set the strategic framework for improving health and 
tackling inequalities. The White Paper, Saving Lives: our healthier nation set 
out the role PCGs were required to play in the development of local health 
improvement programmes: "they will forge powerful local partnerships with 
local bodies ... to deliver shared health goals. They will shape the health 
improvement programme and draw up their own plans of implementing it and 
for hitting the targets in it" (Secretary of State for Health, 1999: 122). 
The perspectives and expertise of PCGs, hospital clinicians and the local 
community and its leaders were to influence the strategy (NHSE, 1998c, pars 
1). HImPs' long term objectives needed to be protected from a crisis 
management approach to budget planning and service demands (Hudson, 
1999b). They were to set out locally defined objectives and include measurable 
targets to improve the health of everyone, to improve the health of the worst 
off in society and close the health gap. 
The Health Development Agency (HDA) conducted a national review of HImPs 
and concluded that their effectiveness was limited by the timescale to which 
they had to be produced, and the constraints this placed on a meaningful 
consultation and involvement process during its production (Gillam & Florin, 
2002). Hunter (2003) reviewed the various analyses of the impact of HImPs 
which found great variety in various of their characteristics, including the 
degree of involvement of partner agencies, breadth of the agenda and degree 
of partnership with the local authority in relation to wider determinants of 
health. Hunter & Killoran (2004) found HImPs were not seen as central to the 
work of PCG/Ts, who found them sometimes abstract and insufficiently action- 
oriented. Tensions between clinical and environmental or social priorities 
hindered their progress. Their emphasis was, in many cases, still found to be 
medically dominated and hijacked by the acute sector (Hunter, 2003) and 
ineffective in tackling "upstream" public health issues such as housing and 
transport (HDA, 2000). Other impediments to their achievements were that 
resources for HImPs were not prioritised. Further, they had insufficient time to 
mature before they were superseded by Health Improvement and 
Modernisation Plans (HIMPs), which meant that ownership of the HImP process, 
and clarity concerning responsibility for Its Implementation were not 
consolidated (Hunter et at, 2000). 
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3.4.2 Health Improvement and Modernisation Programme and Local 
Development Plan 
When PCTs were established and local Health Authorities abolished, public 
health functions were integrated into PCTs, and Strategic Health Authorities 
adopted a performance management and review role (DH 2001,2002). As 
PCTs replaced PCGs, HIMPs replaced HImPs. HIMPs were to set the strategic 
framework for improving health in a locality, and to set out high level 
objectives, measurable targets for Improvement, and outcomes. From April 
2002, PCTs had lead responsibility for HIMPs. Whereas priorites for the HImP 
had been established locally, HIMP priorities were those set out In the national 
NHS Plan, and PCTs were explicitly performance managed against them. 
NHS Plan 
The NHS Plan (Secretary of State for Health, 2000) became the driving force 
behind most of the NHS's work. It acknowledged that the NHS's inability to 
forge collaborative relationships with local authorities, business and 
community organisations had inhibited its efforts to tackle health inequalities. 
It prescribed a set of priority areas of work, and targets which were largely 
medical and quantifiable, and was structured around the following priority 
areas: 
" access 
" cancer 
" capital and capacity 
" coronary heart disease 
" children 
" mental health 
" quality 
" older people 
" workforce planning 
" Information 
" prevention of inequality and disability 
A plethora of performance indicators was identified by the Department of 
Health to underpin the performance improvement agenda outlined in chapter 
six of the NHS Plan (Secretary of State for Health, 2000). The key performance 
indicators for health improvement against which the PCT was to be judged 
were predominantly medical: death rate from circulatory diseases, sexual 
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health as measured by the diagnosis rate of gonorrhoea, four week smoking 
quitters, conceptions below 18, cervical cancer screening, childhood 
immunisations and flu vaccinations. 
The centre was to play a more active role in shaping performance at the 
periphery. Evidence-based National Service Frameworks were produced as 
templates for the organisation of services. National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) would promote, bring together and diffuse evidence about 
good practice. The Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) would monitor 
progress towards achieving the Government's programme for quality. (Klein, 
2001). "Star ratings" were awarded to trusts according to how well they 
performed against performance indicators set by the Commission for Health 
Improvement. The proliferation of central targets contained in the NHS Plan 
and NSF publications increased the tension between national and local 
priorities and threatened to swamp the local objectives and priorities identified 
in the first round of the HImPs (Hunter, 2003). 
However, HIMPs themselves were shortlived, and were abruptly subsumed by 
Local Development Plans (LDPs). Reducing health inequalities was one of the 
stated priorities of LDPs, but in the guidance which accompanied them (DH, 
2002) little was made of the distinction between health and health care, 
whereas they were clearly intended to deliver on the goals and targets of the 
NHS Plan (Secretary of State for Health, 2000). While HImPs and HIMPs were 
clearly dependent on collaboration between PCG/Ts and the range of local 
authority departments, LDPs made no mention of local authority departments 
other than social services. Neither did they require sign-up from voluntary 
sector partners. Once again, the emphasis was on collaboration with parts of 
local councils which had direct contributions to make to the problems 
surrounding access and discharge to hospitals and bed-blocking, and away 
from the broader public health roles of their other local authority departments. 
In 2001 Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) were announced. These would be 
cross-agency, umbrella partnerships with a broad remit to improve the quality 
of life of local communities (DETR, 2001), and would be led, but not owned, by 
local authorities (Glendinning et al, 2003). 
Overall, the move from PCG to PCT status shifted the organisations' focus from 
responding to local needs and demands to national targets, priorities and 
central government directives (Abbot et at, 2001; Heller, 2002). PCTs struggled 
to balance the demanding and specific demands of meeting targets to reduce 
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waiting times, with broader, less performance-managed requirements to break 
cycles of inequality (Evans, 2004). 
3.5 Processes for delivery and development of primary care 
This section describes the centrally prescribed collaborative processes through 
which PCGs' and PCTs' responsibilities to develop and deliver primary care 
were to be met. Clinical governance was the element of New Labour's 
modernisation agenda through which PCGs and PCTs were expected to assure 
the quality of primary care services. Through the clinical governance system 
"NHS organisations are accountable for continuously improving the quality of 
their services, safeguarding high standards by creating an environment in 
which excellence in clinical care will flourish" (DH, 1998b: 33). It was to 
address inconsistencies and unacceptable variations in the quality of practice, 
to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of care and ensure the 
accountability of professionals (Campbell & Roland, 2003). 
The majority of GPs were independent contractors with no line management 
system, whose largest unit of operation was their practice. Other than where 
doctors' fitness to practice was called into question, GPs' day-to-day practice 
had not been closely regulated by any external body, and considerable 
variations in provision existed within individual localities. 
just as the budgetary arrangements meant PCGs had to contain the cost of 
health care by constraining the spending of their constituent practitioners, 
through clinical governance they took on major responsibility to constrain 
clinical behaviour in the primary care sector and had to persuade their 
previously independent and relatively unregulated constituent practitioners to 
operate in a corporate way with a sense of shared purpose and responsibility 
within shared guidelines. 
PCGs had to learn to apply managerial skills beyond the board to areas which 
had traditionally been devoid of management, to create a sense of a single 
organisation working towards specific goals, and to co-ordinate disparate 
groups into a coherent organisation. The arrangements assumed that clinician 
board members would be willing and able to discipline their fellow 
practitioners, who might well be reluctant conscripts rather than volunteers in 
this new enterprise (Klein, 2001). In the case of GPs in particular, this was 
remarkable given their independent contractor status and their opposition as a 
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professional group to any threats to their independence and the historical 
absence of co-operation between practices. 
Further, there was little by way of guidance or legislation to incentivise 
practices to adapt to the corporate plans of the PCG, or sanction those who did 
not (Klein, 2001). If individual GP practices put the budgetary viability of the 
PCG at risk (by overspending on prescribing or referring too many patients to 
hospital) their colleagues had limited statutory means to bring them Into line. 
Conversely, individual GPs had few incentives to adapt their practices to the 
corporate plans of the PCG. The relationship between GPs and PCG/Ts was not 
hierarchical: the PCG and PCT held budgets for prescribing and some general 
practice infrastructure, but the majority of GPs continued to hold a contract 
with the Department of Health, not with the PCG or PCT. A few GPs held 
Personal Medical Services (PMS) contracts with the PCG/T which meant they 
were salaried employees of the PCG/T, but this was not a powerful mechanism 
for managing clinical quality (Sibbald et al, 2001). This meant PCGs' and PCTs' 
main influence over GPs was through distributing knowledge and information 
and monitoring clinical practice through local professional networks (Sheaff et 
al, 2004). 
The continuing independent contractor status of most GPs presented 
challenges to PCGs in the regulation of practices' spending and practices. 
Smith et al (2002) found that PCG/Ts had acute difficulty reaching "corporacy" 
or a common view. Bond & Le Grand (2003) suggest we should not find this 
surprising, given that many primary care actors, particularly GPs, are not used 
to participating in corporate decision-making. They argue that the more 
complex a decision is, the more likely that inconsistent and incoherent 
collective preferences will result. These difficulties were likely to be real, given 
the complexity of delivering health care. 
Initially, clinical governance was defined In terms which allowed considerable 
local interpretation. PCGs could identify local priorities and targets. Over time, 
however, standards were Increasingly set at national level by national service 
frameworks (NSFs) and the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE). 
NSFs were documents which set minimum standards for delivery and 
monitoring in particular areas of care and were published for mental health 
(DH, 1999), coronary heart disease (DH, 2000) and diabetes (DH, 2002). NICE 
published evidence-based appraisals of clinical Interventions and guidelines 
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for particular conditions such as asthma, coronary heart disease and 
depression (Campbell & Roland, 2003). 
PCGs and PCTs were to be the guardians of clinical governance in their locality, 
and NHS Executive (NHSE) guidance stipulated that the PCG must ensure 
... clear 
lines of responsibility and accountability for the quality of clinical 
care, a comprehensive programme of quality improvement systems, 
education and training plans, clear policies aimed at managing risk and 
integrated procedures for all professional groups to identify and remedy 
poor performance (NHSE, June 1999). 
This challenged traditional and cherished medical values of autonomy and 
self-regulation. 
PCGs were expected to implement clinical governance in two ways: first, by 
improving care provided by NHS organisations and clinicians by universalising 
often fragmented approaches such as clinical guidelines, education and 
training and, second, by monitoring care to ensure it met minimum standards 
and identifying those who do not meet these standards. PCGs were required to 
set out their plans for primary care development annually, in the form of their 
Primary Care Investment Plans. 
Thus the primary care community, through their elected peers on the 
governing board, took on collective responsibility for the quality of local 
primary care services (Dowling et al, 2003). The PCG was accountable for the 
clinical governance of peers. Approaches to doing so included education and 
training, the use of incentive schemes, clinical guidelines and audit. The 
National Tracker Survey (Wilkin et al, 2000) found that, in general, PCGs 
appeared to promote developmental, supportive and educational approaches 
to clinical governance. Despite expressing a preference for educational 
approaches, clinical governance leads admitted that formal disciplinary 
procedures for dealing with underperforming clinicians were necessary 
(Campbell et al, 2002). In 2000/1 the national tracker survey found that only 
7% of PCG/Ts were advocating formal disciplinary procedures, whereas by the 
following year this figure was up to 20% (Campbell & Roland, 2003). 
Clinical governance Implied a greater consistency In, and closer regulation of, 
working practices and service delivery. Before PCGs were established, GPs 
worked largely independently of one another and their practice was self- 
regulated. Clinical performance was assessed by other clinicians in a cursory 
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way with the results largely hidden from external scrutiny (Peckham & 
Exworthy 2003). As Campbell & Roland (2003) reflect, implementing clinical 
governance again meant that PCGs had to develop a more corporate culture in 
which quality improvement became a shared enterprise. They felt there was 
cause for optimism, observing substantial progress in the development of 
shared learning environments, sharing data and conducting cross-practice 
audits. However, they also found that clinical governance remained an 
ambiguous concept five years after its introduction, and that this had 
advantages and disadvantages. Its imprecise nature allowed flexibility which 
encouraged local ownership and locally tailored initiatives. However, over time 
the increasing specification, standardisation and centralisation of control 
(Harrison, 2002; LeGrand, 2002) may have meant that PCG/Ts came to focus 
on national priorities at the expense of local ones. The centralising approach 
was felt by clinical governance leads and managers to be at odds with the 
predominantly educational approaches to quality improvement being 
advocated by PCG/Ts. Also, a tension was identified between enabling 
practitioners and organisations to improve the quality of care within a 
supportive, no-blame environment while simultaneously monitoring care to 
ensure that it meets minimum standards (Campbell & Roland, 2003). 
The increased scale and altered structure of the PCT had implications for the 
relationships of trust and sense of corporate identity on which it relied in order 
to implement the clinical governance agenda, and to develop a vision for the 
future delivery of primary care which reflected the views of its constituents. As 
much larger, more bureaucratic organisations, in which the influence of elected 
doctors and nurses was more ambiguous, it was possible that PCTs would 
encounter challenges to developing the shared vision that PCGs had nurtured. 
3.6 Research questions and analytic framework 
This section first recaps on the definition of collaboration, the main research 
questions (RQ1 and RQ2) and the realist theoretical framework (figure 1) set 
out in chapter one. It then summarises chapters two and three, drawing out 
the main factors relating to the first and second elements of the theoretical 
framework: the context in which PCGs and PCTs were introduced and their 
organisational forms. From these, it develops an analytical framework (figure 
6) from which are derived three further research questions (RQ3 to RQ5). This 
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section then operationalises collaboration In ways which are appropriate to the 
context and objectives of the PCG and PCT and sets out the criteria by which 
they can be judged to be, or not to be, effective collaborative mechanisms. 
3.6.1 Recap: definition, main research questions and realist theoretical 
framework 
Chapter one defined collaboration as: 
a relationship in which two or more individuals or groups (which may be 
professional, occupational or organisational) adjust their behaviour in 
some way to pursue common goals, interests or dependencies. 
This definition is sufficiently broad to accommodate the relationships required 
to meet PCGs' and PCTs' different remits and objectives. It frames the two 
main research questions for this study: 
RQ1. How far did Oxford City PCG and PCT act as collaborative mechanisms 
to develop and deliver primary care and to improve the health of its 
population? 
RQ2. Which factors enabled collaboration to come about, and which factors 
inhibited collaboration? 
Chapter one also identified three interdependent elements of the examination 
of a collaborative mechanism which, together, form the theoretical framework 
(figure 1) which underpins this study. 
The first element is the context in which a collaborative mechanism functions, 
in particular the driving forces which act for and against collaboration. Chapter 
two examined the social and political context in which PCGs and PCTs were 
introduced and identified the main features of the context which drove New 
Labour's emphasis on collaboration. This analysis of the context highlighted 
two broad shifts in the ethos and culture by which PCGs and PCTs would be 
able to meet their core responsibilities to improve the health of their 
population and to develop and deliver primary care services. These shifts 
involved the promotion of a collaborative, upstream, public health-oriented 
approach to health improvement, and to nurture a sense of corporacy within 
the primary care community. 
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The second is the form of the collaborative mechanism. This chapter has 
examined the structures and processes of the generic PCG and PCT and 
identified the key features relevant to its collaborative capacity. 
The third element is the mechanism's collaborative capacity and practice. 
Chapters five, six and seven explore the implications of the context and the 
generic PCG and PCT form on their capacity for and practice of collaboration 
through the case studies of one PCG and PCT. 
3.6.2 Analytical framework and further research questions 
To focus these case studies, this section draws out the key features of the 
context and organisational form identified in chapters two and three to 
develop an analytic framework. On the basis of this framework it specifies 
three subsidiary research questions about collaborative capacity and practice 
which must be answered in order to address the main research questions. 
Context 
Chapter two identified four main driving forces for collaboration in the context 
into which PCGs and PCTs were introduced. The New Labour government was 
elected in 1997 in a political and historical context which had emerged from 
periods of quasi-hierarchy followed by quasi-market modes of governance. 
These were both judged to have been unsuccessful as mechanisms to co- 
ordinate the state's responsibilities, and left in their wake a number of 
complex social problems and fragmentation on various fronts: within 
primary care, between primary care and social care organisations, and between 
the many organisations and sectors (such as local authority departments and 
voluntary organisations) whose work had a bearing on health in the broadest 
sense and whose input was necessary to tackle complex social problems. In 
response to these challenges, New Labour distanced itself from hierarchical 
and network modes of governance by adopting a `third way' which placed 
great emphasis on collaboration. This resonated with a network mode of 
governance, centrally articulated by relationships built on trust, loyalty and 
reciprocity. 
It also identified six forces in the context which militated against collaboration. 
1. As a professional group, GPs cherished their autonomy, having fought 
to retain a high degree of self-regulation and their independent 
contractor status. 
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2. GPs had little history of collaboration. 
3. GPs' professional status and power were higher than those of other 
professional groups such as nurses and social workers. 
4. There was a history of animosity between doctors and health service 
management. 
5. Considerable organisational and cultural barriers existed between 
primary care and other statutory and voluntary sector bodies. 
6. Further, general practice traditionally adopted a predominantly 
individualistic, medically-oriented perspective on health care which did 
not engage with the wider determinants of health and was ill-suited to 
addressing the causes of complex health and social problems. 
Organisational form 
Chapter three identified five features of PCGs' and PCTs' organisational 
structures and processes which were expected to equip them to facilitate, 
develop and promote collaboration, and to counteract the driving forces 
against collaboration. 
1. The PCG and PCT were locality-wide primary care bodies. For the first 
time, a single organisational structure brought together general 
practices and other health and social care organisations in a locality. 
2. Practising clinicians influenced strategy. GPs elected by their peers 
held the majority of places on the PCG's board and the PCT's PEC. 
Community nurses, also elected by peers, occupied a smaller numer of 
places. Along with non-clinical managers within the organisation, these 
practitioners were expected to bring first hand knowledge of local 
systems and need, and to be acceptable and credible to their peers. 
3. The PCG's board and the PCT's PEC governing bodies provided a link to 
the local SSD - and potentially to the wider local authority - by 
including an SSD manager. 
4. PCGs and PCTs were expected to devise and implement budgetary and 
clinical governance processes across the locality's primary care 
community. 
5. PCGs and PCTs were charged with the local implementation of health 
improvement frameworks and processes such as the HImP and HIMP, 
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in collaboration with other local organisations. These processes to 
improve the health of the local population involved 'bottom-up' 
collaboration with a range of local organisations in identifying and 
addressing health inequalities. 
Figure 6 shows the analytical framework which summarises the contextual 
forces acting on PCGs and PCTs, for and against collaboration. It also identifies 
the features of the organisations themselves which were expected to facilitate 
collaborative relationships. The parts shown in green pertain to the 
development and delivery of primary care, and the parts in yellow to the 
improvement of their population's health. On the basis of this, three further 
research questions are identified, which relate the third element of the realist 
theoretical framework: collaborative capacity and practice. These frame the 
analysis in chapters five, six and seven. 
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Figure 6: Analytical framework 
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Research questions 
The analysis of context and organisational form represented in figure 6 (above) 
lead to the identification of the following more specific research questions. 
RQ3 How far did the following features of PCGs' and PCTs' organisational 
forms allow them to bring about a collaborative approach to improving 
the health of their population? 
" Their explicit health improvement remit 
" Their locality-wide base 
" the election of practising clinicians to their governing bodies 
" the inclusion of a local authority social services department (SSD) 
representative on their governing bodies. 
RQ4. How far did the following features of PCGs' and PCTs' organisational 
forms equip them to develop a sense of corporacy and collaboration 
within the primary care community to develop and deliver primary care? 
" their locality-wide base 
" the election of practising clinicians to their governing bodies 
" Their new budgetary and clinical governance responsibilities 
" the inclusion of a local authority social services department (SSD) 
representative on their governing bodies. 
RQ5: Did the PCG and PCT's collaborative capacity manifest in collaborative 
processes and outcomes between primary care and other organisations 
at operational levels to promote independent living in older people and 
to tackle substance misuse? 
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Chapter four: Methods and methodology 
Assessing the effectiveness of policy changes in developing collaborative 
primary care services and collaborative approaches to health improvement 
poses something of a methodological challenge. Theoretical underpinnings are 
contested. As much of the argument relies on the reported opinion and 
perceptions of participants, the subjective, situated nature of the data needs 
acknowledgement. Collaboration is a complex and nebulous concept which 
cannot be straightforwardly quantified. 
I have taken a realist approach, influenced by critical realism, which is 
elaborated in this chapter. In making decisions about design and methods in 
the present research it was necessary to be iterative and mindful of the 
particular conceptual, practical and ethical challenges to gathering valid and 
high-quality data about collaboration in the context of an unfolding policy 
initiative. 
This chapter describes how decisions were reached about the design, planning 
and execution of the study and gives an account of the procedures by which 
the data were collected and analysed. It demonstrates how these choices were 
informed by a realist research paradigm and its theoretical framework, and 
how consideration was given to issues of rigour, sensitivity and validity. 
First this chapter elaborates a realist research paradigm (section 4.1), which 
has at its core a sensitivity to the contextual factors In a study. Next, In 
section 4.2 the research design, a longitudinal nested case study, is described 
and I explain why I considered this to be the most appropriate approach to the 
research questions. I show how the research design was used and address Its 
limitations. In section 4.3 I give an account of the methodological approach, 
which was to employ multiple qualitative data collection methods: 
predominantly In-depth, semi-structured interviews conducted at two time 
points, supported by ongoing observation of meetings and workshops, and 
analysis of official documents. Next, section 4.4 details the strengths of the 
In-depth semi-structured case-study method for this study: that It offers 
structure with flexibility and complexity. I outline how participants were 
selected and recruited. The strengths and limitations of the observational and 
documentary analysis methods are presented in sections 4.5 and 4.6 
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respectively. The ethical issues relevant to the research - In particular informed 
consent and assurances of anonymity and confidentiality - are examined In 
section 4.7, along with reflections on the challenges of obtaining research 
ethics approval for the study. Section 4.8 accounts for the data analysis 
processes employed and details the approach to familiarisation, coding, 
thematic charting, and mapping and interpretation. 
4.1 The realist research paradigm 
The nature of research conducted in the social sciences, the sorts of questions 
that are asked and the answers that are ultimately offered, depend essentially 
on the philosophical approach adopted by the researcher. In the past the 
dominant approach to epidemiological and statistical research into health 
policy has been positivist and depended on measurements of such things as 
mortality and morbidity rates, admission, throughput and provision rates 
(Pollitt et al, 1990). However, the problems Inherent in positivist approaches to 
researching contemporary policy are overwhelming. A positivist approach and 
the quantitative methods implied are not appropriate to answer the present 
research questions for several reasons. Impediments to using traditional 
positivist designs such as randomised controlled trials (RCTs) and quasi- 
experiments to research an ambiguous and conceptually elusive phenomenon 
such as collaboration include the impossibility of holding variables constant, 
the complex nature of changes to the health system, and the difficulties of 
Isolating and attributing changes to one policy or Intervention. 
Methodologically, positivist approaches' reliance on quantitative empirical data 
make them more suitable for testing tightly defined and operationalised 
hypotheses, than for exploring the broader questions posed In this research. 
This study adopts a realist research paradigm. The epistemological 
underpinnings of a realist view of the social world differ from those of the 
positivist. The quite subtle disparity in their understandings of the nature of 
causation have implications for research design, data collection and analysis. 
Positivism and realism share some amount of philosophical common ground, 
realism often being characterised (mistakenly) as a middle position somewhere 
between two polar extremes of positivism and constructivism. Constructivism 
represents a view of social enquiry based on a belief that an objective, 
observable, empirical reality is neither desirable nor possible as the substance 
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of social research, whose epistemology asserts that all that can be known 
about the world is human interpretation of it, and whose emphasis Is often on 
deepening research participants' reflection upon and understanding of their 
own social world and experience rather than on uncovering truths or external 
regularities that could then be extrapolated to better understand other realities 
or situations. Both positivism and realism adhere to the notion that the 
assumptions and methods of natural science can and should be applied to 
social science (Smith, 1998). Both take as their objective to identify regularities 
according to which the social world operates, and seek to explain and predict 
change within it. Both positions agree that there exists an external, objective 
reality and hold to a deterministic epistemology. This, however, is where their 
similarities end, and a brief examination of the epistemological and ontological 
differences between the two reveals that realism is not merely a 'moderate' 
version of positivism or a compromise between it and constructivism, but a 
radical reassessment of the possibilities of social scientific enquiry. 
Positivism recognises just one level of reality, the empirical level, at which the 
external world is perceived by us through our senses. Scientific enquiry, then, 
is based only on what is observable and the premise that there is one single 
objective truth. The realist, in contrast, acknowledges three levels of reality 
(Smith, 1998); as well as the empirical, there is the actual where what is 
observed by the senses is interpreted and given meaning in terms of cognitive 
structures according to language, culture and discourse. The third level can be 
termed the real at which it is recognised that objects of study in the social 
world are not simply passive or inert, but consist of what Pawson and Tilley 
(1997) refer to as 'powers', 'potentialities' and 'liabilities'; they have qualities 
and properties that are intrinsic to them, independent of observation or 
whether they are accounted for by mental constructs. 
The levels of reality that each position accounts for informs their respective 
descriptions of the nature of causation, which Is captured in the distinction 
drawn by Harre (1972) between successionist and generative logic. A 
positivist's account of causality accords with the successionist version. 
Causation is external to the object, which changes In a passive way as a result 
of some force which is intangible and can be understood only in terms of 
observable outcomes. Constant conjunction, or "empirical regularity, " Is both 
necessary and sufficient for a causal mechanism to be inferred. 
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In contrast, a realist's three-layered understanding of reality allows a 
generative version of causation. Causation is both a force external to the 
object, but also a result of its intrinsic potentialities, powers and liabilities, 
which can be fired, or not, by external factors. For example, a lettuce seed has 
various physical empirical properties such as weight, colour and DNA patterns, 
and can undergo changes of form that can be measured empirically. It Is also 
associated with "meanings" for gardeners and seed retailers such as perhaps 
cultivation, the miracle of mother nature, a time of year or units of potential 
profit which must be packaged and sold. However, beyond this, and 
irrespective of whether its properties are observed and measured, or whether it 
is held amongst anyone's cognitive constructs, the seed has the "potentiality" 
to germinate and grow into a lettuce, given the right circumstances. Whether 
or not these potentialities are realised (whether or not the seed becomes 
lettuce) depends on the specific conditions of soil, moisture, temperature, light 
levels etc. Understanding causation generatively in terms of transformations of 
potentialities allows an appreciation of the importance of context to the causal 
relation between two events, and thus also allows room for meaningful 
investigation of occasions on which the two events do not concur. 
The realist approach adopted for this study (Bhaskar, 1978) Incorporates 
respect for scientific enquiry without being tied to a rigid and uncompromising 
experimental paradigm. Policy happens not In a vacuum, but in complex, 
sensitive and political contexts where experiences, precedents and 
expectations form the background (Hill, 1997). Whereas the positivist's quasi- 
experimental design would attempt closure to minimise the interference of 
extraneous variables, a realist approach to evaluation Is sensitive to the 
contingency of outcomes on the context In which a mechanism operates. It 
embraces contextual variables as precisely the factors wherein the success or 
failure of a policy may lie. Realism holds that science only makes sense In an 
open setting, In the real world where policies and strategies are free to Interact 
with the social, political, cultural, physical and economic dimensions of their 
environment In fullness and complexity. In attempting to iron out, or at least 
minimise, the contextual differences that may blur the picture of whether or 
not a policy works, the positivist's experimental design may remove or occlude 
factors that are crucial to its success. The realist Is committed to building a 
design around a different sort of research question: one that asks not just 
whether A causes B, but why, how and in what contexts A Is followed by B. 
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The approach I take In this research Is Influenced by the critical tradition within 
social science which Is characterised by an explicit orientation towards a 
'knowledge interest' in human emancipation rather than Improving 
performance (Habermas, 1984). It uses critical realism as a method of studying 
social change by committing not only to analysing the evidence of 
organisational change and collaboration, but also the relationships between 
organisational structures and processes and their social conditions, "both the 
immediate conditions of their social context and the more remote conditions 
of institutional and social structures. " (Fairclough, 1989, p 26). It aims to 
interrogate policy and understand the workings of society more generally. 
4.2 Design: longitudinal nested case study 
The first and broadest methodological question is about the overall design. 
How can collaboration be measured in the field? What should be measured, 
and how? In order to assess the impact of the PCG or PCT, the organisation 
must first be distinguished from the context in which it operates and then the 
effects of concurrent policy and organisational changes must be distinguished 
from the impacts of the organisation. Barnes et al (1997) make the point that 
objectives in public policy can be diffuse, hard to measure and subject to 
change during the life of a project. With this in mind, a longitudinal case study 
design was adopted for this research. 
A case study design is recognised as a useful strategy for exploring 
contemporary phenomena where the Issues hold complexity. According to Yin 
(2003: 4) it is "the method of choice when the phenomenon under study Is not 
readily distinguishable from its context. " Keen and Packwood (2000: 51) see 
case studies as "valuable where policy change Is occurring in messy real world 
settings and it is Important to understand why such interventions succeed or 
fail. " All of these conditions hold for this study of collaboration In relation to a 
PCG and PCT: the situation was highly complex; there were difficult and 
evolving boundary Issues; and policy change was occurring In a messy, real- 
world situation. 
The unit of analysis of a case study can be an organisation, a department 
within an organisation, an event or activity (such as decision-making) or even 
an individual person (Bryman, 1989) with the focus on its circumstances, 
dynamics and complexities (Bowling, 2002). This research was originally 
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conceived as a study of a PCG, as the transition from PCGs to PCTs was 
expected to come about more slowly than it in fact did. In Oxford it took place 
eighteen months into the study, before the fieldwork was complete so, 
although not a feature of the original study design, this case study was 
effectively based on two cases: a PCG and a PCT, and the transitional state 
between them. 
Nested within these evolving cases were parallel, longitudinal case studies of 
progress on two of the PCG's five Health Improvement Plan (HImP) priorities. 
The HImP priorities studied were: 1) tackling substance misuse, and 2) 
promoting independent living in older people. These HImP priorities were 
selected because they exemplified contrasting issues in terms of client group, 
aims and outcomes of the interventions, and Illustrated collaboration between 
different sets of organisations. A separate study focussing exclusively on HImP 
priorities is outside the scope of this project, but would be a rewarding 
exercise. 
The case study method is not without limitations. The main criticisms levelled 
at a case study approach are connected to a perceived lack of general isabiIity. 
General isabiIity is normally achieved in quantitative research by statistical 
sampling procedures which allow confidence in the representativeness of the 
sample and allow to draw inferences to be drawn about the whole population 
(Silverman, 2001). There is a view that results of case study research using 
only one or two, possibly atypical, cases cannot be generalised to wider 
populations, and are therefore of no value. 
Some researchers claim that generalisability is not an issue because the case 
study itself is of intrinsic interest (e. g. Stake, 1994). Yin (1984) argues that, 
while quantitative research may be stronger in terms of general isabiIity, the 
purpose and strengths of the case study lie elsewhere: first, they permit the 
generation of theory; second, they may be employed in an exploratory manner 
to achieve insights Into a previously uncharted area; third, they can be used to 
test and refine theory. Exploration, theory generation and refinement are the 
aims of this study. 
Lewis and Richie (2003), however, draw a distinction between 'empirical' and 
'theoretical' generalisation and argue that case studies can produce 
generalisable findings. Empirical generalisation applies the findings of studies 
to populations beyond the study's sample. Theoretical generalisation means 
drawing theoretical propositions from the findings of a study for wider 
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application, either to contribute directly to social policy or social theory more 
generally. This research aims to achieve theoretical generalisation through 
offering inferences of relevance to social policy on collaboration, and through 
inductive data analytic processes which contribute to the wider theoretical 
debate about the relationships between contexts, forms and capacities of 
collaborative arrangements covered in Chapter 2. 
The advantages of the design of this study are that it affords the depth of a 
longitudinal case study which captures comparisons. In the study we are able 
to compare the two organisations: the PCG and the PCT that evolved from it 
and we are able to compare two more specific areas of work (substance misuse 
and promoting independence in older people). 
This enhances the richness of the theory generation and the potential 
theoretical generalisability of the findings. Its longitudinal design allows an 
exploration of the interactions between the driving forces for collaboration, the 
local context and the organisational forms of the PCG and PCT. This facilitates 
a micro-level examination of the complex forces which, over time, influence 
the capacity for, and practice of, collaboration in these specific cases. 
4.3 Methodological approach: multiple qualitative data 
Snape and Spencer (2003) align themselves with pragmatists - more interested 
in achieving a suitable "fit" between the research methods used and the 
research questions posed than in the degree of philosophical coherence of the 
epistemological positions typically associated with different research methods. 
A realist paradigm does not tie a researcher to any particular methodological 
approach, but can underpin any combination of methods depending on the 
nature of the research question and the stage of development of hypotheses. 
With a realist approach, quality and rigour have more to do with choosing the 
right tools for the job than with limiting ourselves to combining only those 
research methods which are viewed as philosophically consistent. Quality and 
rigour depend also on revealing the different ways in which each method, tool 
or approach contributes to an understanding of the research question. 
Methods and methodologies are more or less useful depending on their fit with 
the theories being developed or tested, and the research topic that is selected. 
The crucial questions in the choice of research methods surround the nature of 
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the information that the research needs to provide. The present research 
aimed to explore and refine hypotheses rather than testing tightly 
operationalised, falsiflable ones. Case studies are generally (but not 
exclusively) associated with a qualitative approach. Qualitative methods are 
most appropriate when the phenomena being studied are ill-defined or not 
well understood, and refinement of understanding is needed. The open and 
generative nature of qualitative methods allows the exploration of complex 
issues as a basis for further thinking about policy or theory development. 
Qualitative methods are more likely to identify the cultural and 
behavioural issues so important to the changing health service 
environment... Development of corporacy, ownership, multidisciplinary 
ethos: all are necessary precursors of service change, shifts that have 
only been noted and their value realised through adopting less 
medically-centred, more sociologically derived evaluation methods. 
(Shapiro, 2001: 22) 
Qualitative methods were adopted for this study because of the complex and 
multi-faceted nature of collaboration. Multiple qualitative methods were 
employed: semi-structured interviews were conducted at two time points, 
supported by ongoing ethnographic observation of meetings and workshops 
and analysis of documents to investigate fully complex situations;. They 
allowed detailed and rich data to be collected using some techniques which 
involved close contact between the researcher and the participants and others 
which drew on different sources of information. Together, these allowed the 
exploration of emergent issues (Silverman, 2001) and some validation the 
findings (Bowling, 2002). 
' See discussion in section 2.8 about boundary-spanners and trust 
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4.4 Interviews: strengths of the in-depth semi-structured case- 
study method 
Ritchie (2003) distinguishes naturally occurring data from generated data. 
Generated data include biographical methods, focus groups and in-depth 
interviews. They involve reconstruction (Bryman, 2001) and require re- 
processing and re-telling of attitudes, beliefs, behaviour or other phenomena. 
The experience, thought, event or whatever, is mentally re-processed and 
verbally recounted by study participants. Generated data give insight into 
people's own perspectives on and interpretation of their beliefs and behaviours 
and, most crucially, an understanding of the meaning that they attach to them. 
They provide the only means of understanding certain psychological 
phenomena, such as motivations, beliefs, decision processes and also because 
they allow participants' reflections on, and understanding of, social 
phenomena to be gained. 
Interviews provide an opportunity for detailed investigation of participants' 
personal perspectives. They are well suited to research that requires an 
understanding of responses to complex systems, processes or experiences 
because of the depth of focus and the opportunity for clarification and detailed 
understanding. They allow insight into their perspectives on their behaviours 
and beliefs, motivations and decision processes. Participants may reflect both 
on the issue in question itself and on their own thinking and facilitative 
questioning may help them in the process. (Snape & Spencer, 2003). Below I 
discuss the recruitment of interview participants, the interview procedure, and 
how some of their features came into play in this research. 
4.4.1 Structure and flexibility 
The in-depth interview is intended to combine structure with flexibility. 
Generally, the structure takes the form of an interview schedule which sets out 
the key topics and issues to be explored. However, it incorporates sufficient 
flexibility to allow the researcher to respond to and explore issues raised by 
the interviewee, and to do this in the order most suited to the interviewee. 
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For this study, the interview schedule outlined the main topics to be covered 
according to what was relevant to each participant on the basis of their role or 
position in an organisation. A decision was taken to send an outline Interview 
schedule to participants in advance of the interview. The rationale behind this 
was twofold: First, it would allow the interviewee time to consider the areas to 
be covered before the interview with the possibility that this would lead to a 
more considered discussion of the issues. Second, when trying to recruit 
participants on the telephone, misgivings were frequently expressed by the 
potential interviewee about whether they would be able to contribute usefully 
to what appeared to some to be a rather abstract research question. It was 
considered that an advance sighting of the interview schedule would serve 
either to reassure the participant that they would be able to contribute to the 
research, or to confirm their doubts so they could decline to be interviewed. 
Lewis & Ritchie (2003) warn that giving too much detail may deter potential 
participants. In this study, nobody withdrew their offer to take part after 
seeing the interview schedule, and sending it in advance appeared to allay 
people's concerns. 
Other potential disadvantages of sending an outline interview schedule in 
advance were considered. Lewis & Ritchie (2003) also warn that it may curtail 
participants' spontaneous views by being over-specific about the objectives 
and subject matter. It could have enabled participants to prepare a sanitised 
account of a more messy reality, or to prepare grievances they wished to air. 
Measures were taken to minimise these negative effects. Rather than sending a 
list of questions, the outline schedules were typically arranged into two or 
three broad areas for discussion with three or four bullet points under each, so 
as not to encourage respondents to run off completely prepared responses and 
to allow responsiveness. It was considered that the potential loss of 
spontaneity did not pose a substantial danger in this research since the aim 
was not to gather intuitive reactions. It was judged that the risk that this 
strategy would yield more contrived data was outweighed by the benefits. 
In general, discussion focussed on people's perceptions of the PCG's impact on 
collaborative activity. For example, what collaborative working happened 
before the PCG or PCT was in place and how had that changed? What structures 
were in place to facilitate joint working, and which of these could be judged to 
be a result of the PCG or PCT? How might individuals have managed a problem 
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or issue relating to collaboration before the PCG was in place? Has a new PCG 
structure helped or hindered a piece of collaborative working? 
The interview schedules were tailored to the profession or position of the 
individual participant and the stage of iterative data analysis. For example, an 
early interview with a PCG board member would have included general 
questions about the nature of inter-professional collaboration within the 
board, and the potential to collaborate with organisations from outside of the 
NHS. An interview carried out at the second data collection point with a PCT 
manager whose remit related specifically to health improvement would have 
been informed by previous knowledge about the work of the PCG and the 
recent history of health improvement work locally. It would have asked 
specific questions about, say, the influence of targets issued by central 
government in the NHS Plan on the nature of the PCT's work towards reducing 
inequalities in health, and how this compared to the approach taken by the 
PCG when targets were locally determined through the HImP process. 
This illustrates how data analysis and collection are not distinct activities but 
inform one another. A point made in one interview would be followed up in a 
later interview; similarly, themes emerging from documents or during 
observation of meetings would be introduced to an interview. 
4.4.2 Depth 
There is considerable variety in the perspectives on in-depth interviewing 
which stem from differences in views on a) how structured they should be, b) 
in how far the content is set by the researcher or participant and c) how far 
knowledge is constructed in the interview or is a pre-existing phenomenon 
(Legard et al, 2003). 
Through the use of probes, and the ongoing rapport between researcher and 
interviewee, interviews were able to achieve a depth of data that would not 
have been obtainable through, say, questionnaire research. I had the 
opportunity to explore the reasons, feelings, opinions and beliefs that 
underpinned participants' answers (Legard et al, 2003). To some extent, the 
interviews were generative in the sense that participants explored issues in 
ways they previously had not, creating new knowledge or thoughts. They were 
also prompted to propose solutions to problems raised in the interviews. 
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Carrying out these interviews successfully rested on the establishment of good 
rapport with a range of participants from powerful chief executives to 
vulnerable older hip fracture patients. Central to this rapport was creating an 
environment of trust in which it was clear that I was genuinely interested in the 
perspective of the participant, could show understanding and empathy, and 
was credible. 
Credibility depended on both familiarity with the participants' organisations 
and thorough pre-interview preparation that allowed me to develop questions 
which were seen as meaningful by the participants and which demonstrated an 
understanding of the issues around local organisations, the role and work of 
each participant, and around collaboration more generally. My ongoing 
presence as an observer in PCG and PCT meetings - attending approximately 
90 percent of the PCG public board meetings and two thirds of the PCT board 
meetings, as well as many of the subgroup meetings - meant that I was not 
viewed as a complete outsider, and seemed to contribute to my credibility with 
participants. 
The interviews with health and social care professionals and independent 
sector employees were arranged for a time and a place to suit the interviewees, 
usually at their place of work if they had access to a suitable room which was 
quiet and offered sufficient privacy. Conducting interviews on participants' 
own territory was designed to make them feel at ease and relaxed. It also 
meant they did not need to travel to the interview, thus removing another 
barrier to their agreement to participate. Where this was not an option, the 
interview was conducted at my University office. When several members of one 
organisation, usually a general practice, were to be interviewed, efforts were 
made to arrange them on the same day to minimise the time I spent travelling. 
At the beginning of each interview, the aims of the research and the purpose of 
the interview were restated and participants were invited to ask any questions 
before they signed a consent form. Permission was asked to tape record the 
interview. They were also involved in the decision about how any quotes from 
their interview would be attributed (see 'ethical considerations'). 
The interview process itself requires considerable concentration on the part of 
the researcher, who must simultaneously listen to what the participant said, 
exercise judgement about what probes were appropriate, consider how they 
related to what the participant had said previously as well as what other 
participants might have said, and formulate the next question. Occasionally 
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noting down key points from what the participant said to return to later in the 
interview was helpful, though it was important not to do this to the point that 
it interrupted the flow of the interview or gave the impression that I was not 
paying careful attention to what the participant said. 
Once the interview itself was finished, the interviewee was asked if there was 
anything they would like to add or ask on tape. The act of switching off the 
tape recorder often prompted some new and interesting information from the 
participants. Where it seemed significant, then I would ask if I might set the 
tape recorder running again, or make notes which could be used with the same 
assurances of confidentiality and anonymity as the transcript. Usually the 
participant agreed to this, but if they did not, the data could not be used. 
4.4.3 Participants 
Oxford City PCG was originally chosen as the unit of analysis for the case study 
for pragmatic reasons: it was local and the chief executive was co-operative 
and prepared to facilitate access to meetings and staff. The participants within 
the study were chosen more purposively. 
The research questions guided the construction of the interview sampling 
frame. The sampling strategy was purposive, as this study was not designed to 
allow empirical generalisation from sample to population or statistical 
significance testing. Rather, a theoretical sample was employed in which, in the 
words of Boulton & Fitzpatrick, 
on the basis of his or her theoretical understanding the investigator 
determines what factors might affect variability in the observations and 
then endeavours to draw the sample in a way which maximises the 
variability. (1994: 111) 
Consideration of the responsibilities and remits of the PCG and PCT guided the 
selection of interview participants. Two of PCGs' and PCTs' main remits were 
the development and delivery of primary care and the improvement of their 
population's health. These two areas of work had quite different objectives, 
and so the collaboration called for in each case would be expected to differ in 
terms of a) the groups between which collaboration was required and b) the 
goals and interests in pursuit of which they collaborated. Figure 5 shows how 
this guided the selection of participants and, simultaneously, the early stages 
of construction of interview schedules. 
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Figure 7: Factors which guided selection of participants 
The original sample was designed to include representatives from different 
levels of the organisations being studied: the PCG and PCT themselves, local 
authority, primary health care teams (PHCTs) and some voluntary sector 
organisations. Participants from this range of settings were identified as 
relevant by their job title, role, or through recommendation by another 
informant. The process of devising a matrix of organisations and levels within 
them then of filling it with participants' names was done in consultation with 
key local figures who had an overview of one or more of these organisations. 
They were able to point towards the appropriate individual or to someone who 
would be able to suggest a key contact. 
Inevitably there was something of an 'implementation gap' between the original 
tidy wish-list of interviewees and the inventory of people who were 
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subsequently interviewed. Over the course of the study the sample was 
adjusted as the PCG expanded and became a PCT, as staff turnover and 
restructuring inevitably affected the key representatives from other 
organisations. Opportunistic sampling took place as new staff were appointed 
to the PCG or PCT, or became regular attenders at sub-group meetings, or 
were mentioned frequently and significantly in interviews. This was most often 
the case with voluntary organisations and 'one off health professionals such as 
the domiciliary physiotherapist, from organisations without statutory 
representation on the board or PEC. While the sample could not be exhaustive, 
the advantages of this combined approach to sampling were that, within the 
obviously key organisations, representatives of various levels of seniority were 
systematically included, while opportunistic sampling permitted the inclusion 
of those less obviously relevant at the outset. 
Unsurprisingly, a number of people declined to be involved in the research. 
The reason offered most often was pressure of time. The thirty-two PHCTs in 
the city were researched carefully in terms of list size, number of partners, 
geographical location, previous fundholding status and inclusion or exclusion 
from City Council boundaries. Eight of these were chosen, constituting an ideal 
purposive sample. However, the process of recruitment revealed that a 
significant proportion of the sample was less motivated to preserve the original 
sampling strategy than its author. This was largely because they were being 
asked to give of their most prized commodity - time - with scant promise of 
tangible short-term reward. In some practices, receptionists and practice 
managers were extremely co-operative and helpful, whereas in others they 
proved to be formidable and at times intransigent gatekeepers. Smart 
challenges the usual assumptions about the direction of power imbalances 
between interviewer and interviewee: "To assume the power imbalance is 
inevitably in favour of the interviewer is to ignore all other social class divisions 
and structures of dominance in society outside the academic world of 
research" (1984: 157). 
This resonated with my experiences of trying to recruit busy senior health 
service professionals to contribute to my research. Ultimately they could 
decline to take part, and some did. The achieved sample of five PHCTs was 
ultimately as opportunistic as purposive. Fortuitously, the criteria by which the 
original sample was selected were still broadly met, although it may be skewed 
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in favour of unrepresentatively research-friendly practices, or practices with a 
greater-than-average level of interest in the research areas. 
4.4.4 Recruitment 
Professionals/ staff 
The methods of recruitment varied depending on the role or positions of the 
individual participant. Recruitment generally happened in two stages and was 
consistently time-consuming. The first stage was to establish contact and 
stimulate interest in the project. It typically began with an introductory 
telephone call briefly to outline the purpose of the research, how the 
participant was selected, what taking part would involve and to suggest I send 
them some written information. If they express willingness to consider taking 
part, the phone call was followed by a letter reiterating this information more 
fully (see Appendix 1) and saying they should expect a phone call, during 
which there would be an opportunity to ask questions about the research and, 
if they would like to take part, to arrange a time and venue for the interview. 
This call constituted the second stage during which assurances of 
confidentially were given, and permission was requested to tape record the 
interview. Once a time had been agreed, it was confirmed in a letter which was 
sent out with an outline interview schedule, an information sheet and a 
consent form which they were asked to bring with them to the interview (See 
Appendices 2,3, and 4). 
The recruitment strategy for PHCT members was slightly different in that 
practices were initially approached through the practice manager who was 
asked to distribute information about the project to the practice staff then, at a 
practice meeting, enlist a GP, a district nurse, health visitor, practice nurse, 
and receptionist who would be willing to take part. Once practice staff who 
were prepared to take part in the study were identified, a telephone call 
confirmed the date, time and venue of the interview, and a letter was sent to 
each with an interview schedule, information sheet and consent form. 
Although this recruitment procedure was cumbersome, it was ethically and 
pragmatically better to invest the time in explaining to potential participants 
what the research was about, rather than risk their feeling pressured to 
volunteer their time to take part in something they didn't yet understand or 
recognise as worthwhile or relevant. 
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Interviews were conducted over two time periods. The first set took place In 
the spring and summer of 2000, when the PCG was still in place but the 
transition to PCT was imminent. 
In the first set of interviews, nine GPs (two were board members, including the 
chair), eight community nurses (one were board members), three City Council 
staff and four SSD staff (these did not include the SSD board representative 
who was not available to be interviewed), five non-clinician PCG staff and 
board members and two participant from non-statutory bodies (Age Concern 
and the Carers' Centre) were interviewed. Additionally, a community 
development nurse from the Community Health Trust, the Health Authority's 
Joint Investment Plan co-ordinator, and four other community therapists. A full 
list of the participants is in Appendix 5. 
The second set of interviews took place approximately one year later, following 
the transition to PCT. This was a period of great upheaval, but where a 
participant from the first set of interviews remained in the same, or equivalent, 
post, they were approached and invited to take part in a follow-up interview. 
Many of the organisations involved, particularly the PCG, underwent dramatic 
organisational upheaval and structural change, so not only were the same 
individuals difficult to trace, often their posts no longer existed, neither was a 
successor available. Arranging the follow-up interviews was much more 
straightforward where the same individual was in post, not least because there 
was a sense of camaraderie amongst those who survived the transitions, in 
which I shared. Where new people or posts were in place, the process of 
explaining the research and recruiting them to it began anew. 
The second set of interviews was smaller and included the PCT chief executive, 
two GPs (including the PEC chair), four community nurses (one was a board 
member), three non-clinical PCT staff and two local authority staff: one from 
the City Council and one from the SSD. 
Service users 
The study originally sought to identify the impact of the PCG and PCT on 
collaboration from the perspective of service users as a measure of the 
outcome of collaboration. Interviews with older people were to provide 
contextual data which would allow the accounts of older people to be 
compared with those of the health professionals, and to explore the extent to 
which changes in service delivery and collaboration were actually experienced 
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by the users. After all, collaboration should not be an end in itself, but a means 
to improving the experiences of patients. Time and resource limitations meant 
that interviewing a sample of older people as well as a sample of drug users 
was not possible, so a choice had to be made between the two groups. The 
experiences of either group would have been interesting to study, but older 
people were chosen on the basis that, if a sample of hip fracture patients was 
taken, they would be easily accessible on the hospital ward. Methodological 
impediments to interviewing drug users include issues to do with access, 
engagement and trust. The sample of older people was narrowed to older 
people who had had a hip fracture, since they were likely to be in receipt of 
care from a range of professional groups and organisations including primary 
care, secondary care, social services and voluntary organisations. Their 
common condition would mean that their service needs were likely to be 
comparable to some extent, while diversity in their individual circumstances 
would mean some variation in their experiences and needs. The limitations of 
choosing this particular group is that their experiences would, in many ways, 
be peculiar to one condition. However, hip fracture is a common condition, and 
a serious one in that readmission to hospital and mortality rates are high. 
It was planned that semi-structured interviews would be conducted to explore 
the experiences of people who had returned home following a hip fracture, to 
provide contextual data to corroborate (or not) the accounts of health and 
social care professionals. People over the age of 65 who had had a hip fracture 
and who were registered with a GP from within the PCG constituency were to 
be accessed through the trauma department at the local general acute 
hospital. Patients whose first language was not English or who were judged by 
the researcher or their primary nurse to be too cognitively impaired to take 
part were to be excluded from the sample. 
Although approval was obtained from the local NHS research ethics committee, 
the conditions which were imposed on obtaining consent from hip fracture 
patients were so stringent as to be prohibitive. The lengths to which potential 
participants had to go to demonstrate their non-coerced consent included 
having to actively return a consent form to the researcher, which was 
prohibitively difficult given their frail and vulnerable condition. This 
undoubtedly contributed to difficulties recruiting older people to the study, 
and caused a large amount of fruitless labour for the researcher visiting the 
trauma wards repeatedly. Lower than expected numbers of patients fitted the 
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inclusion criteria, and there was a reluctance amongst those who did qualify to 
take part. The minority who volunteered tended to be the least vulnerable and 
frail, unlikely to have a social services care package and therefore not well 
placed to describe their experiences of co-ordinated care. 
Even having found a willing gatekeeper on the ward, recruitment was 
unsuccessful, yielding only four interviews over a space of four months. 
Ultimately, a decision was taken to abandon efforts to include older people's 
perspectives of care in the study. Three interviews were carried out, but the 
contribution they could make to the study was too limited to include. 
4.5 Observations: strengths and limitations of observing 
meetings 
Non-participant observation of meetings and workshops of the PCG and PCT's 
was ongoing throughout the period of the study. Observation as a method has 
its own challenges. These include gaining access, observer bias and the 
reactive effects of the observer's presence. 
I attended almost all the PCG and PCT board meetings over the period of the 
study as well as many of their sub-group meetings. Watching, listening and 
note-taking allowed me to gather qualitative data of a different sort. While 
interviews provided valuable insights into participants' thoughts, motivations, 
perceptions and reasoning, data obtained in this way were generated by the 
participant, and their construction was mediated by the participant's memory, 
world view, life experiences, political leanings, etc, and produced in a 
somewhat artificial interview context. 
Snape & Spencer (2003) distinguish these generated data from naturally 
occurring data. Naturally occurring data are obtained by investigating 
phenomena in their natural settings. Observation data are an enactment of 
social behaviour in its own social setting, rather than a recounting of it 
generated specifically for the research study. Collaboration was so fiercely 
rhetorically invoked in the policy environment to the point that it adopted an 
almost moral dimension. Participants' reports of it were, therefore, prone to 
distortion as social forces were liable to influence them, consciously or 
unconsciously, to exaggerate accounts of their collaborative activity. 
Observation of meetings could provide some balance to this as they allowed 
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first-hand scrutiny of interactions between participants at meetings. It allowed 
events, actions and experiences to be seen through the eyes of the researcher 
without any construction on the part of the participants. 
Complementing interviews with PCG and PCT board members and staff with 
observations of their behaviours, actions, activities and interactions provided a 
tool for understanding more than what they said about the organisations and 
their collaborative activities. This allowed me to place data from interviews in a 
more rounded context, to interpret inconsistencies between them, and to 
understand the complex situations more fully. 
4.5.1 Gaining access 
Bowling, (2002) warns that gaining access to the desired setting is potentially a 
problematic area due to people's suspicions about academics and their 
motives, as well as feelings of personal and professional threat. Time must be 
spent forging links with the community of interest before access can be 
expected, and explanations should be offered about how the study can be 
mutually advantageous (Hornsby-Smith, 1993). 
In this study, access posed fewer difficulties. PCG and PCT board meetings 
were open to the public and were held every two months. I was initially given 
access to other PCG meetings through negotiations with the PCG chief 
executive who was supportive of the research and acted as a co-operative 
gatekeeper. His endorsement of the project afforded access to sub-group 
meetings which were not open to the public, and meant I was generally not 
viewed with too much suspicion. Still, some effort was required to strike up 
rapport with the various groups, and to learn their language, concepts and 
practices (Pope et al, 2000b). 
Some meetings remained out of bounds. For example, I was not granted access 
to workshops at which the PCG board met monthly, between the public board 
meetings. These were designed in part to facilitate development of the board, 
and they decided that the presence of a researcher might stifle openness and 
the board members' interactions. 
4.5.2 Observer bias 
While observation is not mediated by the generation of a narrative by the 
participant, it is nonetheless open to observer bias. This is defined by Bowling 
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as a systematic difference between a true situation and that observed owing to 
observer variation in perceptions (Bowling, 2002). She contests that efforts 
should be made to reduce the tendency to report interpreted (perceived and 
inferred) events, rather than the events themselves. My view is that data 
gathered through observation are inevitably and necessarily dependent on the 
observer's interpretation. While a degree of reflexivity on the part of the 
researcher can minimise the effect of this interpretation on the analysis of the 
data, it would be misguided to strive for full objectivity in an observer's 
account, untainted by interpretation or bias. Rather, efforts were made to 
reflect on the likely nature of this bias and the limitations it places on the 
validity of the findings. 
4.5.3 Reactive effects of observer's presence 
Data gathered through participant observation are subject to the effect of the 
researcher's presence in the room. Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) termed 
this the Hawthorne effect: people change in some way simply as a result of 
being studied. The effect of the observer appears to erode over time (Clarke & 
Bowling, 1990); thus it is sometimes argued that the analysis of observation 
data should commence after a time period when the reactive effects of the 
observer have worn off. However well integrated the observer becomes within 
the setting, there is always potential for a reactive effect and therefore bias. It 
is important that the observer maintains an awareness of this (Bowling, 2002). 
Factors which minimised the Hawthorne effect in the observation in this study 
were twofold. First, towards the beginning of the fieldwork period, the PCG was 
new and the participants' relationship with a researcher was one of many new 
relationships being established at that time, and one of the least salient. Its 
impact was therefore diluted. Second, the rapid expansion of the organisation 
in its early days, and the rate of staff turnover at the point of transition from 
PCG to PCT meant that, before long, I was one of the longest-standing 
attendees at many of the meetings, and familiarity seemed to reduce 
awkwardness and mistrust resulting from my presence. 
4.6 Documentary analysis 
Documentary analysis of agendas, notes and minutes from board and sub- 
group meetings, notes from consultation days and a HImP development 
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workshop provided evidence as to which organisations were represented and 
at what level. This was supplementary to the observational and interview data. 
They showed who had committed to do what and with whom. They could also 
evidence the development of structures to enable joint working, for example, 
joint appointments, joint Investment Plans, and the HImP group's wide 
membership. These complemented the interviews well as sources of 
information about who attended partnership events, and to some extent, what 
they contributed, but told little about the subtleties of the development of 
trust between organisations and other less tangible phenomena. 
4.7 Ethics 
4.7.1 Research Ethics Committee approval 
The principles underpinning research ethics are beneficence and duty of care, 
informed consent and confidentiality. Research ethics committees were 
established in response to grossly unethical practices involving human 
experimentation in medical and social sciences research, to protect 
participants from harm. They have a duty to consider all possible sources of 
harm - particularly to vulnerable participants - and to satisfy themselves that 
the researcher has thought through all relevant issues before they proceed 
(Darlington & Scott, 2002). My experience of applying for approval from the 
local NHS Applied and Qualitative Research Ethics Committee for this study, 
suggested that a system designed to protect patients and other participants 
from harm could in fact be obstructive of research designed to give voice to 
vulnerable people, effectively further disenfranchising them. The conditions 
which were imposed on obtaining consent from hip fracture patients were, in 
the end, so stringent as to be prohibitive. 
4.7.2 Informed Consent 
Interviews 
Informed consent means giving information about the research which is 
relevant to the participants' decisions about whether to participate; making 
sure that subjects understand that information (for example, by providing 
information sheets written in their language) and ensuring that participation is 
voluntary (for example, by stating very clearly that the decision whether or not 
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to participate will not have consequences for the care a participant receives, 
and requiring written consent) (Silverman, 2000). 
An information sheet (see Appendix 3) told participants about the purpose of 
the study, how the data would be used, and what participation would require 
of them. The sheet listed the subjects likely to be covered and how much time 
was required. Having read it, they were asked to sign a consent form (see 
Appendix 4), stating that they had read and understood the information sheet, 
that they understood issues to do with confidentiality and anonymity, and that 
they had had an opportunity to ask questions. Even once a person had 
consented to take part in an interview and to the data being used in the way 
that has been described to them, I was mindful that consent is not absolute, 
and should be assessed and sometimes renegotiated. This was particularly true 
at times during data collection when an interviewee would divulge information 
or opinion which, if reported, may have undesirable repercussions. This 
occurred only a few times, but when it did, the way the data would be used was 
discussed again with the participant. 
Observation 
Informed consent was less easy to obtain in observation than in interview 
situations. I was initially given access via the PCG chief executive, a powerful 
gatekeeper, to most PCG meetings, but I was not able to obtain the full explicit 
consent of each person at each of the meetings. Where the opportunity arose, I 
said briefly who I was and what the research was about, but the quick round- 
the-table introductions which happened at the beginning of most meetings did 
not afford time to explain in detail who I was, what I was doing, why and to 
check that everyone had understood and consented to my presence. If anyone 
had objected, I would have left, but It might have felt quite difficult for anyone 
to do so. Certainly towards the end of the study, I was almost an integrated 
part of a number of groups, and regular members seemed barely aware that I 
was not a member of the group. 
4.7.3 Anonymity and confidentiality 
Beyond this, the ethical considerations relevant to this study could be said to 
fall into two broad categories: remaining sensitive to issues of confidentiality 
and anonymity, and further issues around the dissemination of what were 
sometimes quite sensitive data. 
95 
Anonymity implies that the identity of those taking part is not known beyond 
the research team. This may be compromised if participation is arranged 
through a third party (an employer or an organisation) or in case studies 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). Confidentiality means avoiding the attribution of 
comments, in reports or presentations, to identified participants. Both direct 
attribution (where comments are linked to a name or a specific role) and 
indirect (by reference to a collection of characteristics that might identify an 
individual or small group) must be avoided. Indirect attribution requires 
particular care. It may compromise the extent to which contextual detail can 
be given in reporting specific comments and in some circumstances it may be 
necessary to change minor details to disguise identity, to make a point in a 
more general way (even if this reduces its power), or to get specific consent 
from a participant to use it (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003) 
In a relatively close-knit social and health care community such as Oxford, not 
attaching interviewees' names to quotes does not necessarily guarantee 
anonymity. An example of this can be seen in reporting quotes from the board 
nurses. The PCG board included three nurses who, if they were referred to in a 
report as 'board nurse, ' would be quite identifiable to any reader familiar with 
the Oxford primary care community. The identity of the contributor could be 
narrowed down from three to one with reasonable confidence from the 
language they use, their ideas, and the context of what was said. An alternative 
would be to attribute the quote simply to 'health visitor 3, ' or 'Community 
Nurse 16, ' which would further protect anonymity (since there are many 
community nurses in the city, and only three board nurses) but would 
impoverish the data, in that richness would be lost with the information that 
this was the view or experience of a board member. There was a trade-off 
between the anonymity to be gained from being very vague in the description, 
and the greater richness of data associated with being able to match an 
individual's views or experience closely with their role. 
The approach taken was to allow participants to participate in the decision. At 
the beginning of each interview, the interviewee was asked how they would like 
their quotes to be attributed. The option was offered to leave this judgement 
at the end of the interview, at which point the participant would be better 
informed as to the content of the interview. Some were content to be described 
quite specifically (e. g. Health Promotion Officer), while others preferred to be 
identified only loosely (e. g. Community Health Trust employee). The assurance 
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was made that they would be contacted for clearance before anything was 
published which was considered by the researcher to be contentious from their 
interview. 
4.8 Data analysis 
Analysis is the process of describing the data, categorising them and 
examining how concepts interrelate (Dey, 1993), confirming, refuting or 
refining theories (Pawson & Tilley, 1997) and developing further theories. Here, 
the principles and procedures applied in analysing the data in the present 
research are made explicit. 
Ritchie and Spencer's (1994) 'framework' strategy guided the data analysis. It 
was devised specifically for the analysis of data in applied qualitative policy 
research, and its strengths as an approach are that it is explicit, accessible, 
systematic and comprehensive. The specific stages of data analysis are 
described later in this chapter, but first the approach to the data is described. 
Although there will be a stage of the research dedicated to data analysis, the 
process of forming ideas, identifying concepts and testing theories continues 
from beginning to the writing up of a study (Spencer et al, 2003). To some 
extent data collection and analysis were carried out simultaneously as the data 
gathered fed into and informed the ongoing data collection (Mays & Pope, 
2000). 
Qualitative data are usually analysed in a way that is open to emerging 
concepts, provide detailed description, and identify patterns of association, but 
approaches to analysis differ in terms of the main focus and aims. 
4.8.1 Inductive vs deductive 
A distinction is often drawn between inductive and deductive analysis. 
Deductive analysis, or theory-testing, either confirms or refutes a particular 
defined and falsifiable hypothesis. The investigator starts with general ideas 
and develops a theory and testable hypotheses from it, which are tested by 
gathering and analysing data (Bowling, 2002). Inductive analysis, on the other 
hand, involves theory-building: the extraction of themes and theories from the 
data themselves. It begins with the observations and builds up ideas and more 
general statements and theories (Bowling, 2002). It looks for patterns and 
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associations derived from observations of the world (Snape & Spencer, 2003). 
It aims to identify deterministic laws and the essential character of phenomena, 
involving an iterative process of defining a problem, formulating and testing an 
hypothesis, then reformulating the hypothesis or redefining the problem until 
all cases "fit" the hypothesis (Robinson, 1951) 
Dey's (1993) approach is to dispense with the distinction between inductive 
and deductive analysis, since data cannot be analysed without ideas, but ideas 
must be shaped and tested by the data. Bowling concurs that, in practice, 
science is based on a more haphazard blend of the rules of deductive and 
inductive reasoning. "It is a mixture of empirical conception and the certainties 
of deductive reasoning" (Bowling, 2002: 122). Both deduction and induction 
are involved at different stages of the qualitative research process. While 
inductive processes use evidence as the genesis of a conclusion, deductive 
processes use evidence in support of a conclusion (Snape & Spencer, 2003) 
The status of the explanations that are offered in qualitative analysis varies. 
The aim of analytic induction is to seek explanations in terms of universal 
deterministic causes. Others reject this, and argue that the social world is not 
governed by laws in the way that the physical world is thought to be. However, 
if human behaviour is not law-like, neither is it chaotic; it displays regularities 
which can be identified through careful analysis. 
The realist approach, as outlined by Pawson & Tilley (1997), is to test theories 
about the interactions between context and intervention or policy. These are 
not necessarily grand theories of the universe; depending on the stage of 
theory development of the research, they can be all-encompassing or quite 
humble in their scope. The realist approach contends that all data collection 
should be theory-led, but acknowledges a broad variety of theories. Section 
4.5 and figure 5 illustrated how theory influenced the selection of research 
participants and the early stages of designing the interview schedules. A theory 
need not be a positivist-style falsifiable one, operationalised in such a way that 
it can be shown to be either supported or rejected by the data (although it may 
be). It could equally be a less tightly operationalised theory, which can be 
refined through the data analysis process in conjunction with an iterative data 
collection-analysis process. 
The aim of this research was to develop and modify theories in this way. The 
literature covered In chapters two and three identified preliminary theories 
about the organisational forms of the PCG and PCT and the contextual factors 
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acting on them in ways which might enhance or inhibit their collaborative 
capacity. Figure 6 summarises/represents the preliminary theories which 
informed the early data collection and formed the basis of the deductive 
analysis. 
The data analysis adopted a combined approach in which both a priori and 
emergent concepts were used to shape the analysis. Spencer et al (2003) 
describe an "analytic hierarchy" which sets out a non-linear progression 
through levels of analysis from data management, through descriptive 
accounts to explanatory accounts. The analytic account is refined by movement 
in both directions between data and analytic concepts. 
For example, PCGs' and PCTs' locality-wide reach and the election to their 
governing bodies of practising clinicians implied potential as mechanisms to 
facilitate collaboration within the primary care community to develop and 
deliver services. The problems associated with the fragmentation within 
primary care, together with New Labour's third way rhetoric, were identified as 
contextual forces which could act to drive collaboration. On the other hand, it 
was proposed that GPs' tradition of autonomy and self-regulation, and the 
scant history of collaboration within general practice, however, might act to 
inhibit collaboration. 
Theories based on these contextual and organisational factors, and others 
identified in figure 6, formed the basis of the deductive approach which 
informed the early data collection, guided the selection of interview 
participants and the construction of the interview schedules. Inductive 
elements contributed to the evolution of the theories over the course of the 
study to reflect early findings, ongoing organisational change and the 
publication of new guidance and policy. The aim of the research was not to 
prove or disprove these theories, but to combine deductive and inductive 
elements, to test theories iteratively against the data, refine them on the basis 
of the degree to which they were found to fit, or not, and so on. 
4.8.2 Evaluating collaboration 
It is important to specify criteria for the effectiveness of a collaborative 
mechanism in ways which are appropriate to the context and objectives of the 
PCG and PCT, against which its performance can be assessed. This section 
draws heavily on the ideas of Dowling et al (2004) who distinguish between 
evaluations of the processes and outcomes of collaboration, l. e. evaluations of 
99 
how a collaborative mechanism itself functions and of its products (Lazenbatt 
et al, 2001). Collaboration should not be an end in itself, but Dowling et al's 
(2004) literature review found the majority of published research on successful 
partnership working had largely focussed on process rather than outcome 
measures. They argue that this focus has limited the knowledge of whether 
collaboration 'works' in the sense of bringing benefits from a service user 
perspective which should be, after all, the ultimate policy goal of collaboration. 
This study set out to assess both processes and outcomes of collaboration, 
with a focus on the collaborative capacity of individuals and organisations, as 
well as on whether collaboration led to improved services and service user 
experiences. However, for reasons set out in section 4.4, the planned inclusion 
of service users as participants in the research became unfeasible. So the focus 
was turned to process issues about the `health' of collaborative relationships 
and outcome issues about service development. 
Process and outcome evaluations 
Health improvement - process 
Evidence of successful collaborative processes for health improvement was 
sought by examining whether and how primary care worked with organisations 
outside of the NHS such as local authority departments and voluntary sector 
organisations. Given general practices' sparse history of collaboration, and the 
organisational and cultural barriers to collaboration between these groups, as 
well as status and power differentials between them, and the tradition of 
animosity between health professionals and health service managers, effective 
health improvement processes would manifest in any sign of commitment and 
engagement of these groups to working together, and evidence of trust, 
reciprocity and respect. Boundary-spanner activity would also signal 
collaborative processes. 
In the context of GPs' traditionally medically-oriented, individual-focussed 
approach to health and the emphasis of PCGs' and PCTs' remit for the 
improvement of health through addressing wider, non-medical determinants 
of health (for example social, environmental and economic factors), evidence 
of agreement about the purpose and need for collaboration would also signal 
process success. This may manifest in evidence that such an approach to 
health was a vision shared between primary care, local authority and voluntary 
sector organisations. 
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Health improvement - outcome 
Evidence of outcome success in health improvement was more difficult to 
identify, since by their nature the health outcomes of health improvement work 
are often long term, and can not easily be attributed to a single intervention. 
They were sought in the development of services or projects to address 
priorities set out in the PCG's and PCT's health improvement frameworks such 
as services to promote independent living in older people. 
Primary care development/delivery - process 
Successful collaborative processes for delivering and developing primary care 
would manifest in processes which facilitated collective efforts to develop and 
implement clinical governance and strategies for the allocation of the 
organisations' substantial budget, and which were inclusive of a range of 
primary care professionals. 
In the context of the fragmentation of primary care and GPs' tradition of 
autonomy and high degree of self-regulation, evidence for effective 
collaborative processes for delivering and developing primary care would be 
sought in an increased sense of corporacy between members of the primary 
care community, between different professional groups, between management 
and clinicians. Given GPs' poor record of collaboration and their differences in 
status from other professionals, signs of GPs' preparedness to take ownership 
of collaborative ventures and operate in a more corporate fashion with the 
other primary care practitioners in their locality would constitute evidence of 
successful collaborative processes. 
Primary care development/delivery - outcomes 
Outcomes for collaborative delivery and development of primary care services 
could take various forms but would be manifest in the implementation of 
clinical governance and the development of specific services for patients. 
4.8.3 Combining data from interviews and observation 
Data from observation were collected as rough field notes and were used to 
provide a context in which to interpret interview data. This was done with a 
view to overcoming some of the limitations of relying solely on participants' 
reported views and experiences (generated data) or solely on observational 
(naturally occurring) data. Silverman (2001) criticises 'naive' interview studies 
which hope that the limits of quantitative research are overcome by an open- 
101 
ended interview schedule and a desire to catch authentic experience. They fail 
to recognise the problematic analytic status of interview data which are never 
simply raw but are both situated and textual (Mishler, 1986). 
I tried to be careful to avoid treating the actors' points of view as an 
explanations, and having additional, naturally occurring data from 
observations allowed me to contextualise generated interview data. At times 
having data from two sources altered my reading of a situation, and helped 
unpick inconsistencies in what people said. Over time, they provided a 
historical context for understanding the development of collaboration in an 
unfolding policy context. 
4.8.4 Stages of data analysis 
Data analysis, stage one: familiarisation 
The first stage in the framework process of data analysis was familiarisation 
with the data, which was partly achieved through the process of transcribing 
interviews and notes from the non-participant observation. Next, a proportion 
of the interview transcripts, selected to represent a range of interviewee types 
(professions, employment) and date of interview, were re-read paying 
attention to the data's relationship to the a priori themes. During this 
familiarisation period, emergent themes were also noted. Examples of themes 
are: 
" Practicing clinicians, elected by peers, on governing body (a priori) 
" Introduction of locality-wide primary care body (a priori) 
" Organisational turbulence (emergent) 
The transcripts and field notes were then imported into NUDI*ST, which 
facilitated management, coding and retrieval of the large data set. 
To illustrate the stages of the analytic process I employed in this research, I 
will use one a priori theme from the analytic framework (figure 6): the 
inclusion of practising clinicians on the PCG's governing board. This was a 
feature of its organisational form which was identified from the literature as 
one which would potentially help to foster collaboration. 
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Data analysis, stage two: coding 
The second stage of the analytic process was to assign codes to the text units, 
the rough equivalent of short paragraphs, drawing on a priori and emergent 
themes from the theoretical framework. The coding process was inclusive, 
which is to say each section of text could be assigned as many different codes 
as appropriate, rather than choosing just one code for each section of text. 
The framework was evolving in the sense that, where a section of data did not 
fit it, but had something to contribute to the analysis, a new code was created. 
In the coding stage, all sections of text in the interview transcripts where 
participants discussed their views on the inclusion of GPs and nurses on the 
PCG board were identified and assigned the code 'clinician board member' 
within NUDI*ST. 
Data analysis, stage three: thematic charting 
The next stage of the data analysis was to develop descriptive accounts of the 
range, nature and diversity of collaboration; looking for associations between 
different professional groups and their views and behaviours and comparing 
and contrasting their perceptions, accounts and experiences. Typologies - 
specific forms of classification that help to describe the key dimensions of 
collaboration and explain the way that phenomena may be differentiated or 
characterised - were developed. 
In practice this meant arranging the coded text units in charts according to 
thematic reference. Each theme or subtheme, a priori or emergent, was 
assigned a column in the chart. Ritchie and Spencer's (1994) framework 
approach advocates assigning a row in the chart to accommodate the 
responses of each participant, but the number of participants in this study 
would have made such a table too unwieldy. Instead, reference was made to 
the framework which identified organisational position or professional group 
as contextual factors which would potentially act as driving forces for and 
against collaboration. Respondents were thus grouped accordingly into PCG/T 
board/PEC member; PCG/T manager; other GP; other community nurse; local 
authority officer; non-statutory body; and 'other. ' Each group was represented 
in a row. A chart was drawn up for each theme, and entries made for each 
group of respondents. Rather than pasting the full piece of text from the 
interview transcript, a distilled summary of the respondent's views or 
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experiences was entered on the chart, along with a reference to the text unit 
so it could be readily traced to its source in the NUDI*ST database. 
Data analysis, stage four: mapping and interpretation 
The descriptive and typological work of 'charting' was followed by'mapping 
and interpretation. ' This involves finding patterns of association within the 
data and attempting to account for why those patterns occur. Linkages may be 
found between sets of phenomena and associations between experiences, 
behaviours, perspectives and certain characteristics of the study population. 
They enable the analyst to explain why the data take the forms that have been 
identified, and to account for why patterns, recurrent linkages, processes or 
apparent contradictions are found in the data. Ritchie and Spencer (1994: 184) 
identify this as the stage at which the "serious and systematic process of 
detection" begins, where the key objectives and features of qualitative analysis 
are met. Ritchie and Spencer warn that the analysis process is not simply about 
aggregating patterns, but weighing up the salience and dynamics of issues and 
searching for a structure rather than a multiplicity of evidence. 
Staying with the effects of having clinicians on the governing bodies of PCGs 
and PCTs, as an example of the analytic process, the strategic and 
representative functions of board clinicians emerged as related but distinct 
dimensions of their roles. The changes over time in participants' views of the 
effectiveness and value of the inclusion of clinicians on the board as a means 
to foster collaboration were examined. 
Participants' views of the value of clinician membership of the board varied, 
and the data analysis suggested/revealed that one of the main sources of this 
variation lay in the professional status and employment status of different 
professional groups. Nurses, a less powerful professional group than GPs, were 
initially enthusiastic about having a representative voice on a strategic body, 
and confident that their representatives would take their task seriously and 
carry out their roles well. However, their historical impotence in influencing 
strategy within the Community Health Trust (CHT) left some community nurses 
sceptical that they would be able to influence a body on which their interests 
would have to compete with those of GPs, a traditionally more powerful 
professional group. Within the nursing community were differences in views 
which related to the different employment status of district nurses and health 
visitors who were employed by the (CHT), and that of practice nurses who were 
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employed directly by GPs. Their employment status had implications for their 
capacity to attend meetings with their peers, and so to play a part in 
influencing PCG strategy. The most voluble dissent from the inclusion of 
practising clinicians on the PCG board came from senior CHT nurses. They had 
occupied strategic positions within the CHT, and argued that this experience 
was crucial to work effectively on the PCG board, yet they were not eligible for 
the positions on the PCT professional executive committee (PEC). Their 
positions, once the CHT had been dismantled, were very uncertain, and their 
opposition to the model must be understood in the light of the insecurity of 
their positions. 
4.8.5 Validity 
People frequently claim to be collaborating effectively, yet to find supporting 
evidence can be a struggle. It is also difficult to attribute changes specifically 
to the PCG or PCT; how can causation be established with any confidence? 
What constitutes valid evidence? Whose perspective matters (which is also 
related to pragmatic difficulties of access and recruitment)? Whose experiences 
and perspectives are relevant? What questions should be asked of them and 
how? Do the methods and sample illuminate the concepts? How can one be 
confident that what participants say has been correctly interpreted? How is 
rhetoric to be distinguished from reality? It is crucial to be alert to and to 
examine the various threats to the validity of the interpretation of the data and 
to consider how sensitive data analysis procedures may guard against them. 
Interview respondents' answers could reflect a variety of possible scenarios: 
that they had never thought about the issues, that they were unaware of 
change even when there had been change, that they had not attributed 
changes to the PCG, that they had attributed changes to the PCG for which it 
wasn't in fact responsible, that changes had not filtered down or up to them. 
Amongst practitioners, some strategic issues were quite removed from their 
day-to-day work and had not been the subject of lengthy reflection. Similarly, 
more senior staff were sometimes unaware of operational issues. 
Given the frequency with which participants expressed concern that they would 
not have helpful, useful or the 'right' answers, that they felt nervous, or that 
they feared the interview would be some sort of test they might fail, it is 
possible that sometimes people simply felt obliged to produce an answer: 
since the question had been asked it must have an answer. As Plamping et al 
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(2000 : 1723) observed, "partnership has become a legal, almost moral, 
imperative in the health and social care world in recent years. " Another 
potential threat to validity was that with such ubiquitous exhortation to work in 
partnership, it had became a kind of moral imperative. It is possible that 
participants were quick to profess their commitment to and activity in it, for 
fear of being exposed as not fulfilling their duties in this area. 
Another issue to be raised is the one of 'interviewer effect'; how the 
interviewer may inadvertently act as an intervention. The interview questions 
frequently cause participants to reflect upon things they may not normally 
think about, and may well have a bearing on the way they act or practice. Again 
there is a need for sensitivity to the ways the researcher and research process 
shape the data collected. Many instances were recorded of, "Well, we don't 
really do that but perhaps we should. " 
Contradictory or incompatible accounts of an event or issue, within and 
between methods of data collection, were frequently recorded. How these 
should be interpreted or reconciled raises certain questions. Respondents' 
interpretations of the relevant research issues are what's important. I have 
accepted that their different vantage points will yield different types of 
understanding. This diversity of perspectives adds to our understanding of the 
various ways that reality has been experienced, and an underlying aim of this 
work is to apprehend and convey as full a picture as possible of the nature of 
that multifaceted reality. (Snape & Spencer, in Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). It could, 
for example, be concluded that individuals are (inevitably) only partially 
informed, that they are talking about a particular experience or incident that is 
particularly salient in their mind, but not necessarily a experience that reflects 
the generality of the practice, discipline or profession. To make this amount to 
more than idle speculation, it was necessary to look again to theory and 
methods to bolster the validity of the analysis. 
Theoretical clues can be found in the literature on collaboration. For example, 
Glendinning and Rummery (1997) observe that the advantages and 
disadvantages of partnership working may not be evenly distributed between 
the parties. For example, when a social worker is attached to a primary care 
team, the practice gains a person and perhaps quicker referrals, but the social 
worker loses support and supervision. Crawford (1998) identified 
"fundamental conflicts over ideology, purpose and interests, and differential 
power relations between the partners" as key to the major implementation 
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difficulties experienced in partnerships and these might influence the narrative 
of an interview. 
In an ideal world, a methodological safeguard would be to interview the most 
peripheral players first, working inwards towards the most central, using 
iterative data gathering techniques to build a picture and refine the research 
questions along the way, developing themes, identifying issues and raising 
them with subsequent interviewees. This technique would allow the researcher 
to refine theories and subsequently to pursue lines of enquiry in further depth 
(Pope et al, 2000). In some sense it would be almost impossible not to think 
about what is heard as the data collection proceeds, and for that to feed into 
ensuing data gathering. In practice the extent to which this was achieved was 
limited by the process of securing interviews, which was so difficult to regulate 
that concurrent formal data analysis was not always feasible. The more salient 
issues that came up were carried over; some of the more subtle ones may have 
escaped. 
Follow-up interviews provided an opportunity to seek some degree of 
respondent validation, enabling a comparison of the researcher's account with 
the respondent's account. However, the difficulty of relying on this as a 
guarantee of validity is that any vested interests that shaped the original data 
gathering would apply equally to the process of respondent validation. 
Melia (1997) raises the question: "Are the data to be regarded as straight 
accounts of the interviewee's experiences or stories about that experience told 
as an exercise in self-presentation by the interviewee? " To some degree 
"triangulation, " the process of comparing results from either two or more 
different methods of data collection (e. g. interviews and observation) or two or 
more data sources provides a safeguard against this. Patterns of convergence 
are sought to develop or corroborate an overall interpretation. Since multiple 
methods were employed in the present research, this has been attempted. 
However, triangulation is criticised as a test of validity because it assumes 
weaknesses in one method will be compensated by strengths in another, and 
that it is always possible to adjudicate between different accounts. Rather it 
was viewed as a way of ensuring comprehensiveness and encouraging 
reflexivity than as a pure test of validity. 
A method of bolstering claims to validity that has already been touched on is 
reflexivity. Other aspects of reflexivity are an appraisal of the effects of 
personal characteristics, such as age, sex, social class, professional status and 
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the "distance" between the researcher and the researched on the data 
collected. 
Fair dealing means ensuring that the research design explicitly incorporates a 
wide range of different perspectives so the viewpoint of one group is never 
presented as if it represents the sole truth about any situation. This too was 
problematic in the present research, where there is an almost infinite number 
of perspectives; which should be chosen? In researching the local treatment of 
drug users in primary care, for example, there was certainly some self- 
selecting bias amongst GPs. It was possible to interview a broad range of GPs 
from practices which were broadly sympathetic to treating drug users, but 
those from practices which preferred not to take drug users on their lists were 
generally unwilling to engage with the research process. Again, these matters 
of recruitment and access are linked with issues of power. 
Finally, it is important to offer a clear exposition of methods of data collection 
and analysis. Methods used in data collection unavoidably influence the objects 
of inquiry (they influence what is collected, what is offered, what happens, 
what people do), so a clear account of the process of data collection and 
analysis is important. A written account should include sufficient data to allow 
the reader to judge whether the interpretation offered is adequately supported 
by the data. This chapter has aimed to provide such an account. 
4.8.6 Explanatory accounts 
Qualitative explanations attempt to say why patterns and outcomes in the data 
have occurred. These explanations may use a causal logic in a loose, non- 
universal, non-deterministic sense, but the logic is not based on linear variable 
analysis. They rarely cite a single cause or reason, but set out to clarify the 
nature and interrelationship of different contributory factors or influences - 
such as personal intentions, patterns of understanding, norms and situational 
influences. Sometimes explanations will be offered with some certainty 
because of the strength of the evidential base. Other times they will be 
suggested as hypotheses which need to be tested in further research. 
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Chapter five: Health improvement 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter is the first of three findings chapters which examine the PCG's 
and PCT's collaborative capacity and practice, the third element identified in 
the realist theoretical framework. 
0 
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COLLABORATIVE 
CAPACITY & 
PRACTICE 
Health 
improvement 
Primary care 
delivery and 
development 
Figure 8: Realist theoretical framework - collaborative capacity 
As chapter three demonstrated, the New Labour government gave PCGs and 
PCTs a remit to improve the health of their population. The early guidance was 
to adopt an approach to this which considered a wider range of determinants 
of health and thus required a more collaborative model than primary care had 
traditionally taken. This chapter addresses research question 3 (see p80) which 
draws on the analytical framework of figure 6 to identify four features of the 
organisations' forms which were likely to facilitate collaboration. 
RQ3 How far did the following features of PCGs' and PCTs' organisational 
forms allow them to bring about a collaborative approach to improving 
the health of their population? 
" Their explicit health improvement remit 
" Their locality-wide base 
9 the election of practising clinicians to their governing bodies 
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" the inclusion of a local authority social services department (SSD) 
representative on their governing bodies. 
This chapter asks whether these four features equipped the two organisations 
with the collaborative capacity to adopt this more public health-based 
approach to improving the health of their population. It explores how each 
element of the context identified in the analytic framework helped or hindered 
the PCG and PCT to build collaborative relationships. 
It draws on interview data to illuminate the experiences and perspectives of 
participants from different professional groups from the PCG and PCT and 
from the wider primary care community, as well as from participants whose 
main work lay outside the NHS. It also uses documentary and observational 
evidence. 
Section 5.2 briefly outlines the organisational structures of the PCG and PCT in 
Oxford. It highlights the main differences between them, which lay in their 
scale, complexity and the stability of the composition of their staff and 
governing bodies over time. 
Section 5.3 focuses on the first of the four elements of organisational form, 
examining whether and how Oxford City PCG and PCT's explicit health 
improvement remit facilitated their adoption of a more collaborative, public 
health-oriented approach which focussed attention on broad determinants of 
health. To do this, it eplores how the PCG and PCT interpreted their health 
improvement remits: the process by which health improvement priorities were 
identified by each, how health improvement strategies were devised, and how 
progress was made and assessed against them. 
It argues that the PCG's explicit health improvement remit, which was new to 
primary care, was effective in stimulating a more upstream, public health- 
focused approach to to addressing determinants of health than primary care 
had previously adopted, and in initiating collaborative ventures with local 
authority and non-statutory bodies to pursue such an approach. 
Two aspects of the outer context supported this upstream approach to health 
improvement by the PCG. First, in line with its third way rhetoric, central 
government took a facilitative, hands-off role and, second, it emphasised the 
importance of tackling complex social problems. These two elements of the 
context allowed the PCG to identify locally relevant, non-medical health 
improvement priorities. They also made for a policy environment in which the 
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creativity and personal commitment of the PCG's HImP group members and 
boundary-spanners from other organisations could thrive in pursuit of them. 
It argues that the PCT's explicit health improvement remit was less effective as 
a means of underpinning an upstream approach to health improvement. 
Although the PCT was also charged with improving the health of its local 
population, it operated in a policy context in which the government's rhetorical 
commitment to the third way was undermined by an emphasis on medically- 
oriented, centrally-defined targets, which was not conducive to a collaborative, 
public health-oriented approach. Organisational change and major staff 
turnover from PCG to PCT further impeded the health improvement remit of 
the PCT by damaging the collaborative relationships that had been established 
between the PCG and local authority and non-statutory bodies, and disrupting 
the grassroots, public health-oriented work initiated under the aegis of the 
PCG. 
Section 5.4 considers how having in place locality-wide structures facilitated 
primary care's adoption of a more collaborative, public health-oriented 
approach to health improvement. It argues that a consequence of having a 
locality-wide primary care structure was the development of subgroups to 
carry out such work across that geographical area. It focuses on the health 
improvement subgroups established by the PCG and PCT and asks whether 
their composition and terms of reference enabled primary care to collaborate 
with other statutory and non-statutory bodies for health improvement. It asks 
which individual and organisational factors facilitated and inhibited such 
collaboration. 
It argues that the city-wide geographical scale of the PCG and PCT was a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to support a more strategic approach to 
tackling health inequalities than had been available to the fragmented pre-PCG 
primary care community. The introduction of the PCG - coterminous with the 
City Council and with its explicit health improvement remit - supported a city- 
wide subgroup established to implement the health improvement frameworks 
described in 5.3. This allowed collaboration with parts of the local authority 
and non-statutory organisations for health improvement on a city-wide scale. 
The group's terms of reference and composition facilitated an upstream 
approach to health improvement. 
The PCT covered the same geographical area and had a subgroup with a 
responsibility to lead health improvement activity in the locality. This section 
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It argues that collaboration between some departments of the local authority 
and the PCG was strong, but this did not result from the inclusion of the SSD 
representative on the board. The failure of this as a collaborative mechanism 
was due in part to a two-tier and fragmented local authority and the prolonged 
absence from work of the SSD representative. Instead, collaboration evolved 
through, and was maintained by, the efforts of a small number of boundary- 
spanners from the PCG and the city council. In parts of the city council where 
no boundary-spanner emerged (for example, the housing department), 
collaboration was much less evident. 
Representation of SSD survived the transition from PCG to PCT but, since this 
was not the mechanism for health improvement-related collaboration between 
the local authority and the PCG, it did not sustain collaboration with the PCT. 
Finally, section 5.7 summarises the findings about the PCG's and PCT's 
collaborative activity to improve the health of its population. It assesses the 
differences between the two organisations' approaches and relates them to 
contextual factors identified in the framework in section 3.7. 
Overall, chapter five argues that two of the features of the PCG's organisational 
form, its health improvement remit and its locality-wide base, effectively 
facilitated an upstream approach to health improvement. Factors of the outer 
context which acted most strongly as driving forces for collaboration were the 
hands-off, facilitative role of central government, consistent with its third way 
rhetoric of collaboration, and the prominence afforded to tackling complex 
social problems. 
The transition to PCT and differences in the context in which it operated, 
disrupted collaborations forged by the PCG. In particular, the increasingly 
target-driven, centrally controlled health improvement agenda changed the 
focus of public health efforts to a more strongly medically-oriented one. It was 
therefore less effective than the PCG as a collaborative mechanism for 
upstream health improvement. 
The other two factors, local authority representation and the election of 
practising clinicians by their peers to the governing bodies of the PCG and PCT 
did not enable collaboration to come about. These were inhibited by 
organisational and cultural barriers, the traditionally medically-oriented 
approach to health of GPs, and the scant history of collaboration in general 
practice. 
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5.2 Organisational structures of Oxford City PCG and PCT 
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Figure 9: Structure of Oxford City PCG and related NHS and local authority bodies 
This section begins with a brief overview of the structure of Oxford City PCG 
and PCT, their subgroups and staff. 
5.2.1 PCG structure 
The board which governed Oxford City PCG had responsibility for the main 
decisions on the organisation's policy, strategic and financial direction. It was 
dominated by clinicians who had been elected by their peers, comprising 
altogether 
"5 GPs (including chair) 
"3 nurses 
" Chief executive 
" Health Authority non-executive 
" Social services department representative 
" Lay member 
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Staff 
When the PCG originally went "live" in April 1999, the staff consisted only of a 
chief executive and an administrator. Over the following two years, the 
organisation grew, board members were elected or appointed, and a larger 
staff of managers and administrators was employed. Interestingly, over the 
lifespan of the PCG almost no staff left the organisation. 
Subgroups 
The PCG board established five subgroups: the Health Improvement Program 
(HImP) Group, the Communications and Public Involvement Group (CPIG), 
Primary Care Development Group (PCDG), the Clinical Governance Group, and 
the Training and Education Group. Each group was chaired by a board 
member and included at least one member of PCG staff, had a ringfenced 
budget and was accountable to the board. Their main functions were to advise 
the board on national and local developments, agree work programs, and 
commission specific pieces of work, for example needs assessment or 
consultancy. 
The CPIG and the HImP groups were the most outward-looking, and acted as a 
conduit to the wider health and social care infrastructure in Oxford. Their 
flexible composition and activity meant in many ways they were better placed 
than the board to engage partner organisations and facilitate collaboration at a 
local level. 
115 
5.2.2 PCT structure 
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Figure 10: Structure of Oxford City PCT and related NHS and local authority bodies 
To meet the considerable increase in its responsibilities, the DH required that 
PCTs adopted a much more complex and bureaucratic structure than the PCG 
[see figure 10]. At the highest level, this involved the separation of the board 
from the professional executive committee (PEC). There was some overlap 
between the membership of these bodies to allow co-ordination and the 
smooth running of the PCT as a whole. 
The role of the board was to set the overall strategy of the PCT, to take 
responsibility for spending public money, to monitor the performance of the 
PCT including finance and service delivery, and to ensure PCT actions met local 
needs and involved communities. Membership of the board was almost entirely 
lay: it comprised 
9 Chair 
" Chief executive 
0 Director of Public Health 
" Director of Finance and Performance 
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" Director of Quality and Professional Development 
" five non-executive directors 
" three PEC members: the PEC chair, another GP and a nurse 
The PEC was to be the 'engine room' of the organisation, to decide operational 
priorities, and to advise the board on strategy, service and financial plans. 
Most of the clinicians who had been members of the PCG board were 
effectively transferred to the PCT PEC. It consisted of 
" Chair and four other GP members (all former PCG board members) 
" Chief executive 
" SSD representative (formerly PCG board member) 
" four nurse members (initially two from the PCG board) 
" pharmacist 
" therapist 
" Director of Public Health 
0 Director of Finance and Performance. 
The GPs and SSD representatives provided considerable continuity between the 
PCG board and PCT PEC. The main differences between the two bodies were 
the addition of another nurse, a therapist and a pharmacist. GPs did not hold 
the majority of places on the PEC, and it included no lay member. 
PCT Staff 
The staff turnover in the first year of the PCT was enormous. Few of the 
administrative or managerial staff who had worked in the PCG were still 
employed by the PCT by the end of 2001. 
A major administrative change which accompanied the establishment of PCTs 
in Oxfordshire was the dissolution of the Community Health Trust (CHT). As a 
result, community nurses and most of the other staff formerly employed by the 
CHT became employees of the PCTs. 
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Subgroups 
The subgroups transferred intact, for the most part, from PCG to PCT. The 
main differences between the PCG and PCT subgroups were in the transition 
from the PCG's HImP group to the PCT's public health and inequalities (PH&I) 
group. These differences are examined in the section 5.4. 
5.3 Health improvement remit 
Under the aegis of the PCG and PCT, primary care had, for the first time, 
responsibility to improve the health of the local population (a responsibility 
which was distinguished from the delivery of primary care or commissioning 
secondary care) through addressing wider determinants of health than 
mainstream NHS service provision traditionally had. As chapter two argued, the 
PCG's and PCT's responsibility for health improvement required a fundamental 
change in outlook for primary care: from a predominantly downstream 
approach to a more upstream approach. Primary care professionals, 
particularly GPs, had traditionally adopted a predominantly medical, individual 
perspective on health care and had little history of collaboration. The drive 
towards a preventive, public health-oriented approach to health improvement 
seemed, therefore, ambitious for an organisation which placed those health 
professionals "in the driving seat" (Secretary of State for Health, 1997: para 
5.1). 
This section asks whether and how Oxford City PCG and PCT adopted a more 
collaborative, public health-oriented approach which focussed attention on 
broad determinants of health. It examines the process by which health 
improvement priorities were identified and how progress was assessed against 
them. 
5.3.1 PCG upstream health improvement model 
The main framework for Oxford City PCG's health improvement work was its 
Health Improvement Programme (HImP). As chapter three described, the HImP 
was a local plan of action which was expected to bring together people from 
various parts of the NHS (primary and secondary care) with local authorities 
and other agencies and organisations to Improve health and reduce 
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inequalities in health by tackling broad causes of ill health. Oxfordshire's HImP 
provided the overarching framework for health improvement for the whole 
county's population. Each of the six PCGs within Oxfordshire Health 
Authority's boundaries identified their own local priorities, and developed 
plans to meet them. 
Oxford City PCG's local HImP priorities were identified through 'bottom-up' 
consultation process, i. e. priorities were identified by those closest to the 
community being served, rather than imposed by senior policy makers. The 
consultation process was rapid but extensive and inclusive, involving 
community groups, independent and voluntary sector organisations, as well as 
NHS organisations and local authority departments. This inclusiveness was 
reflected in the orientation of the five priorities which emerged from the 
consultation, which was non-medical compared to those of other PCGs in the 
county, and to the traditionally medical and individual focus of mainstream 
primary care which was designed to react to illness than proactively to improve 
health. The priorities agreed by Oxford City PCG for its 1999/2000 HImP were: 
" mental health 
0 substance misuse 
0 reducing inequalities in health 
" housing and homelessness 
" promoting independent living in older people and people with 
disabilities. 
The significance of these HImP priorities was that, for the first time in primary 
care, the promotion of public health and prevention of ill health by addressing 
broad, non-medical determinants of health, were formally endorsed and 
legitimised. This was a welcome development for people who supported this 
approach, but had previously found it difficult to do so within the NHS. 
What was new and interesting and exciting about HImP was that it 
was the first time you could overtly be working on things that were 
not to do with treatment. It was broader, you were looking at 
prevention, and it was formalised in a structure, looking at 
inequalities. [health development manager 1] 
They aimed to tackle complex social problems which the PCG could not 
address alone: collaboration with a range of other organisations was crucial to 
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its success. To pursue a non-medical, public health model, PCGs had not only 
to engage with their primary care community, but also with a range of non- 
statutory organisations, including the voluntary sector. This section explores 
how the PCG's commitment to a collaborative approach to health manifest 
itself in collaboration with other such organisations to address broader 
determinants of health. 
The PCG's HImP group broke from traditional methods typically employed by 
NHS bodies in consultation and needs assessment when it initiated 
collaboration with non-statutory bodies such as the Unemployed Workers and 
Claimants' Union, which had previously had little or no contact with a statutory 
health service body. This brought significant change in both sides' perceptions 
of one another. The Union was initially commissioned to undertake the 
community involvement element of the consultation on becoming a PCT, using 
participatory appraisal methods to access 'hard-to-reach' groups including 
older people, drug users, young people, people with mental health problems, 
and refugees. This bottom-up, qualitative approach which was designed to 
meet the consultation requirements through a process which would empower 
and meaningfully involve members of the community. 
Assessment of progress against HImP (Stakeholder workshop) 
The HImP Action Plan originally acted as a guide for the implementation of the 
health improvement priorities. Milestones and outcome targets were identified, 
but their outcome measures were generally non-quantifiable proxies for long- 
term goals, not quantifiable short-term targets. The assessment of progress 
against these priorities was taken seriously by the PCG. 
In addition, in September 2000 the PCG held a HImP Stakeholder Workshop to 
which people whose work was connected to the HImP priorities were Invited to 
share experiences, information and achievements in health improvement work 
to date and to discuss and shape its future. I attended this workshop, along 
with a wide range of people including, from the statutory sector: PCG staff, 
PHCT members, the Community Health Trust, social services, City Council 
officers and councillors, and the universities. Representatives of the 
independent sector included Age Concern, MIND and other mental health 
charities, MENCAP, The Gap (a day centre for young homeless people), 
nightshelter, housing associations, Dialability, drugs agencies and 
rehabilitation centres. 
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Feedback from the event indicated that the inclusion of health Inequalities on 
the policy agenda was very strongly welcomed. An increase in collaboration 
with the City Council, and particularly the Environmental Health department, 
on a broad range of issues was highlighted as a success as well as an area 
where there was potential for more work. There was thought to be scope for 
greater involvement of the voluntary sector in tackling health inequalities. 
Action points from the workshop included keeping the profile of the HImP 
raised, recognising other partners' work, highlighting the relevance to all 
organisations and within organisations and the public (minutes of HImP group 
meeting, 2nd November 2000). 
The East Oxford Single Regeneration Budget and the Healthy Living Initiative 
bid were praised for recognising wider health needs and fostering joint work, 
including public involvement (minutes of HImP Group meeting, 2nd November 
2000). 
The collaboration-related language, ubiquitous in government rhetoric, was 
increasingly being used by local managers in both the health and social care 
sectors. It was argued by some that this made collaboration more likely to 
come about than it had been previously. It was seen as a worthwhile goal, 
which had not always been the case. 
I think clear partnership working, we haven't got it at the moment. 
We've got lots of good intentions, and that's much better than it was 
before where it was a real siege mentality and no-one spoke to each 
other. I think if we were to have this conversation 10 years ago, 
everyone stuck to their own thing, and i think that's wrong when you 
work in the public sector because you're all paid by the same people. 
(City Council Officer: health promotion) 
Collaborative relationships with non-statutory bodies 
The Union's work continued beyond the period of the PCT consultation as they 
trained facilitators from within the target groups and developed the beginnings 
of a network of community facilitators which would then be in place for future 
consultation and needs assessment. 
This and other opportunities taken by members of the HImP group to engage 
in the work of non-statutory and community groups on their terms signalled a 
commitment to work collaboratively with a broader range of organisations and 
step out of the traditional, medically-focussed NHS role. Because this approach 
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was new to primary care in many ways, its legitimacy was challenged at times 
by board members. However, much of their initial resistance was overcome by 
the health development managers who persuaded sceptics of its value. 
5.3.2 PCT implementation of NHS Plan & NSFs 
The PCT inherited the PCG's responsibility for improving health, but the way 
the two organisations carried out this work differed from one another. Targets 
were set in the NHS Plan and National Service Frameworks (NSFs), and all PCTs 
were performance managed against them, so the focus of the PCT's health 
improvement work became the implementation and performance management 
of the NHS Plan and NSFs. These differed from the HImP priorities in two 
important ways: they had been identified as priorities by central government 
rather than by local stakeholders, and overall, the NHS Plan had a stronger 
medical orientation. 
The NHS Plan priorities were accepted by most PCT staff as legitimate and 
uncontroversial areas of work to tackle ill health. As it became clear that the 
top-down forces on health improvement work were irresistible, efforts were 
made to work with them and incorporate them into locally relevant work. Some 
cautiously welcomed the transparency and accountability implied by the 
performance management. The public health and inequalities (PH&I) group 
worked to align upstream and downstream approaches to health improvement. 
They tried to fit locally relevant work around the centrally imposed targets and 
to manage the tensions between them and local need. Although it demanded a 
change in their working practices, they worked to accommodate the targets, 
and conceded that it was beneficial as a motivating force in certain respects. 
They became adept at presenting locally relevant work in ways that fitted with 
targets, without allowing their work to be dictated completely by these targets. 
Oh you can interpret it so it's synchronised totally. And local need 
fully blends in with the national agenda... It was described as a 
tension and I don't see it as a tension at all. They're complimentary. 
If you look at the epidemiological data, the people who are not 
coming forward - the low take-up rates and the lack of access are 
amongst the people who are most deprived and therefore you need 
to reduce that gap and promote access. (health development 
manager 2) 
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You have to do the must-do's, because, you know, the NHS Plan says 
so, and we're committed to doing that locally. Even if you're doing 
what you're doing, you have to try to phrase it, if you can, in terms 
of one of the NHS Plan target areas, or one of the other guidances 
coming out. And probably most of the work that we do, you can find 
a slot for it somewhere. (health development manager 1) 
However, the absence of national targets relating to reducing health 
inequalities meant that it was easily sidelined, and that developing 
collaboration around locally determined areas for health improvement was 
afforded lower priority. Members of the PH&I group who had been HImP group 
members were concerned that a preoccupation with short term, quantifiable 
targets would detract attention from longer term, more diffuse aspects of 
health inequalities. 
It's probably not a bad thing that you've got to be able to monitor it 
and have targets, but the irony is, in terms of health inequality, 
there aren't any national targets yet, because it's so hard to find 
those. (health development manager 1) 
There's always a tension between what has to be done, the service 
delivery side of it, and health promotion will always lose out. If you 
look at the targets set in the National Plan, the latest document that 
we've got to follow, they're quite medically orientated again. (City 
Council Officer: health promotion) 
All the new guidance coming out is tending to swamp the original 
idea of narrowing the health gap, and the broader causes of ill- 
health, and so on, with targets, with monitoring, and with the NHS 
Plan. It means that health improvement is likely to be the way that 
the NHS Plan is performance managed. (health development 
manager 2) 
Increasing central control and prioritising nationally identified areas bore an 
opportunity cost. Other issues which were held locally to be very important 
risked being neglected as human and financial resources were dedicated to 
meeting centrally prescribed targets. 
The work to tackle substance misuse exemplified this. This was an area of 
collaborative work whose profile had been raised by the PCG and which had 
made progress and garnered significant support locally, yet which risked being 
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sidelined as the PCT pursued the areas on which its performance would be 
measured by the Strategic Health Authority or Department of Health for star 
ratings. This is further explored in chapter seven. 
Implementation of the older people's National Service Framework (NSF) 
illustrated the perverse effects of target-setting on areas of care for which 
targets were not set. Falls prevention was one of the areas highlighted by the 
NSF, but PCT management chose not to address it until pressure was exerted 
to meet a target. One nurse PEC member identified this as an example of the 
differences between the extent to which practitioners and managers were 
motivated by targets. She contrasted her approach as a clinician with what she 
perceived to be the target-obsessed culture of NHS management which, 
without targets, would neglect important health needs. She observed that the 
PCT's preoccupation with targets had increased relative to the PCG and 
attributed this partly to a dilution of the influence of practitioners on the PCTs' 
governing bodies and an increase in the proportion of managers. 
But I have been very disillusioned talking with a senior lead for the 
NSF for older people about falls prevention and falls reduction, and 
this person said in spring 2002, 'I'm not going to do anything on 
this, standard 6, which is about falls reduction, until the autumn 
because the targets don't come through 'til 2003 and 2004. 'l heard 
that and 1 thought, 'people fall over every day, and the impact of 
falls on an older person are often devastating'. The statistic about 
the number of people who are dead within 6 months of a NOFF [neck 
of femur fracture] - about 46 of them are dead. Six month 
morbidity with a fractured neck of femur is huge, and the impact for 
the individual is huge. (PCG board/PCT PEC nurse) 
This illustrates the tensions felt between clinicians and managers. 
Assessment of progress against targets 
The increasing emphasis on performance management of the PCT brought 
about what was referred to as a 'target culture. ' This was particularly salient in 
its approach to work relating to health improvement. While the HImP group 
proposed to "ensure that project work to achieve local HImP priorities [was] 
evaluated", the PH&I group was more driven to achieve explicit outcomes and 
meet quantifiable targets: 
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to agree milestones, targets and where possible, measurable 
outcomes to be used to assess progress against the work plan. 
(Oxford City PCG HImP Group, 2001) 
The key performance indicators for health improvement against which the PCT 
was to be judged were predominantly medical4. 
As the change in focus became apparent around the time of the transition to 
PCT, the implications for the health improvement work were noted by the 
former members of the HImP group who anticipated great change. 
The targets. I think that if we do focus too tightly on the tiny little 
bean counting then you're not looking at the bigger agenda than 
what's going on in front of you. It's frustrating. If the government's 
looking at, I don't know, how many bits of heart disease are treated 
with this drug, and takes its eye off the fact that we're creating 
cycles of poverty that are intergenerational, then I think they're 
missing a real issue. (City Council Officer: social inclusion) 
By the time the PCT's first annual report was published in July 2002,24 targets 
had been identified on which the PCT was performance managed, and the 
PCT's performance against them was reported to each board meeting. The PCT 
would be judged on 21 of these by the DH and Thames Valley Strategic Health 
Authority. The other three, related to the PCT's financial balance, access to 
primary healthcare professionals, and access to emergency services, would be 
used to calculate the PCT's 'star rating'. 
think we've moved into a very strong medical model of public 
health. I regret that but I'm going to have to work with it. I think 
those days have gone. As you say the links are made at strategic 
level but my feel is at the moment less at operational level than they 
used to be. (PCG board/PCT PEC nurse) 
think there's still a real problem with health being around medicine 
and emergency care and hospitals and not being about housing and 
streets and crime and poverty... Within the PCT I think health 
inequalities have gone right down the agenda and that what we 
" See section 3.4.2 for list of performance indicators 
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mean by them is not the same thing. Certainly when I met with [one 
of the public health team], he wasn't really interested in talking 
about projects unless we could prove a medical impact, and of 
course that's quite difficult to do with anything from increased 
leisure provision to housing. It takes ages for the health impacts to 
show. (City Council Officer: social inclusion) 
There was recognition that the new performance management had some 
benefits, but it also felt more coercive and less facilitative, and was sometimes 
accompanied by heavy-handed punitive forces, perceived to be biased in 
favour of secondary care and not always compatible with meeting locally 
identified needs. The threat to "name and shame" people and organisations 
which failed to meet targets and achieve standards within a particular 
timeframe was felt to be unconducive to generating collaborative relationships. 
The requirement for individual organisations to meet separate and sometimes 
conflicting targets was similarly felt to distract attention from longer term, 
wider determinants of health such as poverty which required long-term co- 
ordinated strategic efforts from a range of public sector organisations. 
I think that all the time you have such heavy pronouncements, all 
the time you have the threat of people being named and shamed 
and the threat of jobs going and resources being transferred and 
the rest of the nonsense, all the time you have that Stalinist 
approach to healthcare, you will get in the way of generating 
organic partnerships. That isn't to say that setting standards is a 
bad thing, but it's the 80: 20 rule - how do we interpret this 
standard in our circumstances? That's the 80% we can deliver you; 
we've got to work on the other 20%. But when you've got a focus in 
that league table mentality on secondary care, and specific aspects 
of secondary care, it will get in the way of developing more 
strategically sensible, locally relevant stuff. And you just keep 
banging away and pouring money down the OR's [Oxford Radcliffe, 
acute trust] throat which is what we want to stop doing. (PCG/PCT 
lay member) 
Summary: This section asked whether and how Oxford City PCG and PCT 
adopted a more collaborative, public health-oriented approach which focussed 
attention on broad determinants of health. it examines the process by which 
health improvement priorities were identified and how progress was assessed 
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against them. It argued that the PCG's health improvement remit legitimised 
upstream approach to this area of the PCG's work, and this was facilitated by 
the support of the outer context which emphasised collaboration and complex 
social problems, and the personal commitment of boundary-spanners in the 
inner context. However, this was undermined in the PCT by a context which 
was more centrally controlled and by organisational turbulence which was 
disruptive of nascent collaborative relationships. 
5.4 Locality-wide primary care organisation 
As chapter two set out, many social and environmental determinants of health 
are tackled more effectively at a wider geographical level than at an individual 
GP or practice level. Many are also influenced more by local authority and non- 
statutory bodies than by NHS bodies. The PCG and PCT were locality-based 
primary care organisations, an arrangement which contrasted significantly with 
the fragmentation of primary care and independence/autonomy of GPs prior to 
their introduction. In Oxford they were coterminous with the City Council, 
many of whose functions derived from public health origins. This implied an 
opportunity for primary care to develop a more strategic approach to 
collaborating with the City Council and other organisations to pursue health 
improvement objectives for the population of Oxford than had been possible 
when primary care was an assortment of unconnected practices. This section 
considers how the existence of these overarching locality-based structures 
facilitated primary care's adoption of a more collaborative, public health- 
oriented approach to health. It focuses on the subgroups each established to 
implement the health improvement frameworks described in 5.3, and asks 
whether their composition and terms of reference enabled collaborative 
working for health improvement. It asks which Individual and organisational 
factors facilitated and inhibited collaboration. 
5.4.1 PCG's HImP group 
The main responsibility to develop the PCG's health improvement framework 
was given to the Health Improvement Programme (HImP) group. It was multi- 
disciplinary and multi-sectoral, and was set up explicitly to take forward 
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Oxford City's contribution to Oxfordshire Health Authority's countywide HImP. 
This section examines how the HImP group's terms of reference, its 
composition, activity and character and its relationship to the rest of the PCG 
and the primary care community suited it to facilitating collaboration for health 
improvement. 
HImP group terms of reference 
The HImP group's Terms of Reference (November 1999) placed a strong 
emphasis on working with other parts of the PCG, as well as with the wider 
primary care community and beyond. Among its purposes were: 
" In partnership, to formulate plans for local action on agreed local HImP 
priorities; 
" To encourage primary care teams to become involved and have 
ownership for the PCG's HImP priorities related work; 
" To ensure that links are made to other aspects of Oxford City PCG's 
work (including primary care development, clinical governance, and 
commissioning); 
" To discuss national and local developments in health improvement, 
public health and health promotion and advise the PCG board. 
" To engage in an open dialogue with partner agencies and primary care 
teams on health improvement, public health and health promotion 
issues. 
The Primary Care Investment Plan (PCIP) reinforced the theme of collaboration 
and involvement of a wide range of people, stating that the HImP group's work 
would be: 
... taken forward via partnership working through a range of working 
groups, primary care staff involvement, community involvement, 
information gathering to inform future work, training and education 
strategies, and service developments. (PCIP 1999-2002, September 
1999). 
HImP group composition 
The original membership of the HImP group signalled high-level commitment 
to its work; it Included six PCG board members, Including the chief executive, 
two GPs (one of whom chaired the group), a health visitor, the SSD 
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representative, and the board lay member. Membership from the City Council, 
Community Health Trust Health Promotion, the Health Authority and the 
Community Health Council (CHC) also reflected that the nascent organisation 
was reaching out beyond the immediate primary care community. 
Two key members of the HImP group were the health development managers, 
members of the PCG staff. Their posts were jointly funded by the PCG and the 
City Council in recognition of the overlap in their responsibilities, In itself a 
manifestation of their combined commitment to collaboration on health 
improvement and the support for it at a senior level of both organisations. 
They were employed by the PCG, and based in their premises. They both had 
backgrounds in community development and the voluntary sector, and their 
role was to manage the implementation of the HImP with a focus on 
development, prevention and long term public health initiatives. They played a 
key role in developing the health improvement agenda and projects with a 
range of organisations, agencies, community groups and voluntary 
organisations, including the City Council. One of them chaired the HImP Group. 
The HImP recognised that the distinctly non-medical nature of the Oxford City 
PCG's HImP priorities would require broader input still. The need to include 
representatives of the voluntary and community sectors, black and minority 
ethnic groups, and specialist areas of expertise that may be required, was 
acknowledged early on. To ensure group members had sufficient authority and 
influence within their organisations to undertake meaningful collaboration, it 
was stipulated that 
Members of the group should be able to speak for their own 
organisations and to take back issues for action to their own 
organisations and networks. (HImP Group terms of reference, 
November 1999). 
Over the first six months of the PCG's lifetime, the membership of the group 
changed considerably. Both GPs and the chief executive withdrew, so its 
membership became less senior and less 'medical'. The health visitor board 
member became chair when the GPs withdrew. From this point on, a core HImP 
group membership, from the local authority and a range of community-based 
organisations, remained committed and active in the group's work. 
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HImP group activity and character 
The HImP group brought together Oxford-based organisations to work to 
improve health. Its monthly meetings were attended by City Council officers, 
PCT staff (including, initially, the PCG chief executive), other organisations and, 
at first, two GPs. These meetings provided a forum where Individuals could 
enhance their understanding of each other's professional and organisational 
cultures and explore opportunities for collaboration. Through them the Health 
Promotion Department of the city council had a great deal of contact with the 
PCG chief executive and chair, and they built strong, trusting relationships. 
think it's certainly opened a lot of eyes in the Local Authority about 
the role and status of GPs. I think they were a bit of a mystery group 
before and certainly, going to lots of meetings with them, I 
understand that they come with a particular view: small 
businessman basically, and a cautious group. So it's very valuable to 
understand those issues from their point of view. (City Council 
Officer: health promotion) 
The PCG was also well linked into the City Council's work to promote social 
inclusion. One member of the HImP group was the City Council's social 
inclusion officer, who worked with the PCG and the practices within it to 
introduce a pilot scheme called "Benefits in Practice" which installed benefits 
advisors in certain GP practices with high levels of deprivation to make benefits 
advice more accessible to patients. It was also closely involved with the East 
Oxford Healthy Living Initiative (HLI), a non-statutory sector initiative, funded 
by the National Lottery New Opportunities Fund, with a focus on community- 
level action to promote health and reduce health inequalities. Its five main 
areas of work were healthy eating; improving access to health services by 
enabling health professionals to bring services to community groups; 
improving access to complementary therapies for low-income groups; and the 
provision of childcare and supporting volunteers. 
The HImP group had the most eclectic membership of all the PCG's subgroups, 
and an enthusiastic and vibrant atmosphere. Observation of its meetings 
allowed me to witness the palpable commitment, drive and enthusiasm of the 
team of PCG staff who led the HlmP work. Almost from the inception of the 
PCG, there was an awareness that it was a transitory body which was working 
towards PCT status. The transition occurred more quickly than had been 
anticipated, and staff were operating under considerable uncertainty about 
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their future. The backdrop of organisational turbulence made for a challenging 
environment in which to build collaborative relationships. One health 
development manager described the HImP Group and the PCG as a whole as 
supportive organisations which would support individuals through very 
demanding times of organisational change. The importance of loyalty and trust 
within the PCG for fostering collaboration in an environment dominated by 
uncertainty was underlined by this City Council officer, amongst others. 
I think it's a great group, because it's got energy, it gets things done. 
Out of necessity, it will change slightly [with the PCT move], and 
hopefully the dynamics of the people won't change the overall 
atmosphere. [HImP Group chair] is elected [to the PCT board] now, 
so ... 
hopefully she'll stay on as chair of the HImP group. (City 
Council Officer: social inclusion) 
5.4.2 PCT's Public Health and Inequalities (PH&l) group and 'patches' 
The Public Health and Inequalities (PH&I) subgroup of the PCT replaced the 
PCG's HImP subgroup and took over its role in implementing the PCT's public 
health agenda. This section examines how the PH&I group's terms of 
reference, its composition, activity and character and its relationship to the 
rest of the PCG and the primary care community suited it to facilitating 
collaboration for health improvement. 
PH&I group terms of reference 
The PH&I group's terms of reference suggested that collaboration remained a 
prominent concern, but that it was more likely to be pursued within the NHS 
than with external agencies. Its stated aims included: 
" To develop a work plan to achieve this improvement in health in the context 
of the NHS Plan, the National Service Frameworks and other relevant NHS 
guidance. 
" In partnership with others to work towards improving the health of the 
population of Oxford City PCT... 
" To encourage primary care, community practitioners and the public to 
become involved and have ownership for work to improve health 
(PH&I Group Terms of Reference, 2001) 
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PH&I group composition 
Initially, the PH&I group's composition was similar to that of the HImP group. 
The PCG HImP group's work was led by HDMs whose backgrounds were in 
community development in the voluntary sector, and its processes were 
inclusive of a diverse range of community groups whose work promoted health 
in its broadest sense, undertaking to "involve all with an interest"(PCG HImP 
group terms of reference). The jointly funded health development managers 
(HDMs) played key roles in collaboration between the PCG, the City Council and 
non-statutory organisations. They had proved themselves to be skilled 
networkers, committed to a bottom-up, locally-responsive and inclusive model 
of health improvement. However, the PCT's new approach to public health 
called for a different way of working and a restructuring of the public health 
function in line with the patch-based management structure. This arrangement 
was not well suited to the new responsibilities of the PH&I group and the 
group's composition changed significantly in the first six months. The PCT's 
PH&I group was more closely focussed on meeting national targets and 
priorities, which mostly were expressed in quantifiable, epidemiological terms. 
Government guidance stipulated that all PCTs were to appoint a Director of 
Public Health (DPH), a public health specialist who did not have to have a 
clinical background but, in most cases, had. In Oxford City, the DPH was 
supported by the appointment of three public health specialists - each of 
whom also had a medical background. The PCT inherited a fledgling public 
health team from the PCG which meant that it was recruiting to positions which 
overlapped with existing post-holders. 
The restructuring of its public health function was protracted as the Faculty of 
Public Health's guidance on the appointment of PCT Directors of Public Health 
(DPH) was delayed, and the interim period resulted in considerable Instability 
and uncertainty and disruption for the existing HImP team. It created 
a difficult period to manage with some uncertainty for individuals and 
difficulties for outside agencies knowing who to talk to. (PCT chief 
executive) 
The health development managers, who had been in post for two and three 
years, applied for the posts but discovered the approach to health 
improvement they had been pursuing in the PCG was not what was required by 
the PCT. 
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At interview it was all about the medical model. Cervical cytology and 
immunisations. That's important as well, but it's the holistic, broad 
public health agenda that is so important and I hope it's not lost. (health 
development manager 2) 
Another was told the PCT 
"did not need partnership and collaboration skills" (Health development 
manager 2) 
in the new postholders. 
Within the first year of the PCT, the PCG's Health Development managers, 
whose roles were closely tied to the PCG's more locally determined, broad- 
based processes of health improvement, were both made redundant. The 
change in approach and the redundancies damaged many nascent 
partnerships. 
PH&I group activity and character 
The camaraderie and enthusiasm which the PH&I group inherited from the 
HImP group was undermined by the redundancies of the HDMs and the more 
managerial, less creative approach to health improvement. 
The loss of two well-established members of the team was widely felt in a 
variety of ways. The HDMs and staff of other organisations they had built 
collaborations with expressed regret, anger, sadness and indignation that 
nascent partnerships or projects they had been working on would be damaged 
or abandoned. The comments of one HDM illustrate her personal commitment 
to the work and her sorrow at no longer being in a position to do it. 
I will say, despite that fact that there's a tape recorder here, that I have 
been shocked at an organisation using redundancies in the first year of 
its existence. That shocked me. (PCG board/PCT PEC nurse) 
The impact of losing their public health workers. At that meeting where 
we were told, you could see people were genuinely absolutely gutted that 
it had happened at every level. (City Council Officer: social inclusion) 
The redundancies were also attributed to clashes of power and lack of trust 
within the PCT, where new individuals felt threatened by an established team. 
It was seen by some as a breach of the PCT's pledge to be an 'exemplary 
employer' and an organisation which valued its workforce. 
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It's more about a new organisation still stuck in the storming phase and 
developing and building trust. Internal trust. It's much more about that 
than anything external really. (health development manager 2) 
Patches 
The PCT's locality was divided into three "patches, " primarily to facilitate the 
engagement of the primary care community in health improvement. Patches 
were designed to be of a scale which would strike a balance between 
considering the needs of the patient lists of individual, self-managed primary 
healthcare teams - the traditional horizon of GPs - and more strategic 
management of primary care activity at the whole PCT level. Each patch was 
allocated a public health specialist (these were not the PCG health development 
managers) and a patch manager whose broad remit was to encourage Primary 
Health Care Teams (PHCTs) to consider the health of a population that was 
wider than their own practice list. They would give individual teams the 
support and flexibility to look beyond their own practice's health improvement 
needs to those of a wider geographical area within the city and its population, 
and to collaborate with other PHCTs in order to meet them. 
The way I do approve of the changes in the public health department 
here is that they aim to get much more patch-based and bring 
primary care workers into the public health discussion because in 
the end they're the people who have to implement it. You can't have 
everything done from outside. (PCT chief executive) 
Health needs are always seen in terms of the practice responsibility, 
so everything's seen through the eyes of the practice. So deprivation 
and all that one's implying when one says that, is well understood by 
practices, but there's not a lot of sympathy between practice x and 
practice y who'll say 'yes, you must have some of my resources 
because 1 can see that your deprivation's... ' (PCG board/ PCT PEC 
chair) 
GPs are still very focussed on the needs of their practice. Now you 
could say that that is a public health dimension. They've got their 
identified population and they want to improve the health of that. 
Where we struggle always is saying this not about supporting the 
practice but a particular needy group or a particular geographical 
population. It's a very rare event to float away from your own 
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practice perspective and ignore all the years of thinking about your 
own population and spread it. I think that's quite difficult. (PCG 
board/ PCT PEC chair) 
The chief executive's view reflected changes in the nature of health 
improvement. The PEC chair expressed the view that PHCTs did have an 
understanding of broad determinants of health, but did not have an 
organisational mechanism or incentives to act on it. 
Patches were coterminous with pairs of the City Council's six newly formed 
Local Area Committees (LACs). Three City Council Area Co-ordinators each co- 
ordinated the work of two areas and were paired with the Patch Managers to 
facilitate collaboration. The City Council encouraged the PH&I group to be 
active in the Local Area Committee Meetings. Patch managers attended these 
meetings and could contribute from the floor, but had no formal position 
within them. 
5.4.3 Collaborative relationships with non-statutory bodies 
The health development managers, who were made redundant soon after the 
transition to PCT, had nurtured relationships between the PCG and non- 
statutory bodies which had not formerly engaged collaboratively with the NHS. 
Their redundancies, together with changes in the framework and style of 
health improvement, had implications for collaboration with these bodies. 
Some of the local organisations, agencies and practitioners who had originally 
contributed to the identification of the HImP priorities and the HImP 
stakeholders workshop felt cynical and betrayed as a result of the volle face of 
the health improvement process. The process they were originally invited to 
participate in was one where they could shape the agenda and directly 
influence the priorities. Their trust had been hard won by the HDMs over a 
period of time. This was subsequently sabotaged, from their point of view, by 
the fiercely top-down agenda driven by central government-prescribed 
priorities. Valuable partnerships that had been built at a grassroots level were 
perceived to be undermined by the more strategic, less organic approach to 
health improvement. 
So certainly some of the work that [the health development 
managers] were involved in - it's just been decided that that's not 
appropriate any more... There were lots of links with community 
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groups, and that does seem like a big loss now. We all know that 
community development and community trust-building takes years 
and years and years, it doesn't just happen overnight. (City Council 
Officer: social inclusion) 
Those who had been instrumental in establishing this collaboration, most 
notably the HDMs, were deeply saddened that it was to be interrupted and 
brought to an end at a point when they felt they had made great progress 
towards building trust between themselves and these organisations. 
felt guilty at first. You build trust and I was making commitments 
and fully believed I'd be staying, but it's been taken out of my 
control. It does take a long time to build up partnerships and trust 
and understand people and know you believe in the same things, 
and we had really got there. A lot of debate, about issues and how 
they should be taken forward and I believed in it and enjoyed it. 
(health development manager 2) 
Summary: This section considered how the existence of these overarching 
locality-based structures facilitated primary care's adoption of a more 
collaborative, public health-oriented approach to health. It focused on the 
subgroups each established to implement the health improvement frameworks 
described in 5.3, and asked whether their composition and terms of reference 
enabled collaborative working for health improvement. It asked which 
individual and organisational factors facilitated and inhibited collaboration. 
It argued that the PCG's coterminosity with the City Council supported a more 
strategic approach to tackling health inequalities than the fragmented primary 
care had previously, in particular the establishment of the subggroup to 
Implement the health improvement frameworks. The group's terms of 
reference and composition facilitated an upstream approach to health 
Improvement. The policy context in which the PCT operated was much less 
conducive to upstream health improvement than that of the PCG. Its obligation 
to meet medically-oriented health improvement targets identified by central 
government meant its health improvement working group's composition and 
terms of reference undermined the work of the PCG's health improvement 
group. 
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5.5 Practising clinicians elected by peers to governing bodies 
The HImP group's Terms of Reference stated that it would encourage the 
ownership and involvement of primary care staff in work related to the HImP 
priorities. However, doctors' training is primarily medical with a focus on 
individual patients, rather than on broader determinants of the health of the 
population. Further, the primary care community was disparate and 
organisationally complex with little history of collaboration and a reputation 
for conservatism and resistance to change, so persuading them to adopt a new 
philosophy of health care was likely to be difficult. As chapter three showed, 
one mechanism by which they might be persuaded was the domination of the 
board by doctors and nurses who had been elected by their peers. If these 
clinicians endorsed health improvement work, this might lend it credibility and 
encourage their peers to adopt this new approach. 
This section examines whether the presence of clinicians, elected by their 
peers, on the PCG board facilitated a corporate sense of ownership by PHCTs 
of health improvement work. Did the primary care community adopt a non- 
medical approach to health improvement which focussed on prevention and 
the broad determinants of health? 
5.5.1 PCG board composition 
Most of the clinicians on the board took little interest in the work of the HImP 
group. Over the period of the PCG's life, one of the board nurses was a 
consistent and active member of the HImP group. Two GPs were, consecutively, 
nominal members of the HImP group, but they were present at few meetings 
and both left within six months of the group being set up. The PCG chair, a GP, 
was sympathetic to the approach and philosophy of the group, but did not play 
an active role in its work. 
No participants in the study reported having perceived a shift in primary care 
clinicians towards a stronger public health focus since the PCG came into 
being. They generally felt that individuals' tendencies to favour a public health 
over a medical approach would vary and was to some degree a matter of 
personal ideology: that there had always been people more and less interested 
in wider determinants of health - and that the PCG was not in a position to 
enforce the adoption of a different approach. At most, it could create, facilitate 
and publicise more opportunities for those who were interested In health 
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improvement initiatives to become involved in them. However, many argued 
that the plan to involve primary care professionals in the drive to reduce health 
inequalities, other than through the clinical roles in which they were trained, 
was misguided in itself: clinicians' capacity for this was limited by their role 
and training, and health improvement would be achieved more effectively 
through other means, such as the work of the Health Development managers 
in collaboration with local authority and voluntary bodies. 
The City Council officer for health promotion doubted that the links he had 
built with senior members of the PCG would permeate throughout the PCG 
board, let alone the primary care community: 
I think we've been very fortunate with someone like [the PCG chief 
executive] who's got a lot of vision and is prepared to do things 
differently, very flexible, innovative all the rest of it. If the agenda is 
about change, and I feel it needs to be, he subscribes to that 
agenda, and [PCG chair] as well... But I guess I have a concern that 
although they are quite pioneering and so on, whether they'll be able 
to bring the board with them, whether there's enough carrots and 
sticks in the right proportions, I don't know. (City Council Officer: 
health promotion) 
Although the board tolerated HImP rather than endorsing it or giving it 
credibility with their peers, it did support it financially. Much of the cost 
involved in carrying out HImP work, especially around tackling substance 
misuse, was met from other PCG budgets such as those for service 
development, training and education and primary care staff. HImP activity was 
further supported financially by the PCG board: the HImP group was given a 
devolved budget (starting at (50,000 and rising to f60,000 over two years) to 
support particular projects relevant to the HImP priorities. In spending this 
budget the HImP group was accountable to the board. This funding 
contribution was made ".. in order to ensure a real commitment to specific 
HImP priority projects, aimed at improving health in the broadest possible 
sense. " (HImP Group Terms of Reference 1999). It was Intended to support 
specific local health improvement projects in a number of ways, such as 
participatory needs assessment and project evaluation, project 
development and management, facilitation of primary health care staff 
involvement, facilitation of community members' involvement, 
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particularly excluded or vulnerable groups by, for example, community 
capacity building, project consultancy or research support (Primary Care 
Investment Plan 1999-2002, September 1999). 
It was valued by members of the HImP group: 
Fortunately the board endorsed some money to go to project work, 
because that's where you get the innovation and the initiatives, 
especially in the partnership setting. We can do more - we can initiate 
more, we can work more in partnership with the voluntary sector, and 
the council. (health development manager 1) 
However, beyond this budget, the PCG board took an 'arm's length' interest in 
the work of the HImP group. Whereas finance, prescribing and clinical 
governance were allocated an item on the agenda at each of the board's bi- 
monthly public meetings, the HImP group was allowed to present a brief report 
to the board only every six months. With the exception of the chief executive, 
the lay member and the board nurse who chaired the HImP group, the board 
themselves appeared to tolerate, but not fully understand, the HImP, and 
showed little enthusiasm for its work. The withdrawal of the GPs who originally 
had places on the HImP group reflected their declining interest in it. 
Despite the intentions set out in the terms of reference, the HImP Group's 
formal connections to other parts of the PCG were not strong. Links with other 
sub-groups were not systematic but relied on members of one group being 
also members of another. Two members of the HImP group were also members 
of the Communications and Public Involvement Group (CPIG) but other than 
this, there was no overlap with other PCG subgroups. 
This lack of connectedness with the PCG board and other parts of the 
organisation called into question the PCG's organisational readiness to 
encompass the work of the HImP Group into its mainstream business. One 
HDM felt that parts of the wider community were more receptive to the work of 
the HImP Group than was the rest of the PCG, and that it needed the PCG's 
support to lend it credibility. 
It's all very well the HImP Group getting on and doing the work, but 
it needs the profile raised with the board. I would say outsiders 
probably know more than the board, which is often grappling with 
issues around clinical governance, or finances ... it would help to 
keep the profile up and for the PCG to be aware that things are 
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happening and that these are valid issues to work on. (health 
development manager 1) 
5.5.2 Clinicians on PCT PEC 
Clinicians as PEC members, and lay domination of the board. 
The governing bodies of the PCT were less medically dominated than those of 
the PCG. The PCT'S board was dominated by lay people and managers, and the 
PEC had proportionally fewer GPs than the PCG board. This reduction of 
medical dominance may have presented an opportunity for public health, 
community development approaches to health to flourish. However, this 
opportunity was undermined by the increase in central government targets and 
performance management. 
Influence on primary care community 
In the PCT, the emphasis was taken away from collaboration with other 
organisations and was focussed on work to which primary care had a more 
obvious contribution to make, for example in vaccinations. Fieldwork for this 
study finished before any signs that the new patch structures were altering 
PHCTs' engagement with health improvement, but the change in nature of the 
aims of the work along more medical, quantifiable lines with which they were 
familiar, suggested they would be more able to engage in it. 
PCT board's support of PH&I group 
The PCT board supported the PH&I group by giving them a regular place on the 
agenda of board meetings. The work of the PH&I group had a higher profile 
with the governing bodies of the PCT compared with the PCG's level of interest 
in the HImP Group. It reported on progress against NHS Plan and national 
targets to the executive committee on a quarterly basis. This was significantly 
more frequent than the HImP group's annual report to the PCG board and 
implied greater levels of concern and interest on the part of the PCT. 
Summary: This section examined whether the presence of clinicians, elected 
by their peers, on the PCG board facilitated a corporate sense of ownership by 
PHCTs of health improvement work. Did the primary care community adopt a 
non-medical approach to health improvement which focussed on prevention 
and the broad determinants of health? 
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It argued that although PCG approved the upstream HImP priorities and a 
ringfenced budget, its work was not prioritised by the PCG. The Inclusion of 
clinicians on the governing bodies of the PCG and PCT did not lead clinicians 
on the governing bodies, or their constituent clinicians, to adopt a 
collaborative, public health-oriented approach to health improvement. Cultural 
barriers and doctors' individual and medically-oriented approach to health 
militated against this. The PCT's greater interest in the work of its health 
improvement subgroup did not equate to a more widespread interest in 
upstream health improvement since its approach to health improvement was 
more medically focussed on centrally-defined targets. 
5.6 Local authority representation on governing bodies 
As the PCG HImP group's terms of reference indicated, to meet its 
responsibility to improve the health of its local population, it would need to 
collaborate with organisations outwith the NHS, including the local authority. 
The Department of Health regarded SSD representation on the governing 
bodies of PCGs and PCTs as a potential mechanism to facilitate collaboration 
not only between the PCG and SSD, but also between primary care and the 
wider local authority (see section 3.2.2). This section examines how far 
representation of SSD on the governing bodies of the PCG and PCT proved to 
be an effective means of facilitating collaboration with local authority 
departments to improve the health of the population of Oxford. It also 
explores other mechanisms through which local authority departments 
collaborated with the PCG and PCT. 
5.6.1 Concerns that SSD would dominate PCG-Local authority 
relationships 
Local authorities' remits cover many areas which influence the broad social, 
environmental and economic determinants of health, yet SSDs were the only 
part of the local authority for which representation on the PCG board was 
mandatory. There were concerns that, rather than enhancing collaboration, the 
representation of SSDs on the PCG board would undermine collaboration 
between the PCG and other parts of the local authority. Early in the life of the 
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PCG, the same City Council officer, who had responsibility for health 
promotion, spoke of his expectation that the PCG would prioritise 
collaboration with the social services department and that relationships with 
the rest of the local authority would be sidelined. In his experience, health 
authorities related more easily to social services because they both provided 
items of service rather than more general functions. He feared that district 
council functions such as housing and environmental health, which played an 
important public health role and were of obvious relevance to the PCG's HImP 
priorities, ran the risk of being marginalised. 
Social services are more about treatment than we are, and it's 
missing a trick isn't it? It's back to the broad determinants of health. 
(City Council Officer: health promotion) 
The feasibility of the SSD representation on the board as a mechanism for 
collaboration between primary care and local authority was compromised by 
the scale and complexity of local authority structures. Oxfordshire had a two- 
tier local authority in which Oxfordshire County Council provided certain 
services, including social services, to the whole county. Also, within 
Oxfordshire were six district councils, one of which was Oxford City Council, 
which had responsibility for services such as environmental health and 
housing. Oxfordshire County Council served the populations covered by six 
PCGs which were more-or-less coterminous with the district councils (although 
PCGs' boundaries were not defined geographically but by the patient lists of 
the PCGs' GP practices). 
The potential for an SSD representative to constitute a mechanism for 
collaboration between a PCG and a local authority seemed small even in a 
unitary authority. It seemed less realistic still in a two-tiered local authority 
where county and district councils were separate. 
The fears of the City Council officer that collaboration between the SSD and the 
PCG would overshadow collaborative opportunities between the PCG and other 
parts of the local authority were unfounded. In fact, the representation of SSD 
on the PCG board appeared neither to strengthen nor inhibit collaboration 
between the City Council and the PCG. 
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5.6.2 Local authority involvement in health improvement with PCG 
There was evidence of good relationships between parts of the City Council 
and the PCG, independently of SSD representation on the PCG board. Although 
the City Council was not represented on the PCG's board, some strong threads 
of collaboration between the two organisations were established. Within 
Oxford City Council were departments whose titles suggested their work would 
relate closely to the PCG's health improvement duties, such as housing, 
environmental health and health promotion. 
lt doesn't feel like it's been a problem [for the health promotion 
department]. We're not on the board, but nevertheless we're still 
having an influence on the papers that are going to the board. They 
reflect some of the stuff we've been doing anyway. (City Council 
Officer: health promotion) 
The chief executive and chair of the PCG met twice a year with the chief 
executives, members and senior officers of Oxford City Council. Certain 
agreements, such as establishing the health development manager posts, were 
successfully negotiated between the PCG chief executive and the health 
promotion officer, a relatively low level City Council officer, then agreed by the 
Council Members and effectively 'rubber-stamped' by the City Council's chief 
executive. The chief executive took a largely 'hands-off approach to 
engagement with the PCG, preferring to delegate it to others. Other than where 
funds had to be committed to a project, in his involvement in the Council's 
work with the PCG he generally remained at arm's length and delegated, rather 
than being closely involved himself, but this did not impede collaboration. 
The only things that would really make a difference is when we 
would need to spend some money differently. For example, the 
funding for the joint posts we've done. But again they have mainly 
been negotiated between me and [PCG chief executive] then agreed 
by the members and then [City Council chief executive]'s just kind of 
known about it. That seems to work OK. There hasn't been a case 
yet where we've had to... There may be things in the future we may 
want to formalise agreements or something, and that may need the 
chief executive to sign it off. (City Council Officer: health promotion) 
think definitely in any big hierarchical organisation, which we are, 
you need to have that stamp of approval from the top to make 
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things happen... At the moment it feels to me as if things are 
working along OK. (City Council Officer: health promotion) 
The housing department was much more distant from the City Council's chief 
executive. Its head officer was aware of interactions between the PCG and the 
City Council at board and chief executive level, but said no mechanisms were 
in place to translate that vertically into strategy at her (second-tier) level, or 
joint working at operational level. She described the group attended by the 
chief executive of the City Council and the PCGs as "so strategic that no-one 
from housing actually goes to it. " Even as a second tier officer she felt far 
removed from it, was not informed of the frequency or agendas of meetings, 
or even whether the City Council chief executive attended them, and received 
no feedback. 
f would say it [executive level meetings] has no impact on the staff 
delivering the service day to day in the Local Authority. I don't know 
what impact it may have on the GPs, but at a strategic level here, 
I've no idea of the frequency of the meetings, if [the City Council 
chief executive] actually bothers to attend or not. We have no idea 
what comes up on the agenda. We get no feedback from the 
meetings whatsoever. I have not a clue what is discussed if anything 
is. It's just like a blank. They've obviously established a contact at a 
strategic level, but as far as I'm aware there is nothing underneath 
that at all. (City Council Officer: housing) 
Individual factors 
Individual factors were key to the instigation and maintenance of collaboration. 
Where collaboration between the City Council and the PCG was most 
enthusiastically pursued, the influence of particular boundary-spanners was 
obvious. In particular, the City Council's Health Promotion officer provided 
energy, ideas, leadership and vision to instigate collaboration. He 
demonstrated an understanding of, and commitment to, collaboration which 
went beyond a ubiquitous keen but vague endorsement of collaboration as an 
aspirational ideal. He expressed an explicit, coherent conception of what 
health-related collaboration meant, and why it was Important to the City 
Council. He recognised the public health underpinnings of many of the 
council's functions, for example housing, environment, workplace and 
recreation. He argued that elements of local government originated to protect 
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public health, and so their working with the PCG was an essential component 
of an effort to tackle health inequalities. He also believed that, to bring about 
collaboration between the two organisations to improve public health, 
awareness of the public health function of local government had to be raised 
across the City Council, and he saw this as a key element of his boundary- 
spanning role. 
If you took most [city council] specialisms you could trace their 
origins to public health roots, and the problem is that we've sort of 
lost sight of that... Local Authorities have forgotten a bit of their 
raison d'etre, and I'm sure a lot of my colleagues in this organisation 
don't see themselves as promoting public health. They see public 
health as a service not a function, so we've got a lot of work to do in 
reminding them. But while that's still the case, while it's still seen as 
'oh health, that's [name]' or 'environmental health, they do health we 
don't' or 'we're planning, we don't do health' - they're unlikely to 
engage with the PCG. (City Council Officer: health promotion) 
He was able to articulate a coherent vision of the nature of health Improving 
collaboration. The City Council's Health Promotion team had been involved in 
campaigns to encourage improvements in 'lifestyle issues' such as smoking 
cessation, healthy eating and accident prevention. He appreciated the value of 
such project work in that projects could sometimes grow into something more 
substantial. They were politically useful because they could have tangible 
results and draw the media's attention, but it was important that they didn't 
detract from the strategic goals of joint concern to both organisations. He felt 
that to make a more substantial impact on health, partnerships had to move 
from such marginalised joint projects and campaigns, to influencing those who 
wielded mainstream power and influence. He also anticipated some resistance 
to this. 
The mainstream, looking at it quite cynically and brutally, was 
always very happy to let Health Promotion run around doing little 
campaigns and saying 'You must do this, 'you shouldn't do that', 
because it was never actually challenging the mainstream at all. To 
me it's much more powerful, more meaningful if that effort, which 
commandeers a tiny amount of resources in comparison to 
mainstream spending, actually starts to influence mainstream 
spending. 'How are we going to do this differently so we don't have 
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to run this little campaign? ' That's when things start to twitch and 
the mainstream power, money, influence starts to resist, to say 
'Hang on - you're telling me that we're responsible for some of this 
poor health, or this impact on the environment? You're saying it's 
my fault? Why don't you go and run a little campaign?! ' But only 
when we start to have those problems will we know we're actually 
making a difference (City Council Officer: health promotion) 
He recognised that there were areas where the City Council could exert the 
most influence, such as transport, planning, housing and air quality. Through 
working collaboratively, he envisaged that greater influence could be exerted 
on these broad determinants of health, and health improvement could move 
from health promotion projects to more mainstream activity. The PCG would 
not necessarily be required to contribute a great deal of resources, but their 
collaborative value would sometimes be to offer credibility and solidarity in 
delivering the message. He saw the links with the PCG as beneficial in two 
ways. First, a joint identification of the areas for health improvement would 
more reliably prioritise the important issues than if organisations did so 
separately. Second, having identified the priority areas, a collaboration would 
be better placed to bring resources and influence to bear to bring about 
change than the organisations would individually. According to his vision, the 
role of the health development managers was systematically to challenge the 
health impact of each council department's work and encourage the delivery of 
the health improvement agenda through their mainstream spend, rather than 
through easily sidelined add-on projects. He saw their role as garnering 
support from primary care, applying their influence as leverage to the health 
improvement process. 
In a way [health development managerj's role will be to make a bit 
of a nuisance of herself, to help some of the work that we're doing 
so it's not just that bunch from Health Promotion saying we ought to 
improve the housing stock - it's actually GPs saying that as well, and 
with good reason. (City Council Officer: health promotion) 
Collaborative relationships between key boundary-spanners In the PCG and the 
City Council did not extensively permeate other areas of the local authority. As 
I have shown, relationships between the health promotion team and the PCG 
were strong, but this was not the only part of the authority whose work was 
relevant to the HImP priorities. 
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Housing was one of the five HImP priorities, yet links between the City 
Council's housing department and the PCG were minimal. The Head of 
Strategic Housing Services from Oxford City Council described close links 
between their department and social services at strategic and operational 
levels, but reported that these were quite independent of the PCG. Similarly, 
collaboration between members of the housing department and GP practices 
on an informal, ad hoc basis was well established, but she was aware of no 
impact that the PCG had had on these relationships. She was unaware that 
someone she knew well represented social services on the PCG board, and 
lamented the lack of collaboration between her department and the PCG. 
We've got a lot of staff in housing services who we've employed for 
years and years, and lots of them live in Oxford, they've known the 
GPs for years and years. They get on well, they phone each other up, 
sort out problems. That works reasonably well, but I don't think the 
PCG has had an impact on that. (City Council Officer: housing) 
This contrast between the two parts of the City Council were mirrored in their 
respective relationships with the most senior ranks of their own organisation. 
The housing and environmental health departments reported quite different 
experiences of contact with their chief executive. 
Organisational factors 
The remarkable commitment to collaboration between parts of the City Council 
and the PCG was put down in part to organisational factors. The alliance was 
seen as politically acceptable with relatively low levels of risk. Collaboration 
was seen as a no-lose situation for two organisations with a similar ethos. The 
PCG constituted a city-based NHS structure which some City Council officers 
quickly identified as a potential partner In the development of its public health 
function. It was well-placed to work together strategically with the City Council 
to tackle the root causes of ill health In a way that the Health Authority had not 
been, due to the near-coterminosity of their boundaries. The PCG, being new, 
had no history of antagonism or conflict with other organisations. The 
collaborative rhetoric which surrounded it and its emphasis on health 
Inequalities suggested it had the potential to follow a different approach to 
public health, and led to hope that it could shape things In a radically different 
way to what had gone before. 
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I think we've had a lot of success with the City Council. It was a very 
early alliance really, and colleagues in the City Council have been 
enormously committed to making it work, and have really worked 
very hard in their own organisation to push investment towards 
things that we wanted to see happen. I think we've been more 
successful with the city than we have with the county. It's been 
politically, if you like, a lot more acceptable. (PCG chief executive) 
think it works with the city because it's easy for the city. All 
politicians would like health to be more democratically tied in. It 
doesn't actually have to make any promises, as environmental 
health and housing can only benefit from being closer to health. 
There isn't a tension in the way there is with social services. So I just 
don't think the city can lose. And to their credit they've clocked that 
and they're exploiting that, and that's all to the good. I do think 
there's an ethos within the city PCG that chimes in with that. 
(PCG/PCT lay member) 
Funding cycles and procedures presented very real problems to partnership 
projects. The City Council's financial year did not match the timetable of social 
services or NHS bodies, and commitment to projects could not be made until 
all the necessary funding was in place. 
It's a practical problem which, if the government is serious about 
promoting partnership working, really needs to be addressed. I 
know it's a real bureaucratic administrative detail, but it has to be 
sorted out. There's always going to be problems with partnership 
working while the budgetary timetables are not in synch. (City 
Council Officer: social inclusion) 
The case of the City Council was further complicated by its structure which 
included elected members as well as officers. This brought both practical 
challenges in terms of an increased bureaucratic burden and longer times 
required to carry work forward, but also cultural challenges and vested 
interests which work against collaboration. 
What you're saying is in effect, 'we want you to give up your little bit 
of power to make decisions on this area of the service and sort of 
pool it and all make decisions. ' The people who are attracted to 
being politicians, it's because they want to wield power because they 
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enjoy it. In some ways they're the very worst people to say can you 
give it up for the common good. It's not just the members, there's 
quite a lot of officers that have a vested interest, and their jobs 
depend on them being the one that makes the decision. If they pass 
that over to a group, someone might point the finger and say 'What 
does that person do now? They don't have to make any of these 
strategic decisions now - do we need them? ' (City Council Officer: 
housing) 
5.6.3 Local authority involvement in PCT's health improvement 
Section 5.4 described the PCG HImP subgroup's multidisciplinary and 
multisectoral composition and the strongly inclusive collaborative rhetoric of 
its terms of reference. Strong interpersonal relationships between members of 
the City Council and the PCG, along with their near coterminosity, underpinned 
strong collaborative relationships between the two organisations, built largely 
on the shared vision of a relatively small number of people at middle 
management level of each organisation, around priorities which were jointly 
identified. 
This level of collaboration was not prioritised by the PCT. The chief executive 
of the PCT emphasised the importance of key individuals at the most senior 
strategic levels of the organisations to successful collaboration between them. 
She was one of four new senior appointments to the PCT and the City Council 
around the time of the inception of the PCT along with the PCT's Director of 
Public Health, the City Council's chief executive and its Director of Strategy. 
These senior individuals were quick to forge relationships and plan strategic 
collaboration. Meanwhile, restructuring of the City Council and the transition 
from PCG to PCT disrupted many of the collaborative relationships which had 
been built up by less senior officers in the two organisations over the previous 
two years. 
The PCT chief executive conceded that the restructuring which resulted in the 
PCT's more senior links with the City Council may have disrupted the 
established collaborative arrangements built by the health development 
managers. She argued that this was overall a worthwhile change: the damage 
to previous collaborative relationships would be offset by the new structures 
which were to replace them to implement new, more strategic partnerships. 
She saw organisational change as a valuable opportunity to build new strategic 
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collaboration from the top-down. The strengthening of links at the most 
senior level in the two organisations was also recognised and welcomed by 
other Council officers: 
We're in the process of getting quite a clear partnership agenda 
sorted out with the City Council. It feels a lot better than what we 
had before which was good relationships but a bit nebulous in terms 
of where we were going and what we were trying to achieve... We've 
got a joined-up view of what we want to achieve and it's a question 
of getting our teams in place to help deliver and implement that 
now, whereas I think beforehand we had the good working 
relationships on the ground but actually no sense of common 
direction. (PCT chief executive) 
I think maybe it will take a bit of time but maybe if patches can be 
the way to make public health more visible and more acceptable and 
more effective, then OK I'm prepared to invest a bit of refocusing 
and losing some of the other stuff to achieve that. (PCG board/ PCT 
PEC chair) 
Since our new chief executive came in 2001, again the links at chief 
executive level of the Primary Care Trust and our chief executive 
level have improved greatly (City Council Officer: social inclusion) 
The chief executives group continued, where the chief executives of the county 
PCTs and District Councils met to discuss strategy, although the outcomes 
were not fed down to middle-ranking officers: 
There's this chief executives group which means the PCT goes and our 
chief executive goes. I'm just not sure that that then comes anywhere, 
and that we don't know what they're talking about, and whether there's 
work that we're then directed to do that comes out of that. I'm not sure 
that mechanism's in place yet. (City Council Officer: social inclusion) 
The boundaries of Oxford City PCT were the same as those of the PCG, so 
coterminosity with the City Council was not compromised. However, the 
interpersonal relationships which had developed between the PCG and the City 
Council were disrupted during the transition due to structural changes in both 
organisations, as well as to changes in policy emphasis represented by the NHS 
Plan. 
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The focus on centrally prescribed medical targets alienated the City Council 
officers who had previously been involved with the HImP. As issues prioritised 
by the HImP such as housing and homelessness, and substance misuse were 
displaced by the more medical priorities of the NHS Plan, it became more 
difficult for them to see the contribution they could make. Also, in the 
restructuring of the City Council, its health portfolio was removed, which 
brought into question the new leadership's commitment to health. 
It's confusing for me now because we don't have a health 
improvement plan any more, so it feels like there isn't something 
we can go to and say 'our role in tackling health inequalities is put 
in the HImP and we know what it is. ' The NHS Plan means nothing 
to anyone here. It's a bit like expecting the PCT to understand some 
of the plans that we produce like the local plan without any 
commentary or interpretation. (City Council Officer: social 
inclusion) 
One of the things that was noticeable for us with the restructure 
was that health did disappear. There was no portfolio given for 
health. 
... The problem with this authority is that when the lawyers 
and the corporate people sit down and look at portfolios they think 
that health is something someone else does, and they don't give it a 
portfolio. Which is weird because they gave crime one and we don't 
go out and police the streets. I think that shows a difference between 
crime and health.. (City Council Officer: social inclusion) 
Boundary-spanners had played an important role in the relationships between 
the PCG and the City Council. One of the key relationships between individuals 
from the City Council and the PCG was disrupted when the boundary-spanner 
from Health Promotion in the City Council and the HDMs who had formerly 
worked very closely together left their respective organisations. Their good 
working relationship and the City Councillor's particularly strong vision of, and 
commitment to tackling social, environmental and economic causes of health 
inequalities through collaboration were lost to both organisations. His skills as 
a boundary-spanner were also lost. 
The officer's post was not continued when the City Council restructured. To 
some extent, his role was absorbed by the City Council's Director of Strategy, a 
more senior officer. However, this person had a much wider remit and was not 
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able to commit as much time and energy to the bridging role as his 
predecessor. 
What's been weakened are the links between the lower or middle 
ranks of the council officers and the actual people who do the work 
at the PCT rather than director level. (City Council Officer: social 
inclusion) 
Wider organisational ownership of the health improvement agenda within the 
City Council remained elusive in the PCT era; by early 2003 there were no signs 
that this had been translated down the organisation or that members and 
officers were seeing their work in terms of improving health. 
still think people think health is about hospitals and that's what the 
PCT and doctors do and it's nothing to do with us. Of course we're 
the main housing authority, we clean the streets, we have a lot to do 
with environmental impact, issues about crime that affect health. 
But that message, I think, still doesn't really get there. (City Council 
Officer: social inclusion) 
A new link between the PCT and the City Council was the appointment of an 
elected member of the Council to the PCT board. Other board members 
reported that his presence on the board offered valuable insight into the 
mindset, culture and procedures of the council. However, his influence on the 
local authority's policies and practices were limited as a City Councillor in a 
two-tier local authority, as he was not in a position to affect collaboration with, 
for example, the SSD of the County Council. It was further reduced following 
local elections in which his party lost joint leadership of the council. 
5.6.4 Change 
With the publication of the NHS Plan it became clear that the HImP, and its 
approach, were to be shortlived. The NHS Plan heralded a different approach to 
public health, but the structures and processes which were to take its place 
remained uncertain for a number of months. This was unsettling for the Health 
Improvement subgroup and staff who knew their work and role would not 
continue as it had, but knew little about how or when it would change. 
Not quite knowing what the new board will do or what commitment 
there's going to be from April, and the line management and the 
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structure and where we all fit into that. Let's just hope it remains. 
We just wait and see. (health development manager 1) 
The PCG staff were not anti-reform: 
To push so that the change and modernisation happens - and it 
needs it, I'm not saying it's not needed, but to do it at a pace so that 
people don't feel burnt out... The atmosphere in the PCG is great, 
and that's what keeps you going really. So, as long as the local 
environment is friendly and conducive, it's all right (health 
development manager 2) 
Collaborative relationships take time to establish trust and mutual 
understanding, to identify shared goals and values. 
There's been an awful lot of groundwork that's needed to be done. If 
you look at what we've actually done differently it's not very much 
yet. In a sense that's inevitable - you've got to go through a lot of 
preparatory stuff. It's all very valuable - it'll have spin-offs later. The 
fact is we've gone along to these meetings, no-one has put their foot 
in anything untoward, we haven't disagreed violently over anything 
yet. And that will all bear fruit later on. I think fairly soon we're 
going to come under pressure to say OK what are you going to do 
that's different now? And that's always the challenge with these 
things. (City Council Officer: health promotion) 
Organisational change is a force frequently cited as an impediment to building 
good partnerships. From the point of view of one City Council officer the 
opportunities presented by the introduction of a city-based PCG outweighed 
the secondary impediments caused by the upheaval of staff. Another was less 
prepared to accept its benefits until they were proved: 
I think that a lot of people are quite cynical about it. Fundholding 
was meant to be the answer to everything and it wasn't highly 
successful and I think people think PCGs are just the same. An 
administrative detail to make it look as if something's happened, 
that it's all dynamic but it's not really. (City Council Officer: housing) 
Conclusion: This section examined how far representation of SSD on the 
governing bodies of the PCG and PCT proved to be an effective means of 
facilitating collaboration with local authority departments to improve the 
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health of the population of Oxford. It also explored other mechanisms through 
which local authority departments collaborated with the PCG and PCT. 
It argued that SSD representation on the board was not the root of the health 
improvement-related collaboration which developed between some 
departments of the City Council and the PCG through the efforts of a small 
number of boundary-spanners from the PCG and the city council. 
5.7 Summary 
This section returns to the third research question set out in section 3.7 and 
draws conclusions about how it can be answered in the light of data from 
chapter five. 
RQ3 How far did the following features of PCGs' and PCTs' organisational 
forms allow them to bring about a collaborative approach to improving 
the health of their population? 
" their explicit health improvement remit 
" its locality-wide base 
" the election of practising clinicians to their governing bodies 
" the representation of the local authority's SSD on their governing bodies 
Health improvement remit 
The PCG's explicit health improvement remit fostered a more collaborative, 
upstream approach to health than had traditionally been taken in primary care. 
The PCT also was given health improvement responsibilities, but these were 
undermined by the context in which it operated. This context was a much 
more hierarchical mode of governance, in which medically-focused problems, 
identified by central government, were prioritised over complex social issues. 
What excited many people about the introduction of the PCG was that, for the 
first time, work to promote public health and prevent ill health was endorsed 
and legitimised through the organisation's explicit health Improvement remit. 
Central government's role was facilitative, encouraging priorities to be 
identified locally and PCGs were given a free rein to adopt a bottom-up 
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approach to work with other local organisations to identify local health 
improvement priorities. Oxford City PCG rose to this challenge eagerly and 
adopted a collaborative and outward-looking approach to health improvement 
which was very new for primary care. It prioritised complex, non-medical, 
social problems in its Health Improvement Programme (HImP) and inclusive, 
collaborative relationships evolved among a range of actors who identified 
shared interests in addressing these priorities in a bottom-up way. The PCG's 
progress was assessed in terms of proxy measures for long term public health 
outcomes. Ownership of the HImP was high amongst those carrying out the 
work, and members of the HImP group were personally very committed to it. 
The group's structures were flexible and informal, and they carried out their 
work through locally-driven, bottom-up processes. 
The cross-cutting nature of their HImP priorities meant they relied heavily on 
boundary-spanners. The group's two most active members were the health 
development managers (HDMs), whose posts were jointly funded by the PCG 
and the City Council. The PCG was coterminous with the City Council, many of 
whose functions derived from public health origins. Their professional 
backgrounds were in community development and health promotion, and they 
were adept at working in inclusive, collaborative ways and employing upstream 
approaches to health improvement. The sense of camaraderie and commitment 
within the HImP group was remarkable. They played key roles in collaboration 
between the PCG, the City Council and non-statutory organisations. They 
proved themselves to be skilled networkers, committed to a bottom-up, 
locally-responsive and inclusive model of health improvement. This was in 
keeping with New Labour's rhetoric of collaboration and the imperative to 
tackle complex social problems. 
The rhetoric of improving health survived the transition from PCG to PCT, as 
PCTs were also explicitly charged with a public health function and a Director 
of Public Health was appointed. However, the publication of the NHS Plan in 
2000 brought centrally-defined targets to the fore. These deflected attention 
from the local HImP priorities and were perceived by many to conflict in detail, 
ethos and philosophy, with the locally responsive, bottom-up health 
improvement of the HImP. 
Over time, the PCT almost completely discarded the PCG's locally identified 
HImP priorities and instead its Health Improvement and Modernisation Plan 
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(HIMP) directed their work towards priority areas set out by central 
government. Many of the trusting, collaborative relationships which had been 
developed between local bodies and primary care under the auspices of the 
PCG were badly damaged. 
The redundancies of the two HDMs was seen as controversial, and undermined 
the network relationships they had developed. When interviewed for the new 
public health specialist posts, the HDMs were told their collaborative skills 
would not be required in the PCT, and they were replaced with medically 
trained public health specialists. Collaborative relationships between the HImP 
group and non-statutory bodies were badly damaged by redundancies of the 
HDMs. In good faith they had made promises which they were unable to keep 
because they were no longer in post. This proved very damaging to the trust 
which had been carefully nurtured over two years. Many research participants 
felt an unacceptable opportunity cost was attached to the increasingly medical 
orientation of the health improvement agenda. 
Most of the new areas of work were considerably more medically-focussed 
than the PCG's HImP priorities had been. The PH&I group were asked to report 
on progress regularly to the PCT board, and the PCT was more closely 
performance managed upwards by the strategic health authority against 
targets set by central government. The performance management was more 
formal in style and the targets were strictly quantifiable. 
Locality-based primary care organisation 
The locality-wide base of PCG/Ts had potential to facilitate collaboration for 
upstream health improvement, but was not in itself sufficient. When the 
context was conducive to the fostering of network relationships in the PCG 
based on loyalty and reciprocity, it was facilitatory. However, during the PCT's 
first year, the context became one which encouraged contract-like 
relationships rather than networks. 
The introduction of a locality-wide primary care organisation provided an 
opportunity to set up city-wide working groups, one of which was the HImP 
group. 
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The HImP subgroup was set up by the PCG board to take forward its health 
improvement work, in collaboration with a range of other local organisations. 
Its terms of reference were resolutely outward-looking and indicated an 
approach to carrying forward health improvement which challenged primary 
care's history of isolation from other organisations, particularly from those 
outside of the NHS, and was in keeping with the collaborative rhetoric of the 
third way. 
The working group (PH&I group) required to implement the PCT's health 
improvement agenda differed from the HImP group. The contrasts between the 
two subgroups reflected some of the key differences between the policy 
contexts within which the PCG and the PCT operated. The PH&I group's 
composition and terms of reference were shaped by centrally-driven forces 
driving an increasingly medically-defined public health agenda for primary 
care. 
The PCT's approach to public health led to the restructuring of the public 
health function in line with patch-based management structure. The PEC 
argued that to divide the PCT area into three 'patches' was a more feasible 
scale than city-wide on which to pursue collaboratively the NHS Plan targets. 
That patches were coterminous with City Council 'local area committees' 
indicated that intentions to collaborate with the local authority to address non- 
medical determinants of health had not been altogether abandoned in favour 
of a return to an emphasis on clinical targets. The fieldwork for this study was 
completed before the effectiveness of this approach to facilitating 
collaboration within primary care or between primary care and the City Council 
was in evidence. However, it was clear that the drive towards a collaborative, 
bottom-up approach to health improvement which tackled the broad 
determinants of health was making way for a more traditionally medical 
approach, less resonant of networks as in New Labour's early rhetoric. 
Clinicians on governing bodies 
The election of clinicians to the governing bodies of the PCG/T was not an 
effective mechanism to bring about a collaborative, upstream approach to 
health improvement. The PCG HImP group operated in parallel, and separately 
from, mainstream primary care activity. GP membership of the HImP group was 
too shortlived to influence GPs' medically-oriented culture. Clinicians were 
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more involved with the PCT's public health and inequalities work because it 
was better aligned to their practice. 
The HImP was a low profile element of the PCG's agenda. Initially the HImP 
group's membership included two GPs. The board endorsed the HImP priorities 
and a ringfenced HImP budget. This suggested the group might challenge 
general practitioners' individual, medically-oriented approach to health, as well 
as the organisational and cultural barriers between them and other group 
members and the animosity between health professionals and health service 
managers. However, within the first six months the GPs had left the group. 
Rather than challenging the culture of general practice, the HImP group worked 
in parallel with it with a stronger public health orientation. The PCG's remit to 
improve health did not persuade primary care practitioners to shift their own 
practice away from a medically, individually focussed one. The HImP process 
did not require that GPs relinquish any autonomy, status or power, or that they 
themselves established any new collaborative relationships. 
Other than this, however, board clinician involvement in the HImP process was 
minimal: they maintained an arm's length relationship to the HImP, setting up 
a dedicated working group which it supported financially but taking little 
interest in its methods or achievements. The PCG board did not allow the HImP 
group to report regularly at board meetings as they did other working groups. 
The medical, individually-focussed approach of clinicians was not directly 
challenged by the HImP. 
The PCG's HImP work appeared to be treated as an add-on to the main work of 
the PCG's board, which was led by managers and impinged little on their 
working lives or those of their clinician colleagues. However, the animosity 
which characterised many professional-manager relationships was not evident 
in this case. These professional-manager relationships were characterised 
more by detachment and disinterest than by outright hostility. 
The PCT's approach to public health and inequalities, driven by more medical 
targets, was more readily understood by doctors, and so there was more 
collaboration towards its goals from PEC clinicians themselves. Whereas the 
PCG's HImP was not perceived to be relevant to most clinicians' day to day 
work, the implementation of the HIMP and the NHS Plan had much more direct 
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relevance to their practice, because their professional roles were more closely 
aligned to treatment of the prioritised conditions. PCT PEC members were 
more involved in strategy for health improvement than they had been in the 
PCG. 
The distinction between health improvement and clinical governance was less 
distinct in the PCT than it had been in the PCG. Thus, clinicians were expected 
to play a greater part in health improvement, but it was to be in a form which 
fitted more readily with their traditional professional culture. 
SSD representative on board 
SSD representation on the governing bodies of the PCG/T was not effective as 
a mechanism to facilitate health improvement work between primary care and 
the local authority, because the local authority was two-tier, the county council 
was not coterminous with the PCG and the SSD representative was not a 
practitioner as were other board members. Boundary-spanners operated 
independently of the board to engender collaboration between the PCG and 
some, but not all, departments of the City Council. Reliance on these 
boundary-spanners made the collaborative relationships vulnerable to 
organisational change. 
Second, boundary-spanners within the city council did not allow their lack of 
direct representation on the PCG board to impede collaboration. Strong 
collaborative relationships between the PCG and parts of the city council were 
established and maintained by a small number of key boundary-spanners. Two 
effective boundary-spanners, the PCG chief executive and an officer from the 
city council, negotiated the joint funding of two HDM posts. The two HDMs, in 
turn, had strong boundary-spanning roles. This city council officer saw the 
burgeoning relationship with the PCG as an opportunity to reconnect the city 
council with its public health roots. 
Coterminosity between the City Council and the PCG worked in the favour of 
boundary-spanners. However, other organisational factors meant that 
collaboration between the PCG and all parts of the City Council was far from 
automatic. The city council was big, and the collaboration was not sufficiently 
strategic to avoid collaborative gaps. Organisational and structural barriers 
remained. Too great a reliance on boundary-spanners meant that where 
collaboration worked it worked well, but several departments, for example 
housing, remained disconnected from the PCG. 
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In the PCT, these collaborative relationships, which depended on individuals, 
were disrupted by redundancies and organisational change. 
160 
Chapter six: Primary care development and delivery 
6.1 Overview 
This chapter is the second of three findings chapters which examine the PCG's 
and PCT's collaborative capacity and practice, the third element identified in 
the realist theoretical framework. 
PRACTICE 
Health 
improvement 
Primary care 
delivery and 
development 
Figure 8: Realist theoretical framework - collaborative capacity 
As chapter three set out, PCGs and PCTs had responsibility for developing and 
delivering primary care. They were expected to assure the quality as well as 
contain the cost of primary care services. This chapter addresses research 
question 4 (see p80) which draws on the analytical framework (figure 6) to 
identify four features of the organisations' forms which were likely to facilitate 
collaboration. 
RQ4: How far did the following features of PCGs' and PCTs' organisational 
forms equip them to develop a sense of corporacy and collaboration within the 
primary care community to develop and deliver primary care? 
" their locality-wide base 
" the election of practising clinicians to their governing bodies 
" their budgetary and clinical governance responsibilities 
" the inclusion of a local authority social services department (SSD) 
representative on their governing bodies. 
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It asks whether these features - which were common to both the PCG and the 
PCT but manifest differently in each - equipped them to bring about a more 
collaborative, corporate approach to the delivery and development of primary 
care in the city. It draws on interview data to illuminate the experiences and 
perspectives of participants from different professional groups, from the PCG 
and PCT and from the wider primary care community, as well as from 
participants whose main work lay outside the NHS. It also uses documentary 
and observational evidence. Through these data, it explores how the elements 
of the context identified in the framework in figure 6 helped and hindered the 
building of collaborative relationships. 
Section 6.2 examines how having locality-wide structures in place facilitated 
the development and delivery of primary care. The PCG and PCT were broadly 
similar in this respect, so they are considered together in his section. 
It argues that the introduction of a locality-wide body, the PCG, reduced the 
considerable structural fragmentation of the primary care community in several 
ways. First, as a collective body, it acted as a point of contact for collaborating 
organisations. It also acted to represent members of the previously disparate 
primary care community to some extent, although consensus between the 
city's clinicians did not automatically follow from this structural change. As a 
collective body, the PCT was less conspicuous than the PCT, largely because It 
had been preceded by the PCG and so departed less radically from what had 
gone before. Its extended sphere of responsibility relative to the PCG, and 
particularly its responsibility to implement more centrally-defined policies, 
meant it was a more bureaucratic and less locally responsive organisation. 
Second, the PCG and PCT convened working groups which brought together 
clinicians and managers to develop primary care, to Implement clinical 
governance on a locality-wide basis, and to develop training and education for 
health and social care staff. It also published a local newsletter for local 
clinicians and other health-related bodies. Third, GP forums brought together 
local GPs in new ways which aimed to erode fragmentation and encourage a 
sense of unity between them, although this was of limited success. Fourth, the 
PCT became the employer of community nurses which, some anticipated, 
would challenge the status differentials between nurses and other 
professionals in the primary care community, although there was little 
evidence that this was the case. 
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Section 6.3 examines whether the PCG's and PCT's clinician-led governing 
bodies nurtured a sense of corporacy: whether these structures enabled local 
clinicians to feed into, and feel ownership of, policy and, therefore, to be 
motivated to comply with it. It considers the PCG and PCT separately because 
clinicians occupied different positions within their quite different 
organisational structures. It draws a distinction between the roles of clinicians 
on governing bodies as strategists and as representatives of the clinicians who 
elected them. 
It argues that their strengths as strategists were seen to lie in their identity as 
practitioners, and their consequent closeness to local issues and to patients. 
Their weaknesses were seen to be their lack of experience of working 
strategically with other organisations. On balance, local clinicians were very 
supportive of this aspect of the PCG model. The shift of clinicians from board 
to professional executive committee (PEC) in the PCT did not curtail the 
effectiveness of the clinician-as-strategist model. However, the PCT's greater 
preoccupation with nationally-defined targets limited their efficacy as 
strategists. 
As well as their strategic roles, clinician board members were seen to have a 
representative function. Community and practice nurses were cautiously 
optimistic that because clinicians sat on its board, the PCG could act as a 
vehicle for developing a shared identity and sense of purpose within primary 
care locally. However, this optimism was tempered by previous experiences of 
feeling powerless at the policy table, as well as by the employment status of 
practice nurses which served to exclude them partially from the PCG's 
processes. Its effectiveness as a means of involving nurses In the collective 
activity of the primary care community was indeed limited partly by the fact 
that nurses were outnumbered by doctors on the board, which perpetuated 
existing power differentials. Although the imbalance in numbers of GPs and 
nurses was reduced in the PCT, by then the enthusiasm of nurses to become 
involved had waned and there was little interest amongst nurses In joining the 
PEC. This was reflected in the paucity of applicants for the greater number of 
nurse positions on the PCT PEC. 
Amongst GPs, other than ex-fundholders, the representation of GPs on the 
PCG board by their peers was popular. The Increased organisational complexity 
of the PCT compared to the PCG, and the PCT's Increased obligation to act on 
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national priorities, weakened the sense of representative-ness of GPs. 
However, the continuity of GP representatives from PCG to PCT was one of the 
few elements of continuity between the two organisations. 
Section 6.4 examines the budgetary and clinical governance activities In the 
PCG and PCT, and the extent to which they transformed the primary care 
community from a fragmented one which lacked co-ordination, to one with a 
sense of collective responsibility. It focuses on how the new primary care 
development and delivery responsibilities were interpreted by the PCG and 
PCT: how their priorities were identified; how clinical governance and financial 
strategies were devised to deliver more coherent primary care services; and 
how progress was assessed against them. In these respects, the approaches of 
the two organisations differed little and so they are considered together in this 
section. 
It argues that the employment and professional status of GPs as Independent 
contractors placed considerable limitations on the PCG's influence over their 
clinical practice and its capacity to nurture a sense of cohesion. The PCG 
recognised this and, as a result, its primary care development priorities were 
identified through inclusive and facilitative, rather than authoritarian, means, 
since this was considered to be a more effective way to bring about changes in 
GPs' clinical practice. The board GPs played a major role in the development of 
prescribing and clinical governance policy and, as a result, practices complied 
with it more readily than they would have had it been imposed by managers. 
Their progress in priority areas was assessed in ways which encouraged them 
to improve relative to their peers, rather than in ways that would expose 
practices which had not made good progress. 
This section also examines clinicians' views on the PCG and PCT as vehicles for 
developing a shared identity and sense of purpose within primary care locally, 
and on the implications of it for facilitating collective activity in the primary 
care community. It examines the implications of changes in commissioning 
arrangements; of clinicians' limited experience of management and 
collaboration; and of the professional and employment status of GPs, for 
cohesion. Finally, it examines the two organisations' approaches to planning, 
education and training. 
It argues that many factors of national policy militated against the 
development of a shared sense of identity and purpose across a primary care 
community. Dismantling what GP fundholding there had been in Oxford was 
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controversial since the levelling up of services was not always compatible with 
overall budgetary constraints. Although the inclusion of clinicians on governing 
bodies was largely seen as positive, their presence on the PCG board and PCT 
PEC did not necessarily make difficult decisions less unpopular. Finally, it 
argues that the PCG/T approaches to planning, and the provision of education 
and training open to a range of clinicians and local authority staff, were 
conducive to collaboration within and beyond the primary care community. 
Section 6.5 explores the role of the SSD member on the governing bodies of 
the PCG and PCT and whether it allowed primary care to develop in ways which 
took into account the perspectives of both health and social care. 
It argues that SSD representation on the PCG board was considered to be of 
very limited effectiveness. It depended heavily on individuals who were not 
always available. it was argued that the PCG prioritised establishing itself as an 
organisation, and was medically dominated, and that these factors impeded 
collaboration with social services. Geographical boundaries and different 
internal structures and financial pressures also presented challenges for 
collaboration. 
Collaboration between the PCT and SSD promised to be more strategic and 
with higher level oversight. 
Section 6.6 summarises the findings about the PCG's and PCT's collaborative 
activity to develop and deliver primary care. It assesses the differences 
between the two organisations' approaches and relates them to the contextual 
factors of the framework in section 3.7. 
The overall argument of this chapter is that factors such as the power and 
status differentials between different professional groups, and the history of 
little collaboration in general practice, could be overcome to some extent by 
structural factors such as the introduction of locality-wide organisations and 
the inclusion of clinicians on their governing bodies. However, they are 
resistant to change, and structural factors are not in themselves always 
sufficient to overcome cultural barriers to collaboration. 
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6.2 Locality-wide primary care organisation 
The introduction of Oxford City PCG and PCT meant that, for the first time, 
there was a locality-based primary care organisation in the city. This 
contrasted with the previous fragmentation of primary care and independence 
of general practice. This section considers how the existence of these 
overarching primary care structures facilitated the delivery and development of 
primary care in the city. The PCG and PCT were broadly similar in this respect, 
so they are considered together in this section. 
6.2.1 Point of contact 
The very existence of an overarching primary care organisation for Oxford City 
provided external organisations with a point of contact with primary care 
citywide which had previously been lacking. It was helpful to agencies which 
needed to work with the primary care community in the city that they could 
now work with a single body rather than trying to negotiate with each practice 
individually. For example, a social services manager who experienced 
difficulties in establishing access to primary care services for asylum seekers 
was able to approach the PCG to help resolve this problem. Prior to its 
introduction, she would have had either to contact practices individually or to 
work through Oxfordshire Health Authority which had a less local focus. The 
PCG, in contrast, was building a relationship with each practice in the city and 
had a mandate and resources to address such problems on a strategic city- 
wide basis. 
Similarly, as the local Drug Action Team formulated its action plan, it 
approached the PCG to enquire about the needs, views and priorities of the 
local primary care community. The PCG's substance misuse service 
development officer was able to report on the needs of the practices within the 
PCG on the basis of a consultation he had undertaken, which Included a survey 
of all GPs in the city and a workshop which had been attended by a range of 
stakeholders. 
Of course, the PCG's existence did not guarantee a consensus within the 
primary care community on every issue, and mechanisms for consultation were 
not always perceived to be adequate. Some clinicians objected to the notion 
that a manager from the PCG should speak on their behalf. However, a 
recognisable primary care body was in place, and its relationship with Its 
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constituents evolved over time as budgetary and clinical governance 
arrangements developed. 
Whereas the PCG was formed in a context where previously there had been no 
collective primary care organisation in the locality, the PCT was established in a 
context in which the primary care community had become habituated to the 
existence of a local primary care organisation. 
The PCT had a greater budget and greater responsibilities, which lent it, as a 
representative body, more power in its negotiations with secondary care and 
other organisations. However, the PCT's more complex, bureaucratic structure 
meant it was perceived as less unified than the PCG as well as less focussed 
on, and responsive to, local issues. Its greater organisational complexity 
brought about a diminished sense of corporacy and greater distance between 
the PCT and the primary care community. This is explored further in section 
6.4 about the role of practising clinicians on the governing bodies of PCGs and 
PCTs. 
6.2.2 Working groups 
The Primary Care Development Group (PCDG) was formed as a working group 
of the PCG board to develop primary care collaboratively with practitioners In 
the city. It was made up of clinicians, practice managers and PCG development 
staff. It was responsible for leading a number of processes to develop primary 
care in the city, including the "Future Directions" consultation (see 6.3). A 
subgroup of the PCDG was the Education and Training Group which organised 
multidisciplinary education and training for health and social care staff. A 
Clinical Governance working group was also convened. Clinical governance was 
prioritised by the PCG: its was the only subgroup which was Invited to report to 
each board meeting. 
These groups continued their work in a similar way as subgroups of both the 
PCG and PCT. The PCT strengthened the PCG's multidisciplinary training and 
education program, and introduced 'protected learning time, ' where all 
practices in the city were encouraged to close for a day or half day to come 
together for joint training. It continued and developed the PCG's clinical 
governance work, maintained the GP and nurses forums and the PCT 
newsletter. 
The remits of these groups are discussed further in 6.3 
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6.2.3 Nurse and GP forums 
Prior to the establishment of the PCG, the Community Health Trust (CHT) had 
instigated nurse forum meetings which were held monthly for all community 
health nurses, including district nurses, health visitors and practice nurses. At 
these meetings, nurses discussed both clinical and organisational issues and, 
following the establishment of the PCG, feedback was presented to the PCG. 
Whereas full-time CHT nurses were contractually obliged to attend seven such 
meetings each year, the status of practice nurses as employees of GPs meant it 
could be difficult for them to take time out of the practice to attend them. 
Prior to the PCG, little was in place to create a sense of collective identity for 
GPs in Oxford. Oxfordshire had a countywide Local Medical Committee, but no 
equivalent city-wide fora were in place to facilitate communication between 
GPs in different practices, or between GPs and the PCG. Practices operated 
independently of one another, coming together occasionally for training and 
education but little else. 
The PCG chair identified a need for a local doctors' forum, to "inform strategy, 
to hear about grassroots problems, to share information and to make sure we 
are using everyone's skills" (PCG chair, 2000). It was some time from the 
introduction of the PCG in April 1999 until its first meeting In January 2001. 
The forum met thereafter every six to eight weeks, with half of each meeting 
open to items from GPs and the other half reserved for pre-determined PCG- 
led topics. Small project groups were also set up, with defined tasks and 
timescales, and their recommendations were fed back to the Primary Care 
Development subgroup of the board. They dealt with specific clinical areas, 
particularly those around the primary-secondary interface, as well as non- 
clinical areas. 
As there was no obligation on GPs to attend, the numbers who did depended 
largely on the topic under discussion. These forums would generally attract 
only a few (up to 15) GPs, but occasionally, when the topic was of great 
Interest to GPs, usually because it had resource or workload implications such 
as out-of-hours services, the turnout was much greater (around 70). 
6.2.4 PCT employment of community nurses 
When PCGs were replaced by PCTs, CHTs were disbanded and the employment 
of their staff transferred to PCTs. One GP anticipated that this would be an 
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opportunity to reduce the power differential between nurses and doctors. He 
perceived that the employment practices of the CHT, which required they clock 
in and clock out, undermined their professionalism. This, he felt, perpetuated 
the status and power differentials between GPs and nurses, and thus impeded 
collaboration between the two groups. He hoped that their employment by the 
PCT would address the two professional groups' inequalities in status and 
allow them greater autonomy. 
They have to fill in time sheets. / mean are they grown up or what? 
think it's an insult that district nurses and health visitors are treated in 
that way by their employers. They're not being treated like 
professionals. So if the PCT can achieve a demolition of that sort of 
culture and a new culture where we all work in the same direction and 
we all have the same professional values 1 think that's fantastic. (GP 2) 
However, the impact of the PCT's employment of community nurses was less 
significant than this doctor had anticipated. Community nurses retained their 
employee status while GPs, for the most part, remained independent 
contractors. I found no indication that the PCT did, in fact, challenge the status 
differentials between the two professional groups. 
Summary: This section considered how the existence of these overarching 
primary care structures facilitated the delivery and development of primary 
care in the city. The PCG and PCT were broadly similar in this respect, so they 
were considered together in this section. 
It argued that as a collective body, the PCG acted as a point of contact for 
collaborating organisations as well as to represent the primary care community 
(although this structural change did not automatically lead to consensus). The 
PCT's responsibility to implement more centrally-defined policies meant It was 
more bureaucratic and less locally responsive. The organisations' working 
groups brought together clinicians and managers to develop primary care, to 
implement clinical governance on a locality-wide basis, and to develop training 
and education for health and social care staff. Their GP forums brought 
together local GPs in new ways which aimed to erode fragmentation and 
encourage a sense of unity between them, although this was of limited 
success. As the employer of community nurses, there was little evidence that 
PCT challenged the status differentials between nurses and other professionals 
in the primary care community. 
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6.3 Practising clinicians elected by peers to governing bodies 
It was argued in chapter three that a sense of corporacy would need to be 
engendered between clinicians, and between clinicians and management for 
the primary care community to fulfil its primary care development 
responsibilities. They had, together, to develop budgetary and clinical 
governance policy which was acceptable to clinicians, and to implement it. GPs 
would have to be encouraged to collaborate in pursuit of the collective 
interests of primary care across the city. Given GPs' history of autonomy, self- 
regulation, their continuing status as independent contractors, and the 
traditional animosity between them and health service managers, heavy- 
handed managerial tactics to force them to practice differently were unlikely to 
be effective. 
As chapter three showed, the PCG model bypassed, to some extent, the 
clinician-manager tensions by including primary care practitioners on their 
governing bodies. On these bodies, the clinicians had both strategic and 
representative roles. This section examines the implications of the clinician-led 
governing bodies for the development of strategy and nurturing a sense of 
corporacy by enabling their clinicians to feed into, and feel ownership of policy 
and, therefore, to be motivated to comply with it. 
It considers the PCG and PCT separately because clinicians occupied different 
positions within these two quite different structures. 
6.3.1 Practising clinicians on PCG board 
Clinicians as strategists 
Most board members were supportive of the model of the primary care group 
governing board, believing that practitioners' closeness to practice placed 
them well to contribute to policies to develop primary care. This board nurse 
argued that the PCG's greatest strength lay in the contribution practitioners 
made to the board's decision-making, as they were in touch with patients and 
the front line of delivery of primary care. 
What all of us [board clinicians] bring to the work is that experience of 
practice contact with patients every day, and I would never sacrifice 
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that, personally, because I think that's what enriches my whole way of 
looking. I've never gone into nurse management because I want to keep 
client contact. I think that's what the white paper [New NHS] was trying 
to recognise, one of the very first places I've seen for years talking about 
the involvement of community practitioners. I very much value that dual 
thing. I think it enriches both. (PCG board/PCT PEC nurse) 
Board members held that the mix of clinicians on the board fostered debates in 
which the different professional groups were exposed to each other's cultures, 
concerns and styles of working, and that this provided a valuable learning 
opportunity for them all. 
Undoubtedly having nurses working together with doctors in that way 
has brought nursing issues much closer to the doctors. They saw things 
happening before, but they didn't perhaps consider them in quite the 
same way. (health visitor 2) 
Arguments against the inclusion of clinicians on the board were that 
practitioners lacked experience of working strategically with other 
organisations. Some saw clinical skills as being entirely different from strategic 
and managerial skills, and argued competence in one area does not imply 
competence in the other. For example, a primary care development nurse from 
the Community Health Trust (CHT) argued that the PCG model was III- 
conceived and not at all well suited to collaborative working. Although nurses 
and doctors on the board would certainly have experience of collaborative 
working with other clinicians and SSD care managers in managing the care of 
individual patients, they would not bring to the board the strategic insight that 
comes from the experience of managing large services. Through this 
experience, she argued: 
.. one learns about the very, very, very alien culture the Local Authorities 
have, which is completely different from the Health Service culture... 
They're [PCG board doctors and nurses] unlikely to have a picture of 
what the political sensitivities are, which ways you need to go in to get 
the outcome and to influence practice the way you want to. (CHT 
Community Development Nurse) 
Might she have had reason for her misgivings? They were shared by a senior 
member of SSD staff who had no direct connection to the PCG, but who felt 
similarly that clinician and managerial skills were distinct: 
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Leave your professionals to get on with their professional expertise. I 
think clearly you need a board with accountability and a board with the 
professional expertise, but at the end of the day, running an 
organisation is an expertise in itself. It's different from providing a 
service. (SSD Manager 1) 
The uncertainties surrounding the future positions of CHT primary care 
development nurses provide a crucial factor of context in which their views 
should be understood. The positions of nurse managers from the CHT seemed 
more precarious than anyone's given the imminent dissolution of the CHT, and 
so the managerial position of the PCG nurse board members could be seen as 
a trespass on their professional territory. The PCG model offered community 
nurses strategic influence that they had not previously had, so its perpetuation 
was in their interests. PCG board nurses did lack the PCDNs' experience of 
collaboration at a strategic level. However, as the next section shows, the 
principle that places on the PCG board were occupied by practising clinicians 
had the strong support of their constituent clinicians. This was seen by them 
to outweigh their lack of experience of strategic planning. 
Only one PCG board member was an ex-GP fundholder. He felt his strategic 
skills were underused by the PCG. Through developing services for their 
practices, GP fundholding practices had developed skills in designing, 
commissioning, developing and implementing services for their patients which 
he felt would have been valuable to the PCG. This GP resigned his position on 
the board partly through frustration that he was not given the opportunity to 
exercise these skills In the PCG as he would have liked to. Services were 
developed more slowly and less efficiently than he thought they would have 
had the PCG exploited the experience and skills of ex-fundholders. 
That's what fundholders did - had consultation and developed new 
services. And did it fast. (PCG board GP1) 
Clinicians as representatives 
Here I examine clinicians' views on the principle, as well as the quality and 
accessibility of board representation, their inclination to assume a role in the 
local primary care policy process and the effects of their employment status on 
this. Did their representation on the board by elected peers persuade clinicians 
to see the PCG as a vehicle for developing a shared identity and sense of 
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purpose within primary care locally? Did it have implications for facilitating 
collective activity in the primary care community? 
Accessibility and quality 
Not all GPs felt the population of the PCG's governing board by clinicians 
worked as a means to bring together the clinicians in the city. The ex- 
fundholding GP who was a PCG board member described how other GPs' 
attitudes to him had been unduly negative and that indeed, far from feeling 
part of a new, cohesive primary care community, the introduction of the PCG 
left him feeling marginalised and discriminated against on the grounds that he 
had been a fundholder: 
It doesn't seem to me that the other GPs in Oxford did anything other 
than be anti-fundholding. The PCG is largely democratic and largely 
representative of the anti-Fundholding, and being identified as closely as 
we are with pro-fundholding views, that is quite difficult... It feels 
divisive. (PCG board GP1) 
All the community nurses interviewed held their board representatives in very 
high esteem and reported that they found them accessible; all but one of the 
eight nurses interviewed knew their names and how to contact them. They 
were unanimously in favour of the principle and practice of being represented 
at this strategic level by elected local practitioners. They valued the fact that 
these were their peers: familiar, accessible, 'one-of-us' and in touch with 
current local issues. The representatives were also valued as individuals, and 
the nurses interviewed were confident that through them their views and 
interests were represented fairly and well. 
always think with [name of board nurse] she's got her hands on so she 
knows what's happening at the grassroots level as well as looking at the 
way forward. It makes a good balance. Sometimes I think people get a 
bit too distanced from what actually happens. So I think it actually 
works quite well. (district nurse 3) 
The board nurses themselves were reportedly determined in their efforts to 
involve the wider nursing community in the work of the PCG. 
She really pushes, you know, she almost sort of bullies: 'You've got to let 
me know what you want to say' (district nurse 2) 
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However, community nurses' perceived capacity to contribute to the PCG's 
work was influenced by the context in which the board operated. Nurses 
described three main limitations: their workload pressures, the PCG's 
communication style, and a lack of confidence that nurses' views would be 
taken seriously enough to influence local policy. 
The PCG board nurse representatives generally had a slot, or were at least 
present, at their respective nurse forum meetings. Pressing caseloads 
sometimes prevented nurses attending however, leaving some feeling out of 
touch. The board's business was disseminated via written bulletins and 
newsletters but again, their volume and the pressure of time on the nurses 
meant they were not always effective means of communication. In its 
newsletter, the PCG expressed its commitment to encouraging the 
participation of nurses in its work by keeping them informed of developments 
and involving them in its decisions. It circulated details of nurses' forum 
meetings to all city nurses, and of a training and education programme. The 
PCG website and newsletter each had a nurses' section. When interviewed, 
community nurses (CNs) and practice nurses (PNs) agreed that the information 
sent to them was abundant, but often they were critical of the PCG's methods 
and style of communication. 
We get loads [of written communication from the PCG]. I don't read them 
all. It's far too much, it's jargonistic, we all get individual copies, which 
think is a ludicrous waste of money, but yes, we get it! We are 
informed! (District nurse 2) 
The PCG presented a new opportunity for nurses to exercise strategic influence 
over the direction of primary care at the locality level. Some were excited by 
this and felt they and their colleagues had a responsibility to grasp it. They 
were unsympathetic towards nurses who complained that they were 
uninformed of changes when they had made no effort to be involved, and felt 
the burden of responsibility fell too often on a few individuals. 
Others expressed weariness at more "new opportunities" to engage In 
organisational reform which, they felt, lacked substance. Three nurses referred 
to their profession's lack of confidence in Its Influence. One health visitor 
explained this in terms of the Community Nursing Forum's history of marginal 
influence. It had failed to resolve issues relating to the CHT, even though 
community nursing was the major part of the CHT's business. She feared that 
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their concerns would assume less importance still within the PCG and their 
sense of powerlessness would be compounded. 
In terms of nurses having a voice I think it's our responsibility to make 
the noises and let them know what our concerns are... and l just think 
that perhaps we're not doing that enough. That we're happy to sit and 
complain about things that aren't changing, but we're still not yet into 
the culture of thinking '1 can actually do something about this. ' We're 
perhaps not used to being listened to, or taken seriously... (district nurse 
4) 
I feel a little bit far removed from it I suppose. It's been another year, 
we've seen a hundred and five changes, that kind of thing, and ... I 
suppose I have often put in an enormous amount of energy to try and go 
along with those changes to find that they're changing back anyway, so 
I'm slightly cynical. (health visitor 1) 
Perhaps our priorities will be sitting somewhere near the bottom which 
is maybe how it has to be. (health visitor 3) 
Employment status 
Practice nurses faced particular challenges in engaging with the PCG process 
because of their status as employees of GPs rather than of the CHT. In theory 
they had access to meetings from which their issues and concerns would be 
fed on, through the nurse representatives, to the PCG board. But as employees 
of GPs, their first contractual duty was to the practice, and they were aware of 
the financial impact on the practice that their absence would have. 
I feel pretty bad because I haven't been to them [meetings]. Because I'm 
employed by the GPs, my priority is that I see the patients because the 
GPs employ me to do that... I find that a real struggle. (practice nurse) 
Overall, the first year of the PCG could be characterised as a period In which 
new opportunities to develop a sense of shared purpose and unity amongst 
community and practice nurses emerged. In principle these were broadly 
welcomed by the nursing community and, on the face of it, the organisational 
structure and the commitment of the board nurses were In place to facilitate 
this. However, the influence of the context on implementation was evident. 
Rapid organisational change and the relatively low status of the nursing 
profession meant some nurses were ambivalent towards the new organisation 
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and their opportunity, through it, to exploit the opportunities it claimed to 
present for them to shape the provision of primary care. 
In terms of developing the sense of commitment to and ownership of the 
PCG's collaborative process identified by Hardy et al (2000) as ingredients of 
successful partnerships, the value attached by nurses to being represented by 
'their own' was clear. Board nurses had won the confidence of their electorate, 
and they were considered familiar, trustworthy, accessible and in touch with 
issues and the community. 
However, it is not evident that this confidence in their elected representatives 
led to active 'buy-in' from the practitioner community. After 18 months, the 
outcomes of nurse representation in terms of its impact on nurses' day-to-day 
working lives were intangible. 
think initially that feeling of hope was: 'OK, we've got something new 
and exciting happening', and some people may feel that that is the case. 
may be wrong but I think quite a lot of nurses have continued doing 
their work without being terribly aware of an awful lot that was 
happening. (health visitor 2) 
6.3.2 Practising clinicians on PCT professional executive committee (PEC) 
As Chapter 3 set out, the inclusion of practitioners on the PCG/T governing 
bodies was intended to influence its work in two related ways: first, by eliciting 
the input of practitioners to policy and strategy and, second, by introducing a 
sense of cohesion and ownership to the primary care community. The 
clinicians-as-strategists model was heartily welcomed in principle by the 
practitioners in the community, (although some nurses doubted that, in 
practice, it strengthened their strategic influence). However, there was little 
direct involvement of community practitioners other than board members in 
the work of any subgroups, although some GPs were involved in the 
development of substance misuse services. There was, therefore, potential for 
further community input to PCT policy and strategy. 
Clinicians as strategists 
As a result of the separation of the board from the PEC, and the larger 
bureaucratic scale of the PCT compared to the PCG, some GPs reported that it 
felt more distant from them than the PCG had. The more complex structure of 
the PCT brought ambiguity of power and status and appeared to shift it from 
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clinicians towards lay people and managers. In the PCG, strategic decisions 
were taken by a board composed mainly of clinicians, whereas In the PCT these 
were shared between two governing bodies, only one of which was dominated 
by clinicians. Further, the most senior level of the PCG comprised the GP chair 
and the lay chief executive; a clinician: manager ratio of 1: 1. The PCT was led 
by "three at the top": the chief executive (lay), the board chair (lay) and the 
executive committee chair (GP), reducing this clinician: manager ratio to 1: 2. 
It became less clear to the practitioners on the PEC, and to their colleagues In 
the community, that they were able to influence policy and its implementation. 
They questioned whether the move from PCG board to PCT PEC was a 
demotion of clinicians from 'driving seat' (DH, 1997: para 5.1) to passenger 
seat. It was perceived, at first, to represent a shift in the power base of the 
clinicians which put influence back in the hands of managers and bureaucrats, 
undermining the clinician-led model of the PCG. It was unclear how power and 
influence would be distributed between the two bodies and through the 
organisation as a whole. There was a concern that it would mean clinicians had 
less overall influence over local issues, particularly in a context in which central 
government was exerting greater Influence than ever over the way NHS 
services were delivered through more centralised policy making and 
performance management. 
The imbalance between the number of GPs and nurses on the PCT was reduced 
compared to the PCG. Paradoxically, the transition to PCT appeared, in some 
respects, to lessen the preparedness or capacity of nurses in the community to 
assume a strategic role in guiding the direction of the primary care community. 
Community nurses' reduced engagement in the business of the PCT compared 
to the PCG was manifest in their lack of involvement in subgroups and the 
difficulties in recruiting nurse PEC members. The increase in the number of 
nurse places on the PCT PEC, together with the maternity leave of one of the 
PCG board nurses, meant vacancies came up on the PEC for two nurses. There 
was little interest in them, and the paucity of candidates for these vacancies 
indicated that interest in the PCT was low amongst nurses. 
Chapter three suggested that the employment of community nurses by the PCT 
might bring about more cohesive packages of primary and social care. 
However, the transfer of their employment had little Impact on their 
collaboration with social care staff. 
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I think they've [nurses and care managers] always worked quite closely 
together anyway. I'm not sure the PCT has taken that another step 
forward. I don't think it's been a great sea change as a result of the PCT 
taking them on. (PCG board/ PCT PEC chair) 
Clinicians as representatives 
The separation of the board from the PEC in the PCT muddied the mechanism 
for clinician representation and introduced doubts about clinicians' influence 
on policy. In order for the clinicians on the PEC to act effectively as conduits 
between their constituent clinicians and policy, they had both to be in touch 
with their constituents and be influential in the policy process. The clinician- 
PEC link in the chain appeared to be intact: the PEC GP chair felt that 
relationships between the PEC and the city's GPs were good - they felt in touch 
with their opinions through being a part of, and accessible to, the GP 
community. However, he acknowledged that their influence on policy 
sometimes seemed questionable to the GPs in the city. Another PEC GP 
revealed that he too was unsure that they were influential. 
think in general we're probably not seen as remote because we're 
always at the meetings and all this sort of thing, so they see us. But in 
terms of making their feelings change the organisation then the links 
are so many and so long that they probably don't have confidence. (PCG 
board/ PCT PEC chair) 
It may be there's a disconnection - that there's no connection between 
me and what actually happens in the organisation. I'd like to think there 
is, but maybe I'm just window dressing and the whole of the executive 
committee is just window dressing, and that's the sort of nightmare that 
tend to have. I know that's not the case because we are steering policy. 
(PCG board/PCT PEC GP) 
This indirect chain of influence from clinician to PCT policy resulted partly from 
the separation of the PEC from the board and its more bureaucratic and less 
transparent processes. This brought with it a number of disadvantages. First, 
there were felt to be gaps in communication and understanding between the 
two bodies, despite the element of overlap between them. Second, whereas the 
PCG board met in public (as did the PCT board), the PCT PEC met in private, so 
the clinicians' decision-making process was no longer exposed to the scrutiny 
of their peers or the public. 
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The risks at that stage must have been incredibly high of it all going off 
the rails, and there was a honeymoon period probably where GPs, and 
nurses to a different extent, felt that it was going to be the same as the 
PCG with knobs on, more functionalities. Then reality began to hit with 
things like starter budgets and lack of money coming out to primary 
care, and the national targets coming down, and that's made GPs 
particularly feel less and less nailed in, and therefore quicker to criticise 
and therefore more of an uphill battle to involve... (PCG board/ PCT PEC 
chair) 
However, as the new organisation established itself, concerns that clinicians' 
influence had been eroded by the new organisation subsided, and practitioners 
on the PEC found they were still in a position to influence the major decisions 
made in the PCT. 
I think some of the clinicians who have previously been on the board in 
the early days felt they weren't where the action was. I suspect they now 
realise that's not the case because the action's in the Executive. 
(PCG/PCT lay member) 
As one nurse anticipated (see 6.4.1), community nurses' employment by the 
PCT seemed to do little to bring their concerns to prominence on the PCT's 
agenda. Community nursing had represented a large proportion of the CHT's 
activity and their interests were relatively high profile within it. In contrast, the 
PCT's agenda was crowded with many other issues, and community nurses felt 
their issues were sidelined. Despite the PEC nurse representatives' efforts to 
rally their colleagues in the city, they felt less influential in the larger PCT than 
they had been in the CHT, and workloads continued to present a barrier to 
their colleagues' engagement. 
In the PCT community nursing is - well, I was going to say a drop in the 
bucket. I think that might be how it feels to community nurses. It may 
not be the intention, but it is how it feels, and I think most people get on 
with their clinical work and have not as much engagement with the PCT 
as I would like. I don't think it's for want of trying to communicate and 
engage people. But the agendas are heavy, workloads are heavy. (PCG 
board/PCT PEC nurse) 
Still, the PCT management recognised that the PCT had to make greater effort 
to involve the broader primary care community in policy making. It was 
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difficult for clinicians on the governing body to represent the diversity of their 
constituents' views and to reconcile their preferences with the sometimes 
difficult options available. The PCT attempted to broaden the direct 
participation of the primary care community by increasing their opportunities 
to join the subgroups of the PEC, such as the Secondary Care Access Group, 
the Primary Care Development Group, Clinical Governance, Education and 
Training. 
think what you get through the cxecutive committee is a clinical reality 
and a clinical perspective. I think it's very hard for members of the 
executive committee to say they can represent the views of their 
colleagues. Their colleagues invariably have a hundred and one 
different viewpoints, and will support the nice things and challenge the 
difficult things... 
We're trying to not see the executive committee as the sole place where 
we get clinicians from the city involved in decision making and working 
with the PCT. We've tried to widen that net, to increase the number of 
people who come into the building and talk to us and get involved in the 
work we're doing. (PCT chief executive) 
Continuity 
There was a strong degree of continuity of membership between the PCG 
board and the PCT PEC of doctor and, to a lesser extent, nurse representation. 
This meant the relationships which had originated in the PCG between the 
elected clinicians and their constituents were maintained In the PCT. It offered 
some stability amidst much organisational change, and limited the disruption 
to the trust and loyalty built between them as governing body members, and 
between them and their constituent clinicians. It also built upon the experience 
as strategists these clinicians had developed in the PCG. The PCT aimed to 
extend the collaborative reach of the PCT by including pharmacy and therapist 
representatives on the PEC alongside the nurses and GPs. Also, the imbalance 
In numbers of nurses and GPs was reduced compared to the PCG: another 
partial challenge to the imbalances of power and status between doctors and 
nurses. 
Summary: This section examined the implications of the clinician-led 
governing bodies for the development of strategy and nurturing a sense of 
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corporacy by enabling their clinicians to feed into, and feel ownership of policy 
and, therefore, to be motivated to comply with it. 
It argued that the PCG board members were seen to have strategic and 
representative roles. Their strengths as strategists were seen to lie in their 
identity as practitioners, and their weaknesses in their lack of experience of 
working strategically with other organisations. The influence of nationally- 
defined targets limited their efficacy as strategists on the PCT compared to the 
PCG. The continuity of GP representatives from PCG to PCT was one of the few 
elements of continuity between the two organisations. The effectiveness of 
nurse representation as a means of involving their peers in the collective 
activity of the primary care community was indeed limited partly by the fact 
that nurses were outnumbered by doctors on the board, which perpetuated 
existing power differentials and rendered PCT PEC membership less attractive 
to nurses. 
6.4 Shared responsibilities and corporate behaviour in primary 
care 
Chapter three described the fragmentation and lack of co-ordination of 
primary care services prior to the introduction of PCGs. General practitioners 
were independent contractors who provided services for their own patient list. 
Community nurses were sometimes attached to a single practice or a small 
number of practices but - other than practice nurses - had been employed by 
their local CHT. To instil a sense of collective responsibility to a primary care 
community for the delivery and development of services was an ambitious 
objective. 
PCGs and PCTs had to pull together these previously disparate and 
uncoordinated constituents of the primary care community to develop and 
deliver more coherent primary care services. They had to develop policies on 
budgetary issues, clinical governance, education and training and planning of 
services and set them out annually in the form of their Primary Care Investment 
Plan. 
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PCGs and PCTs had responsibility to implement clinical governance, the local 
framework for monitoring and improving the quality of services. Thus, they 
had to shape and constrain spending and clinical behaviour In the local 
primary care community. They were also given a unified budget, calculated to 
cover the cost of all NHS healthcare for all patients on the PCG's and PCT's 
practice lists. This meant GP fundholding had to be dismantled, priorities for 
spending had to be agreed across the locality, and clinicians persuaded to 
practice within the constraints it implied. Implementing clinical governance and 
the unified budget required new corporate behaviour within the PCG and PCT, 
particularly amongst GPs whose practice and clinical decision-making had the 
greatest cost implications. 
This section examines the budgetary and clinical governance developments in 
the PCG and PCT. It focuses on how the new primary care development and 
delivery responsibilities were interpreted by the PCG and PCT: how their 
priorities were identified, how clinical governance and financial strategies were 
devised by each, and how progress was assessed against them. 
It section also examines clinicians' views on the PCG and PCT as vehicles for 
developing a shared identity and sense of purpose within primary care locally, 
and the implications of it for facilitating collective activity In the primary care 
community. It examines the implications for cohesion first of changes In 
commissioning arrangements; second, of clinicians' limited experience of 
management and collaboration; and third, of the professional and employment 
status of GPs. Finally, it examines the two organisations' approaches tp 
planning, education and training. 
In these respects, the two organisations differed little: the PCT largely adopted 
the processes and continued the approach which the PCG had set up, making 
no significant changes. 
6.4.1 Budget and clinical governance 
Transition from GP fundholding to PCG 
Chapter two postulated that certain contextual factors were likely to bear on 
GPs' perspectives on the introduction of the PCG and their readiness to take 
part in collective activity with the primary care community, or to adopt a 
corporate identity as part of it. These were their professional status relative to 
other primary care professionals; their autonomy and employment status as 
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independent contractors; the local history of commissioning secondary 
services; their limited experience of NHS management and of collaboration 
with other organisations (including other practices, local authority and non- 
statutory organisations); animosity between professionals and managers; and 
their predominantly individual, medical approach to healthcare. These largely 
militated against the development of a sense of cohesion and common 
purpose amongst GPs in the city, and between GPs and the wider primary care 
community. Their influence on the introduction of the PCG and the dismantling 
of fundholding are examined here. 
GP fundholding (GPFH) had demonstrated that GPs and groups of GPs could, to 
some extent, effectively manage a budget to provide and commission cost- 
effective care. However, GPFH perpetuated variations in the standards of care 
patients received. PCG and PCT models were designed to universalise 
budgetary aspects of GPFH such that a locality-based group of clinicians was 
given responsibility for managing a budget to cover healthcare for all their 
patients, and for implementing local systems to ensure the quality of this care. 
In Oxford the take-up of GP fundholding and other forms of primary care 
commissioning prior to the PCG had been low. In some parts of the country, GP 
fundholding had become the dominant model. In other areas, GPs Ideologically 
opposed to bringing the principles of the marketplace Into the NHS had 
adopted alternative forms of GP commissioning such as total purchasing pilots. 
These meant practices had gained experience of collaborating with one 
another to commission secondary services and developed, to some extent, a 
collective identity as a commissioning body. In Oxford, however, no alternative 
joint commissioning arrangements had been established. 
Still, dismantling what fundholding activity there had been In Oxford was 
controversial, and painful for some ex-fundholders, as they had to forgo some 
of their freedom to develop services independently of other practices. PCGs 
were to ensure that provision of services was equitable across all practices In 
the locality. It required sensitive budgetary manoeuvres, In particular, In 
reviewing the provision of particular services In primary care. 
Some services had been provided by a minority of practices under GP 
fundholding, and the PCG had to decide whether and how It would continue to 
fund them. This was controversial since practices which had provided a service 
prior to the PCG did not want to lose it. Further, central government rhetoric 
was of "levelling up" not "levelling down" I. e. ensuring that services developed 
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by fundholders were made available across the locality, rather than reducing 
standards of care available to any patients. 
Having GPs on the board of the PCG was expected to make the transition more 
palatable for these GPs since decisions about service development and 
resource allocation would be made by their peers, with whom they shared 
professional values and identity, rather than NHS managers who, as chapter 
two set out, often operated from a different set of principles and perspectives. 
Physiotherapy, for example, had been provided in practice by four former 
fundholding practices. To provide physiotherapy in every practice would have 
had significant cost implications, but after a protracted period of negotiation 
between the PCG board and GPs in the community, a compromise was reached 
whereby physiotherapy services were provided from some practices in the city, 
but could be accessed by patients from other practices. Levelling up also 
occurred with counselling and psychology services, which were made available 
to practices across the city, many of which had not previously had access to 
them. 
Levelling up, however, was not always seen by the PCG as a viable option, 
given their inevitably limited resources. While the PCG supported and 
reorganised some services which had been developed in practices under the 
fundholding system, others were not subsequently funded by the PCG. In some 
cases, this led to animosity towards the PCG which was seen as the cause of 
damage to the quality of service provision. The unpopularity of a difficult 
decision was not automatically mitigated by the fact that it had been made by a 
clinician-led body. 
Clinical governance issues 
Clinical governance focussed mainly on issues concerning GPs' practice. A 
large proportion of the PCG's single cash-limited budget was spent on 
prescription drugs. This meant that effective and cost-effective prescribing 
practice was a high priority and ongoing issue for clinical governance. 
As chapter three showed, clinical governance and budgetary constraints risked 
being viewed as an unwelcome intrusion on the self-regulation of GPs. The 
PCG ultimately could decide whether or not it would fund services such as 
physiotherapy, but there were other areas of doctors' practice over which they 
had little direct control. Most GPs operated as independent contractors, which 
meant they were not accountable on a day-to-day basis to any form of 
184 
management. While some practices had a practice manager, this was an 
employee of the practice who would manage the practice rather than manage 
the GPs, and the practice manager would be accountable to the GPs rather than 
vice versa. As long as the majority of GPs remained independent contractors, 
the PCG's power to exert leverage and impose change on most aspects of their 
clinical and prescribing practice was limited, so the PCG had to develop an 
approach to clinical governance which was acceptable to GPs, and with which 
they would consent to comply. 
Both the PCG and PCT in Oxford City employed inclusive and facilitative rather 
than authoritarian clinical governance procedures, so doctors were encouraged 
to view it positively and to collaborate with their peers to shape its direction. 
Clinical governance priorities were identified through consultation with 
practices, which led the PCG to adopt coronary heart disease and mental health 
as two issues around which service improvements, good practice and 
techniques for monitoring performance were developed. An annual clinical 
governance report was published and in June 2000 a clinical governance 
conference was called for practices to share examples of their good practice 
and experiences. With the publication of the NHS Plan (Secretary of State for 
Health, 2000) priority areas for service delivery were specified centrally which 
guided the development of clinical governance, although the PCG's priorities 
fitted well with these so relatively little disruption was caused. 
Although GPs' prescribing spends had not previously been regulated, targets 
were set for each practice. A formula which allowed for the effects of 
deprivation levels and other demographics on practices' spends was developed 
by board GPs and agreed by the board. Anonymised graphs were produced 
which allowed each practice to compare its performance to other practices' 
against these targets. The combination of the clinician-generated approach to 
prescribing policy and implementation, the provision of guidance on 
prescribing generic drugs, and the support of a prescribing advisor was 
effective: practices in the PCG did comply with PCG policy and collectively 
reduce their spending on prescribing. 
6.4.2 Planning, education and training 
The PCG was keen to involve local clinicians in the day-to-day issues of clinical 
governance as well as more long-term, strategic service development. The 
city's whole primary care community was invited by the PCG to contribute to a 
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one-day consultation called: Future Directions; The Development of Primary 
Care in Oxford City, at which the whole range of primary care workers was 
asked to think creatively about the direction for primary care in Oxford over 
the medium term: what it should provide and how it should be delivered over 
the following ten years. This attracted primary care professionals from across 
the city, across disciplines and professional groups, and brought them 
together to share ideas, perspectives and points of view on a city-wide scale In 
a way that had not happened prior to the PCG. 
The PCG developed a training programme, linked to clinical governance, which 
covered a range of issues from specific practice skills, such as wound care, to 
more abstract levels of professional development, such as multidisciplinary 
working. It was made available not only to primary care workers, but also to 
social care staff. New opportunities for joint training opened up by the PCG 
provided further chances for practitioners to learn and solve problems 
together. 
Suddenly we're able to tap into this other source of training, and 
particularly on promoting independence. So yes, there's extra training 
opportunities for people from social services and health, which is great, 
because I like the cross-fertilisation of ideas. (SSD Care Manager 2) 
Conclusion: This section examined the budgetary and clinical governance 
developments in the PCG and PCT. It argued that the professional and 
employment status of doctors meant that controlling their clinical and 
budgetary practice was challenging for the PCG/T. Introducing the structure of 
the PCG was not in itself sufficient to overcome these challenges. However, the 
fact that board GPs were influential in shaping clinical governance, and that the 
PCG took a facilitatory, rather than a coercive, approach to Its Implementation, 
meant that doctors complied with It to a great extent. 
6.5 Local authority representation on governing bodies 
The Social Ser vices Department (SSD) of the local authority was represented on 
the governing bodies of the PCG and PCT. This section explores the role of the 
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SSD member on the governing bodies of the PCG and PCT and whether It 
allowed primary care to develop in ways which took into account the 
perspectives of both health and social care. 
6.5.1 SSD representation on PCG board 
Reluctant collaboration 
Sensitivities around social services' contribution to the PCG were high, and the 
language used when the issue was raised in interview reflected discomfort In 
discussing it. It was impeded by the SSD representative's absence due to 
sickness for several months soon after the PCG went 'live'. Most participants 
from outside of the SSD acknowledged that collaboration between primary care 
and the SSD was unforthcoming, but were reluctant to discuss reasons for this 
lack of progress on record. Asked whether she thought there was potential for 
more input from social service to the PCG, one board nurse's response was: 
It's key. It's absolutely key, and it's just been an unfortunate set of 
circumstances. I'm not saying anything more than that on the tape... I 
was pleased at the commitment to send a high level - the deputies to 
the director - but that hasn't really worked in the city, for whatever 
reasons, and I regret that. You can't deliver the HImP agenda without 
that, and I think you can't really improve primary care in isolation from 
social care. So I'm hoping that will pick up. (PCG board/PCT PEC nurse) 
When she was asked about the level of influence social services had had in 
shaping the PCG's work, one social services manager's response was quite 
defensive: 
think I will answer that by saying that social services takes its 
commitment to PCGs very seriously, and that's demonstrated by the fact 
that representation on PCG boards is at assistant director level. And 
they're putting a huge amount of energy and time into all PCGs. (SSD 
Manager 1) 
A number of suggestions were made, off the record and unattributably, to 
explain the reluctant collaboration between the PCG and social services. One 
was that it was at least in part a result of the medical dominance of the PCG 
agenda and its preoccupation with establishing and developing Itself and its 
finances, and that other concerns, such as social services involvement, had 
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been squeezed off the agenda, and the important contribution they could 
make to the delivery of primary care services had been overlooked. 
I think probably the feeling from where we're coming from is that there 
are such huge agendas within PCGs that actually there's things that 
need to be sorted out that's actually not pertinent to social services at 
this stage. (SSD Manager 2) 
Others felt that responsibility for social services' lack of Involvement rested 
with social services; that their input to the business of the PCG had been 
invited but was not forthcoming due to pressures and their prioritisation of 
other things within their department. Other circumstances intervened to Inhibit 
collaboration. For example, a reorganisation of the SSD at the assistant 
director level took place at the same time as a radical change in the delivery of 
social services was heralded by the publication of Modernising Social Services 
(Secretary of State for Health, 1998). Further, this all took place against a 
backdrop of serious financial difficulties. 
Structural and geographical boundary differences between NHS and local 
authority 
The organisational structures of primary care and social services were very 
different. Whereas primary care professionals were mostly generalists whose 
skills could be applied across the community within certain parameters, social 
services are more specialised and are organised in "silos" of management and 
accountability. This made it difficult to pitch the SSD board representative at a 
level of strategic influence equivalent the board doctors and nurses who were 
all practicing clinicians. The social services department was part of the county 
council of a two-tier local authority, and covered five PCG areas. Initially, the 
decision was taken to allocate one assistant director to each of these five PCGs, 
and to signal commitment to collaboration at a senior level, that PCGs were 
being taken seriously by social services. This set the social services 
representative apart from the doctors and nurses In terms of their current 
hands-on understanding of operational and strategic matters. 
Oxford City PCG's social services representative had a remit for adult services. 
Health professionals who worked closely with children's services expressed 
concerns that they might be disadvantaged or marginalised by the PCG's focus 
on older people and the social services representative's adult remit. 
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just like primary care teams don't all easily relate to the PCG, and some 
are much more closely attached than others, social services is a very 
disparate organisation and there is one very senior manager from social 
services on the PCO, but she's from adult services and she won't really 
be able to tell you anything much about children's services. (SSD 
Manager 1) 
Accountability mechanisms between the two organisations were unclear, and 
there was no obvious mechanism for action via the social services 
representative in either direction between the PCG and the wider local 
authority. The potential for the PCG to use its link with the SSD to tap into local 
democratic function of the local authority was not realised. 
For a time, prompted in part by the absence through sickness of the board 
representative, a Service Manager was co-opted to the PCG board and attended 
some sub-group meetings. Her position in the hierarchy was the next level 
down from the Assistant Manager, with some operational responsibilities. 
Social services research participants anticipated that her lower position in the 
hierarchy would mean she could bring an understanding of operational issues 
faced by frontline social services staff, would be better placed to share 
information with her colleagues, and her position would be more consistent 
with the health practitioners on the board, while still being sufficiently senior 
to effect change. 
/ think it has been welcomed by development managers of each of the 
PCGs and I think that'll be a very fruitful way forward of making sure 
the right services are commissioned locally. (Joint Investment Plan co- 
ordinator) 
However the capacity of the co-opted Service Manager to effect change across 
the SSD was limited and, while her involvement led to some useful work 
around relatively circumscribed issues such as co-ordinating social and health 
services for asylum seekers, no wider effects were identified. There appeared 
to be a trade-off between having a sufficiently senior representative able to 
link at a strategic level across a broader section of the organisation, and a less 
senior one with close access to a narrower section of social services staff at a 
practitioner level. There would appear to be scope for input from both 
assistant director and service manager levels, although this was not realised in 
the PCG for any sustained period. 
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Geographical boundaries were another factor identified by social services staff 
as a barrier to the collaboration between the five Oxfordshire PCGs and 
Oxfordshire's social services department. While the benefits in terms of 
responsiveness to local needs of a geographically small PCG was 
acknowledged, one Care Manager described how each of the five city or 
district-based PCGs had its own quirks or idiosyncrasies were difficult for 
social services to accommodate. These differences were reflected in the Health 
Improvement Programme priorities identified by each PCG, and they conflicted 
with social services' need for a level of countywide consistency. 
7PCGs1 see themselves as pioneers and... each area seems to have 
things that they are ranking as very important. It might be asylum 
seekers in one area, it might be healthcare for older people, something 
to do with cancer somewhere else, service delivery somewhere else... 
Surely if we're going to have consistency there's got to be core things 
that each PCG should be taking on board, and then bringing it together 
and having more of a focus so that you actually develop in a similar 
way... Otherwise it's going to be a mish-mash and we won't be as 
effective as we could. (SSD Care Manager 1) 
Financial pressures 
The wider economic context had a bearing on social services' capacity for 
collaboration. Financial pressures were also identified as a significant barrier to 
building collaboration at strategic and practitioner level in a context in which 
the SSD was chronically underfunded and Health Act flexibilitles had not been 
widely employed to pool budgets. Funding structures and charging legislation 
set by central government, which the PCG had no power to change, presented 
obstacles. The SSD's state of chronic underfunding had rendered them less 
psychologically equipped to be open to working with other organisations. 
Certainly my view is that people retreat into their corner when they're 
under pressure, and I think part of the pressure that's around all this 
for social services is not just about finance, but the consequences of not 
having finance for so long that staff have been moved around in 
different roles, reorganisation, all that stuff that happens, and ! just 
think that they're a bit short on energy. (PCG/PCT lay member) 
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6.5.2 SSD representation on the PCT PEC 
The expectations of the PCT were higher than of the PCG to collaborate with 
social services. PCTs were tasked with 'integrating health and social care, ' a 
role not explicitly included in the three core tasks of PCGs, but which implied a 
requirement to go beyond building ad hoc relationships between primary care 
and frontline social services staff, and to build strategic collaborative 
arrangements between health and social care organisations with a view to 
improving the delivery of both services. 
It was understood at a senior level that the services were Interdependent at an 
operational level. 
Undoubtedly community nursing and social care is important - there are 
obvious overlaps between district nursing teams and some of the care 
management teams that go into older people's homes, and that's the 
territory we need to collectively get into. Things like the shared care 
protocols have helped clarify responsibilities and roles in the past, but 
actually there's a lot more that we could be doing there. (PCT chief 
executive) 
The representation of social services on the executive committee was not an 
effective mechanism by which to improve the organisation's capacity for 
collaboration. Instead, structural changes at the senior levels of both 
organisations which did promise to Improve the capacity for collaboration, 
were initiated within the social services department and the appointment of a 
new chief executive. 
A more optimistic outlook for primary care-social services collaboration was 
evident by early 2003, towards the end of the fieldwork period for the study. 
The social services department was renamed the Department of Social and 
Health Care, and chief executives of all five of the county's PCTs contributed to 
the process of selecting the new Director. The new title and the selection 
process suggested a new readiness to collaborate at a senior level. Although at 
first it was viewed with suspicion In some quarters, there was a sense of 
optimism that new leadership of the Department of Social and Health Care 
would present opportunities for better collaboration than that which had 
characterised the first three years of PCG/T - social services relationships. It 
was anticipated that closer strategic links between the two organisations, 
combined with the PCT's employment of community nurses, would Increase the 
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capacity for general practice, community and social care to collaborate 
effectively. 
"Some of my colleagues thought it was threatening to the NHS. 'Are 
social services planning to take over? ' l saw it much more positively: this 
is signalling an intention to bring social services closer together. (PCT 
chief executive) 
"Organisations that were looking inwards, once there's someone new 
around, start to look outwards again and can be more confident. Once 
you've got new leadership there are a lot of positive things you can take 
forward. (PCT chief executive) 
The fieldwork period was over before the outcomes of these changes could be 
assessed. 
Summary: This section explored the role of the SSD member on the governing 
bodies of the PCG and PCT and whether it allowed primary care to develop in 
ways which took into account the perspectives of both health and social care. 
It argued that SSD representation on the PCG board was considered to be of 
very limited effectiveness. It depended heavily on Individuals who were not 
always available. Establishing the PCG as an organisation, and Its perceived 
medical domination impeded collaboration with social services. Geographical 
boundaries and different internal structures and financial pressures also 
presented challenges for collaboration. Collaboration between the PCT and SSD 
promised to be more strategic and with higher level oversight. 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented findings in relation to RQ4 (set out In section 3.7) 
which asked whether Oxford City PCG's and PCT's organisational forms 
facilitated a collaborative approach to developing and delivering primary care 
services for their population. Primary care had previously been fragmented and 
unco-ordinated, dominated by GPs who were largely unmanaged and 
unregulated. The PCG's and PCT's budgetary and clinical governance 
responsibilities meant they had to rein in GPs' spending, control their clinical 
practice and encourage them to take a more corporate approach to their 
practice. This was likely to be challenging, given the medical profession's 
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history of fiercely-guarded autonomy. Four features of the PCG and PCT 
models, as set out in the analytical framework (section 3.6) potentially 
equipped them to meet this challenge. 
This section returns to the fourth research question and draws conclusions 
about how it can be answered with reference to data from chapter six. 
RQ4: How far did the following features of PCGs' and PCTs' organisational 
forms equip them to bring together primary care workers in the community to 
develop and deliver primary care? 
" their locality-wide base 
" the election of practising clinicians to their governing bodies 
" their budgetary and clinical governance responsibilities 
" the inclusion of a local authority social services department (SSD) 
representative on their governing bodies. 
Locality-wide base 
The PCG/T's locality-wide base allowed the PCG to perform consultative 
functions and to be a point of contact for other organisations who wished to 
collaborate with primary care on a city-wide basis. 
PCG/Ts constituted an overarching primary care organisation which brought 
together GP practices and other primary care workers within one loose 
organisational structure with shared responsibility for budget and quality. The 
existence of a single overarching primary care organisation for Oxford City 
meant others had a point of contact for the local primary care community to 
which they could bring issues of local concern. Over time the PCG developed 
relationships with its constituent practices through consultations, meetings 
and visits, and increased its usefulness and credibility as its mouthpiece for 
the primary care community. 
The PCG set up subgroups whose focus was the development and delivery of 
primary care in the locality of the city. The work of the Primary Care 
193 
Development Group, the Clinical Governance group and the Training and 
Education group was focussed on the policy, practice and organisation of the 
primary care community itself The training and education, newsletter and 
service development initiative brought together primary care clinicians and 
managers to deliver and develop primary care. 
The PCG chair identified a need for a GP forum to bring together GPs In a 
similar way to the nurse forums which predated the PCG. Unlike nurses, there 
was no obligation for GPs to attend their forum meetings and they did so in 
small numbers other than when the topic directly affected their practice 
resources. 
The existence of the city-wide organisation itself, and its subgroups and 
professional forums, all contributed incrementally to reducing general 
practices' isolation from one another. 
The direct employment of community nurses by the PCT, on the other hand, 
had no discernable influence on the way they collaborated with one another or 
with other professional groups during the period of the fieldwork for this 
study. Contrary to some people's hopes, it did not result in an alignment of 
their professional or employment status with those of GPs. 
Clinicians on governing bodies 
The election of clinicians to the governing bodies of the PCG/T was more 
effective in the context of primary care delivery and development than in the 
context of health improvement. Clinicians adopted both strategic and 
representative roles. In the PCT a larger range of clinicians was included, but 
nurses were difficult to recruit. The influence of clinicians on PCT was 
perceived to have been diluted by the transition from PCG to the more 
bureaucratic and centrally-controlled PCT. 
Dismantling GP fundholding was a challenge made more acceptable by Input 
from clinicians, yet ex-GP fundholders felt stigmatised In the new democratic 
PCG environment, and that the hard-won service development and 
commissioning skills they had developed as fundholders were not exploited by 
the PCG as they should have been. 
The long-standing status and power differentials between different 
professional groups, notably doctors and nurses were partially challenged by 
the composition of the governing bodies of the PCG and the PCT by giving 
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them almost equal formal status as board/PEC members. However, their actual 
status on these governing bodies was not quite equal: The longstanding status 
differentials of board members were deeply culturally and professionally 
embedded, and could not be redressed simply by changes to organisational 
structures. 
The PCG model was welcomed by clinicians, but nurses' enthusiasm for it 
waned as it became clear that challenges to power differentials between them 
and GPs were only partial. As central control of PCG/Ts increased, the role of 
clinicians on their governing bodies reduced. 
The PCT's separation of board from PEC meant that the professionals on the 
executive committee were, and felt, further removed from their colleagues in 
the primary care community. The transition to the bureaucratically more 
complex PCT exacerbated ambiguity of channels for clinicians to influence 
policy. Their peers expressed concern that the pure clinician identity of the 
executive committee had been compromised. This reduced trust and loyalty, 
and thus the networks, between the PCT and the doctors and nurses in the 
primary care community. The occupation of the PEC rather than the board did 
not in itself seem to marginalise clinicians' interests. The continuity of GPs 
from PCG board to PCT PEC provided one of the few threads of continuity 
between the two organisations. 
The composition of the PEC became more inclusive and egalitarian than the 
PCG board had been. More primary care health professionals (pharmacist and a 
therapist were added) so as a collaborative mechanism it could reach a wider 
section of its clinical constituents. 
Community nurses became employees of the PCT but these new employment 
arrangements had little effect on their professional status or their day-to-day 
work. Their inclusion in a larger, more powerful organisation paradoxically 
made them feel less influential in primary care policy, and this was reflected in 
the difficulty the PCT had in recruiting nurses to two new posts on the PEC. 
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Clinical governance and budget 
Clinical governance and the development of primary care were taken seriously 
and prioritised by Oxford City PCG, and clinicians on the board were keen to be 
involved in the process. The involvement of primary care clinicians in all steps 
of the process was actively encouraged. Many of the PCG practitioner board 
members engendered their colleagues' trust in the processes, minimised 
resistance from GPs and supported their collaboration in developing and 
adhering to clinical governance policies. 
A bottom-up approach was taken by the PCG board and clinical governance 
subgroup to designing strategic budgetary and prescribing policies. Clinicians 
themselves were involved in the process of identifying the priority areas for 
clinical governance. Practices' performance against targets (initially locally 
defined, but latterly identified by central government in the NHS Plan) was 
assessed and fed back using anonymised data. Training and education were 
provided by the PCG and PCT to support clinicians in the pursuit of good 
practice. The PCG's facilitative, non-coercive approach to clinical governance, 
led by clinicians, ensured that what was potentially a confrontational process 
was facilitated and negotiated, and did not present an unacceptably strong 
challenge to professional self-regulation. Its effectiveness was demonstrated In 
the successful reduction of prescribing spend in the city. 
SSD representative on board 
The SSD was represented on the governing bodies, which was designed to 
allow primary care to develop in ways which took into account the perspectives 
of both health and social care. The effectiveness of social services 
representation on Oxford City PCG board was difficult to discern and a 
sensitive area for discussion in interviews. At an operational level, a degree of 
everyday ad hoc collaboration between SSD care managers, community and 
hospital nurses and GPs predated the PCG. However, I found no evidence that 
the PCG furthered operational level collaboration between health and social 
care practitioners, or systematic, strategic collaboration between the PCG and 
social services. Structural and geographical differences between health and 
social care were longstanding barriers to collaboration, and neither SSD 
representation on the PCG board itself, nor the changes made to the seniority 
of the SSD board representative, overcame this. The SSD representative was 
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not directly accountable for her contribution to the PCG to anyone in the SSD 
nor in the PCG. The PCG did not use SSD representation to tap into the 
democratic function of the local authority. SSD found it difficult to respond to 
each of five Oxfordshire PCGs, and their longterm financial pressures left them 
ill-equipped to adapt to challenges. 
197 
Chapter seven: Nested case studies 
7.1 Overview 
This chapter is the third of three findings chapters which examine the PCG's 
and PCT's collaborative capacity and practice, the third element identified in 
the realist theoretical framework. 
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Figure 8: Realist theoretical framework - collaborative capacity 
Two of the PCG's Health Improvement Programme (HImP) priorities were to 
tackle substance misuse and to promote independent living in older people. 
They were identified as key issues for health improvement by the range of NHS 
and non-NHS organisations who took part in the early consultation to agree 
the local HImP priorities for Oxford. This chapter addresses research question 
S. 
RQ5: Did the PCG's and PCT's collaborative capacity manifest in collaborative 
processes and outcomes at operational levels to tackle substance misuse and 
to promote independent living in older people? 
It reports the findings of the nested case studies, which examined how Oxford 
City PCG and PCT engendered collaborative capacity and practice relating to 
these two HImP priorities. It is structured around the organisational features of 
the PCG and PCT identified in the analytical framework (figure 6): the PCG's 
explicit health improvement remit (in section 7.3); its locality-wide base (7.4); 
its clinical governance and budgetary responsibilities and the composition of 
its governing bodies (7.5). 
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Section 7.2 introduces the two nested case studies. It recaps the reasons for 
selecting the promotion of independent living in older people and tackling 
substance misuse as case studies: essentially that the needs of each group 
spanned a number of organisational and sectoral boundaries and the PCG/T 
appeared to be well positioned to facilitate collaboration between them. 
Section 7.3 examines the influence of the two organisations' specific health 
Improvement remit on their engagement with the complex problems 
exemplified by the nested case studies: did they adopt a more collaborative, 
upstream approach than primary care traditionally had? 
It argues that the shared care model developed for tackling substance misuse 
was less collaborative than its name suggested, and presented a less upstream 
approach to the problem than the HImP implied. The PCG and PCTs' substance 
misuse services were treatment-oriented, the role of the GP and 
pharmaceuticals being central. At the patient level, each case required Input 
from four individuals, but their collaboration was based not on trust, 
reciprocity and loyalty, but on a contract. The collaborative arrangements 
specified by the shared care protocol were more formal than the network 
relationships implied by New Labour's rhetoric. 
Elements of the PCG's services to promote independence in older people, in 
contrast, took a distinctly upstream approach, developing non-medical, 
collaborative interventions designed to reduce hospital admissions and speed 
hospital discharge. The PCT claimed its relationship with the SSD (renamed the 
Department of Social and Health Care) would be more strategic than the PCG's 
had been but the intention to adopt a preventive approach to promoting 
Independence in older people was retained. There was evidence that the 
increasingly centrally-driven target culture Impeded upstream work to promote 
independence in older people. 
Section 7.4 investigates the significance of the PCG's and PCT's locality-wide 
base for collaboration to address these two HImP priorities. 
Understanding its significance for its efforts to tackle substance misuse 
requires an awareness of the history of drug service provision locally. The local 
context in which drugs services were to be developed was one in which 
specialist services were being withdrawn and a minority of doctors had taken 
on a disproportionate amount of work with drug users, at what was perceived 
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to be an unsustainable cost to their practice. Therefore, a key challenge for the 
PCG was to foster a sense of collective responsibility for addressing the city's 
substance misuse problems. The locality-wide base of the PCG was seen as key 
to redistributing the workload more fairly across the city. 
This section argues that power differentials between GPs, managers and other 
clinicians, as well as GPs' professional autonomy, presented Impediments to 
developing a collective will to provide services across the city. These 
Impediments were largely overcome by the PCG's appointment of a 'specialist 
generalist'. Her identity as a former GP allowed her to operate as a boundary- 
spanner between the PCG and different professional groups, and helped to 
engender clear and robust collaborative working with drug users amongst 
previously reluctant GPs. This was effective In redistributing the treatment of 
drug users across a larger number of city practices. 
A major challenge in the promotion of independence in older people was to 
tackle problems surrounding hospital discharge. This required that different 
professional groups improved their understanding of each others' roles and 
that appropriate discharge procedures and protocols were put in place. This 
chapter argues that the PCG's locality-wide base positioned it well to facilitate 
better understanding of roles and to improve referral procedures around 
hospital discharge across the geographical area. 
Section 7.5 focuses on the impact of clinical governance, board composition 
and budgetary aspects of health improvement priorities on collaboration: three 
design factors which combined to reveal the vision of the PCG/T as corporate 
cultures that emphasised collective responsibility. 
The rationale for the presence of clinicians on the PCG/T governing bodies was 
partly that this would engender a sense of cohesion and corporacy. It would 
bring a more strategic approach to improving the quality of primary care, and 
facilitate the sharing of good practice across professional groups and 
practices. Board clinicians would have credibility with their colleagues, and so 
would persuade them to implement PCG/T policy across the city practices. 
This section argues that, some GPs and a PCG/T manager felt passionately 
that the shared care of drug users was a valuable area of work, but this view 
was not represented on the PCG/T governing bodies. Although a substance 
misuse services development officer was appointed, and the board eventually 
200 
ratified proposals to introduce shared care for drug users, many of the board 
GPs were themselves hostile to the idea that heroin users should be treated In 
primary care so were not motivated to bring their GP colleagues with them In 
taking on this area of work. In this case, having clinicians on the governing 
body of the PCG was not effective in implementing 'official' PCG policy. 
Individual doctors' resistance to working with drug users stemmed from issues 
related to levels of remuneration and fear of being overwhelmed by demand If 
"floodgates" were opened. The PCG/T's corporate reluctance to prioritise it 
derived from the fact that it were not centrally performance managed on 
substance misuse services, and the funding for it came not from their budget, 
but from the local Drug Action Team. The factor which was most effective In 
bringing GPs on board with shared care was the appointment of the 'specialist 
generalist. ' Her identity as a former GP made her arguments were more 
persuasive to GPs than those of the PCG manager. She was also better able to 
influence the drugs workers. 
The inclusion of clinicians on the governing bodies was designed to overcome 
the traditional animosity between managers and professionals which Is said to 
arise from their different motivations: professional and altruist amongst 
clinicians, and hierarchical and careerist in managers. 
However, this section argues that the managers and clinicians deviated 
significantly from their respective stereotypes. Managers did not always behave 
like "bean-counters. " In the PCG, they were manifestly motivated by social 
justice and public-spiritedness. Controversy surrounding remuneration of GPs 
bore testament to the degree to which they were financially motivated. It also 
Illustrated the contractual, rather than network-based, nature of collaborative 
working. 
The inclusion of a local authority SSD representative on the PCG/T governing 
bodies was designed to facilitate closer working between primary care and 
social services on the planning and delivery of services. This section argues 
that the intermediate care services set up to reduce pressure on acute services 
by reducing the number of hospital admissions amongst older people and to 
facilitate effective and timely discharge from hospital did not arise as a result 
of SSD representation on the governing bodies of the PCG/T, but were rather 
brought about by new collaborative relationships at senior levels of SSD and 
PCT management, and were facilitated by the Health Act Flexibllitles. 
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7.2 Introduction to the nested case studies 
In chapter 4,1 set out the argument for conducting two parallel longitudinal 
case studies of two of the HImP priorities: 1) tackling substance misuse, and 2) 
promoting independent living in older people. These HImP priorities were 
selected because the needs of both groups spanned a number of 
organisational and sectoral boundaries, yet they exemplified contrasting Issues 
in terms of client group, aims and outcomes of the Interventions, and 
illustrated collaboration between different sets of organisations. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted at two time points with PCG/T 
staff, local authority officers and managers, clinicians and some voluntary 
sector organisations. An interview schedule (see appendix 2) outlining the 
main topics to be covered was sent to participants In advance of the Interview, 
tailored to the profession or position of the Individual participant and the stage 
of iterative data analysis. Interviews focused on people's perceptions and 
experiences of the PCG/T's impact on collaborative activity in these two areas 
of work. 
7.2.1 Substance Misuse 
Substance misuse in many ways exemplifies a complex health and social 
problem. It has implications for health Inequalities, criminal justice, housing, 
employment and social exclusion as well as medical morbidity and mortality. 
The management of drug misuse and dependence presents a 
considerable clinical challenge to all practitioners. However, delivering 
treatment well and gaining good outcomes, enhances clinicians' 
competence and confidence in tackling these complex problems, to the 
benefit of the individual patient and to society. (DH, 1999) 
Heroin was Identified as the most problematic Illicit drug at the time In the city. 
The prevalence of heroin misuse in Oxford was growing rapidly at a time when 
the specialist drugs services, which had previously taken referrals from GPs, 
had been cut back. Nationally, the profile of drugs service provision was 
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highlighted in 1998 by the launch of the Government's ten year drugs strategy 
Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain (Home Office, 1998), and In 1999 Drug 
misuse and Dependence: Guidelines on Clinical Management (DH, 1999) was 
published. 
7.2.2 Care of older people 
Older people were a group whose needs were often unmet, nationally and 
locally, because they fell through gaps between services. This was Identified as 
a priority for the NHS and social services with the publication of the National 
Service Framework for Older People (DH, 2001b). 
A major challenge for health and social services was to stop the 'revolving 
door' of hospital admission and discharge. Older people were frequently 
admitted and readmitted to hospital due to gaps in services in several places 
throughout their pathway of care. There were several possible sites of 
intervention, and the PCG/Ts' wide remits provided many opportunities to 
intervene. In particular, their health improvement remit could promote health 
and prevent hospital admissions. Their position as a locality-based primary 
care organisation suggested they could act at a locality level to improve 
communication and interaction between primary care, secondary care, social 
services and voluntary organisations, to help clarify their remits and co- 
ordinate their activities. In theory, their budgetary responsibilities allowed 
them to direct NHS funds where they were most needed and combine them 
with SSD funds where required. The inclusion of an SSD representative on the 
board/PEC was designed to facilitate a collaborative channel between the PCG 
and the SSD although, as chapter five demonstrated, this was not a very 
effective channel for change. 
7.3 Health improvement remit 
Section 7.3 examines the influence of the two organisations' specific health 
improvement remit on their engagement with the complex problems 
exemplified by the nested case studies: did they adopt a more collaborative, 
upstream approach than primary care traditionally had? 
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7.3.1 Substance misuse 
Substance misuse was an issue which touched on the work of many bodies and 
agencies, including local authority departments and a range of voluntary sector 
organisations. It was identified as a HImP priority which, given the multi- 
agency nature of the HImP and the terms of reference of the PCG's HImP 
group, suggested an upstream approach might be adopted, with a greater 
emphasis on broad determinants of health than primary care had previously 
taken. 
However, the PCG's and PCT's efforts to tackle the problem of substance 
misuse were to develop primary care based services for heroin users to which 
the GP role and pharmaceuticals were central. A 'shared care' treatment model 
based on prescribing methadone (an opiate substitute) was promoted. 
Underpinning the shared care scheme was a contract which specified the 
responsibilities of four parties: the drug user, a GP, a drugs worker and a 
pharmacist, and was signed by each party. This model had been adopted In 
other parts of the country, and a substantial evidence base demonstrated its 
efficacy in reducing mortality and morbidity in heroin users (Keen, 1999a). 
Methadone maintenance treatment had some vociferous proponents, who 
believed it should be routinely delivered within a well designed shared care 
system in primary care. 
When the effectiveness of a relatively inexpensive treatment such as 
methadone maintenance in reducing mortality and morbidity is now so 
well established, for how long can it be considered ethical for some 
general practitioners to refuse to prescribe it within a shared care 
framework? (Keen 1999a) 
At first sight, this approach to tackling substance misuse bore little 
resemblance to collaboration embodied as a network mode of governance 
based on relationships of trust, reciprocity and loyalty. It took a treatment- 
oriented view of a problem which had strong social, economic and 
environmental Influences. This shared care model focussed on treating 
Individuals and was based on a formal contract between the four Individuals, 
backed up by a system of financial remuneration. Nor did It obviously relate to 
the defining features of the PCG's health Improvement remit which Implied 
taking an upstream, broad view of the determinants of a population's health. 
204 
However, it was collaborative in the sense that the four-way agreement 
required three of the four parties from different professional and occupational 
groups to sign up to the scheme and to work together to pursue the health of 
the drug user. Also, the reduction of health inequalities and 'harm reduction' 
were underlying aims of the substance misuse services. The drugs worker's 
role was largely to address health and social concerns other than the user's 
addiction itself, such as health promotion, housing and benefits, and to 
provide a link with other organisations and agencies whose services were 
needed by the drug user. A strong public health ethos motivated the GPs who 
worked with drug users prior to the PCG's development of substance misuse 
services. 
It also required a degree of corporacy in the primary care community jointly to 
take responsibility for a problem which seemed not to be acknowledged as a 
priority and had previously been regarded by GPs as a specialist area of 
treatment. 
A change of heart is needed. A change of culture, philosophy, which Is 
notoriously difficult to bring about historically, in the area of drugs. 
Without that change of culture the GPs of any big city will more often be 
treating the worried well more and more, and the genuinely needy will 
fall by the wayside once again. And that isn't the idea of care. The 
inverse care law is very well illustrated In Oxford. (GP5) 
7.3.2 Promotion of independent living in older people 
The PCG and PCT's health improvement function (along with their budgetary 
responsibilities) implied a role in breaking the cycle of the overuse of acute 
services as a result of a lack of investment in low-level health promotion and 
preventive services (Rummery & Coleman, 2003). 
One of the PCG's early health improving collaborative ventures was Its 
involvement in the Small Repairs Scheme. It was a county-wide Initiative 
developed by the PCG, SSD, Oxford City Council, Oxfordshire District Councils 
and Anchor Trust, a voluntary organisation, to enable older people to live In 
their own homes as independently as possible. It aimed to promote 
independence in older home owners over the age of 65, to help them to live as 
independently as possible, and to help prevent accidents In the home. It was 
aimed at older owner-occupiers and, In the early days, its 'handyman' carried 
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out small plumbing, joinery and electrical jobs and small adaptations around 
the home in return for a fixed fee. It came Into effect In 2000 and the PCG's 
role in the scheme was to advise on the development of the service, to 
contribute towards the funding and to disseminate Information about it to 
primary healthcare teams (PHCTs) and encourage them to refer patients to the 
scheme where necessary. 
With input from the PCG, the scheme was developed further with a view to 
speeding discharge and preventing readmission, through collaborative working 
with other services. For example, training was given by occupational health 
and physiotherapy staff to enable the handyman to identify inconveniences, 
hazards and risks and to do home safety checks. He was trained to advise 
clients how to avoid trips and falls and was sometimes asked to prepare a 
home for someone about to be discharged from hospital. 
The scheme exemplified a low-technology, non-medical intervention which, 
according to the evaluation presented to PH&l group May 2002, succeeded in 
preventing admission to hospital and speeding discharge by providing minor 
adaptations and aids within the home and bypassing long waiting times to 
access statutory services. Its two year review claimed to demonstrate its cost- 
effectiveness in terms of prevention when the cost of a hip fracture was 
considered, and that it allowed the fast-tracking of people in hospital to speed 
discharge and prevented readmission. In Its second year, the number of people 
accessing the service increased by 10%, the proportion of black and minoity 
ethnic (BME) people accessing it increased by 6.5%. 
It was a project in which the HImP Group took an ongoing Interest. It was not 
nearly as high profile or financially prioritised as the major elements of the 
Intermediate care strategy, but the PCG's involvement was ongoing over Its 
first two years, largely because of the HImP team's Involvement. The fieldwork 
ended before it was possible to know whether this Input would be maintained 
by the PCT's restructured public health team. 
Summary: This section examined the influence of the two organisations' 
specific health improvement remit on their engagement with the complex 
problems exemplified by the nested case studies. 
It argued that the shared care model developed for tackling substance misuse 
was less collaborative than Its name suggested, and presented a less upstream 
approach to the problem than the HImP Implied. Elements of the PCG's 
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services to promote independence in older people, In contrast, took a distinctly 
upstream approach, developing non-medical, collaborative Interventions 
designed to reduce hospital admissions and speed hospital discharge. 
7.4 Locality-wide primary care organisation 
This new model of primary care organisation provided a structure which aimed 
to lend cohesion to the primary care community In a locality, and to bring 
primary care together with other local health and social care organisations. As 
chapter three showed, this was a key change to the way primary care was 
organised. The PCG/T's provision of services to drugs users and older people 
sought to address poor collaborative working arrangements, to encourage 
developments in primary and community services and had a public health 
focus. This section investigates the significance of the PCG's and PCT's 
locality-wide base for collaboration to address these two HImP priorities. 
7.4.1 Substance misuse 
The PCG identified a need to provide accessible and high quality drugs services 
across the city and, as a city-wide organisation, seemed geographically well 
positioned to do this. The need for such services, and the challenges inherent 
in meeting this need, are best understood in the context of the national and 
local situation with respect to drugs services. 
What's happening in oxford is that secondary services tend to be under- 
resourced and overstretched and therefore the relationship between 
primary care and secondary care services is under tension and 
strained... There are areas where there is a good service and we're 
definitely one of the areas where there isn't. (PCG substance misuse 
services development officer) 
Drugs services in Oxford 
A survey of city GPs was conducted in April 2000 to benchmark initial 
involvement with drug users, and in July 2000 a stakeholders consultation 
event was held to identify local needs and requirements. Their findings were 
summarised in a paper to the PCG board in July 2000 (00/17). 62 GPs 
responded to the survey, Indicating that between them they had about 500 
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definite or possible class A drug users. Support, training and remuneration 
were cited as major elements which needed to be addressed if PHCTs were to 
feel able to take on shared care of drug users. GPs were aware of charges 
made against doctors for mis-prescribing methadone in other parts of the 
country, highlighting the importance of protocols. 
In brief, prior to the PCG's introduction, services for drug users In the city had 
been provided by specialists in the psychiatry department of an acute hospital, 
but this service was no longer accepting referrals. The remaining services were 
inconsistent in quality and inadequate to meet the needs of Oxford's drug 
users. Oxfordshire Mental Healthcare Trust had a community-based team of 
psychiatric nurses, the Specialist Community Addiction Service (SCAS), who 
treated a caseload of drug users with some methadone maintenance, but their 
practice was not supported by the latest evidence base, and their service was 
'silted up', i. e. the waiting list was too long to allow them to accept further 
referrals. Four general practices in the city provided some methadone 
maintenance treatment for heroin users but some of these GPs felt 
inadequately supported in this. One of these practices was a primary care 
service set up specifically to meet the needs of homeless people and staffed by 
salaried GPs, another was a practice whose patient list included bail hostel 
residents, and a third was a single-handed practitioner who had developed a 
reputation for treating drug users, and had on his patient list a 
disproportionate number from across the city. The fourth ran a regular practice 
in a deprived part of the city and treated a small number of drug users. Some 
other GPs provided general medical services to a small number of patients who 
were drug users, but provided no specific treatment for their substance 
misuse. 
In other parts of the UK, the development of primary care-based substance 
misuse services had demonstrably improved access to evidence-based 
treatment from GPs who were trained and supported in this work. The PCG 
believed this model would benefit drug users in Oxford by ensuring access to 
high quality services, as well as normalising the treatment of drug use In the 
community and removing the stigma of attending a specialist clinic. From the 
point of view of the primary care community, lt would distribute the workload 
more evenly across practices in the city and reduce the demands made of a 
small number of GPs who were bearing a disproportionate amount of this 
resource-intensive work. 
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Corporate approach to tackling the city's drugs problems 
As section 3.2.1 argued, the PCG provided a locality-based body which could 
potentially foster a corporate culture and a sense of collective responsibility 
(Wilkin et al, 2001). Their introduction was an attempt to foster local 
ownership and control of locally defined needs, as well as a sense of shared 
identity and purpose in meeting them. In the context of developing substance 
misuse services, this meant the primary care community adopting shared 
ownership of problems relating to heroin use and a collective will to tackle 
them. If the proposed shared care scheme for the treatment of drug users was 
to be viable, the PCG had to recruit to it a proportion of their constituent GPs. 
That heroin use was a problem in Oxford was undisputed, but corporate 
ownership of the problem by GPs, and willingness to work together to tackle, it 
was difficult to foster. 
One contextual factor which militated against the PCG's efforts to recruit GPs 
to the shared care scheme was GPs' autonomy and their independent 
contractor status. The PCG had no direct control over many aspects of their 
practice and, since substitute prescribing lay outside of the General Medical 
Services (GMS) contract, GPs had to be cajoled rather than coerced Into taking 
part in the scheme. Resistance to signing up came In several forms. 
Some objected to the principle of prescribing drugs for something they 
considered not to be an illness. Also, GPs were often aware of well-publicised 
cases where criminal proceedings had been brought against GPs when 
something had gone wrong, and this fear was sometimes reinforced by a 
section of the medical profession. Some Local Medical Committees (LMCs), for 
example, formally advised doctors not to prescribe methadone unless they 
were separately contracted to provide the service, warning against being 
'blackmailed' into actions that could have 'severe legal consequences' and 
'threaten their whole future careers' (Wessex LMC, 2000). 
Methadone maintenance seems a very dodgy business. People die from It 
and doctors have been prosecuted. It's dangerous for me as well as for 
the patient. The aim is not to be taking drugs or medication, prescribed 
or street, unless there's some clear medical Indication. That's a sort of 
philosophical thing that underlies all the doctors' prescribing here. 
Whether someone has a sore throat or a drug problem, we much prefer 
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not to prescribe than to prescribe. It's much healthier and better, 
always, always, always. (PCG board GP1) 
Colleagues' disapproval 
Some GPs reported that their clinical partners were obstructive and 
disapproving of their work with drug users. They found this unacceptable in 
the light of the General Medical Council's (GMC) guidance that withholding 
treatment on the basis of moral judgements about a patient's activities or 
lifestyle would be unethical (GMC, 1999) and argued that it might even raise 
questions of serious professional misconduct. But, given this sometimes 
hostile GP culture and the high stakes involved in methadone prescribing, solid 
support, in terms of both multidisciplinary teamwork in primary care, and 
access to secondary services to which to refer complex cases, was perceived as 
absolutely crucial. This support was often absent, and recent upheaval within 
the Mental Healthcare Trust contributed to confusion: 
We feel a bit beleaguered and quite isolated; as a practice we feel we 
haven't got any backup if we do take addicts on, and I personally feel it 
within the practice because I know my other partners really disapprove 
of it. The official policy is not to run methadone programs. (GP 3) 
We have been asked to do written referrals to the specialist service via 
[name of Community Psychiatric Nurse] at the Community Drug Team. 
We get letters back saying 'we're sorry there's no service at present. 
There may be one in January. ' Sometimes floating around are hints that 
there may be a locum consultant available, but we're not told about 
that. (GP 4) 
think the specialist services have completely collapsed now. (GP 1) 
Drugs services developed 
After very lengthy negotiations and ongoing work, to which the city PCG's 
Methadone Prescribers Group contributed significantly, shared care protocols 
were drawn up for the whole county and launched by the Oxfordshire Drug and 
Alcohol Action Team (DAAT) In June 2002. The shared care plan Included: 
" therapeutic intervention to promote change, provided by a GP Liaison 
Worker (GPLW) (eg motivational interviewing, cognitive behavioural 
therapy) 
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" pharmacotherapy if appropriate, prescribed by the GP or Intermediate 
practitioner and dispensed by arrangement at a named pharmacy 
" social support provided by a voluntary agency, the probation service, 
school nurse, health visitor or other professional (Oxfordshire DAAT, 
2002) 
However, implementing the shared care model was managed by a non-clinical 
PCG manager. He faced considerable challenges in recruiting GPs to the 
scheme. This was a fraught task, which in many ways exemplified manager- 
professional tensions. It also required that he grapple with the differentials in 
power and status between GPs and other groups, which derived largely from 
their tradition of professional autonomy and independent contractor status. At 
times the animosity between clinicians and managers was evident in the slow 
progress made in bringing GPs on board. The manager was aware of this 
manager-professional divide, and took steps to find other doctors to instil 
credibility in the shared care model. 
The recruitment of GPs to the scheme was eased partly by the employment of a 
specialist generalist, "intermediate practitioner". By 2002, the intermediate 
practitioner had become known as the Specialist GP in Addictions and her 
remit was broadened to the promotion and support of the shared care of drug 
users, to provide clinical care in shared care clinics, and to offer advice and 
support for GPs for individual cases, as well as facilitating the continuing 
education of GPs. Crucially, her remit included supervision of the SCAS nurses. 
A parallel post of Development Pharmacist addressed issues and facilitated 
training for pharmacists signed up to the scheme, as well as managing and 
developing needle exchange schemes across Oxfordshire. GP liaison workers 
provided assessment, care management and planning, detoxification, 
counselling advice and support. A Shared Care Monitoring Group addressed 
issues such as clinical governance and data collection, education and training, 
and would advise the DAAT treatment subgroup. Membership Included 
representatives from the Local Medical Committee, Local Pharmaceutical 
Committee, PCTs, DAAT and the development pharmacist and specialist GP. A 
set of treatment guidelines were provided for GPs and community pharmacists, 
and Shared Care Lunches replaced the Methadone Prescribers Group, providing 
a forum for GPs, pharmacists and other shared care workers to discuss clinical 
Issues, which were then fed to the Shared Care Monitoring Group. 
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As well as engendering trust in the process, the shared care protocol 
constituted the basis for clear and robust partnership arrangements. Within 
them, the role and expectations of each professional group was made explicit 
so each professional could be clear about their contribution to the overall care 
of the patient/client, and what they could expect by way of support from their 
colleagues. Within a framework which provided safeguards to protect 
confidentiality of clients, arrangements were formalised to share information. 
The role of the pharmacist, for example, was key. They were the professional 
who, if the patient was collecting their methadone daily, would expect to see 
the patient most frequently. They were therefore In an ideal position to Inform 
the drugs worker or GP if the patient has not attended, which is then likely to 
imply reduced tolerance and danger of overdose. 
7.4.2 Care of older people 
As a locality-wide body, the PCG and PCT should be well placed to address 
problems across the city which occurred at the interfaces between primary care 
and social services and secondary care, and education about each other's 
roles. The PCT, as an organisation which also employed community nurses, 
would be expected to be in a stronger position still to foster collaboration 
between organisations and teams. 
Hospital discharge processes seemed to be the source of many problems In the 
care pathways of older people. Insufficient hospital beds meant there was great 
pressure to discharge patients as soon as possible. Discharge procedures 
were, therefore, often a rushed reaction to this pressure, where the goal was to 
free up a bed rather than a timely and planned process In which the common 
goal was to protect the patient's best Interests. Referrals were often made 
inappropriately, too late or not at all. 
A lack of understanding of other groups' roles and sometimes even of their 
existence often impeded effective collaboration. This section examines these 
problems and the PCG and PCT's responses to them, as locality-based primary 
care organisations. 
Hospital discharge 
Hospital discharge was a key point in the care pathway of older people, and 
one at which collaboration often failed. Hospital and community health and 
social care staff all played roles which had to be co-ordinated at the point of 
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discharge, but the different organisational contexts within which each group 
operated meant their goals and interests were not always aligned. 
Pressure to free hospital beds 
Hospital staff reacted to acute pressure to free up hospital beds and to arrange 
discharge as soon as the patients occupying them were considered medically 
fit to leave. The term 'scattergun referral' was used to describe an approach to 
discharge planning whereby hospital staff made blanket referrals to anyone 
who might be able to facilitate the soonest possible discharge. 
Many participants, including an outreach occupational therapist (OT), three 
district nurses (DNs) and a member of social services staff, felt the need to free 
up hospital beds overrode hospital staff's concerns about the patient's safety, 
long term recovery and the provision of the most appropriate care and 
treatment. 
When there's a crisis people just scream for help, don't they, although it 
may not be the right person. [outreach occupational therapist) 
They tend to do a scatter gun approach - they ring all of us and say we 
need a bed at the community hospital, we need a bed at the RI for 
rehab, we need a care package, and so on. That's how they go on, and 
not really clear what's the best thing for the client because they just try 
to make sure they go somewhere. [social services hospital unit manager) 
A district nurse's account of one older person's discharge from hospital 
illustrated many of the problems documented in the Audit Commission's report 
(1998a). A patient who had a social services care package and whose diabetes 
had been managed by the DN team for over four years was admitted to 
hospital. While in hospital, his diabetes treatment was changed and his care 
package at home was discontinued, so hospital and community nurses agreed 
that he would be discharged from hospital to a residential home. However, one 
day the district nurses received a call from the Care Manager to say he was 
coming home that day. The hospital had not contacted them to let them know 
his diabetes treatment had been changed, despite their vital role in managing 
it. 
I spoke to them the week before and they were in agreement that he 
shouldn't go home alone, and then that's exactly what they did. So It was 
inappropriate discharging without the correct package of care to follow 
up, and then that lands on our doorstep, because once they're out In the 
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community, the hospital can say 'They've gone, they're nothing to do 
with us. ' And no matter what mess they come home in, one of us will 
have to go in the next day and pick up the pieces and sort out what 
happens to them from there on. (district nurse 3) 
Although they visited him the following day, he was readmitted to hospital 
within a matter of days. The district nurse understood his rushed discharge 
was the result of the hospital being under enormous pressure to free up beds, 
but argued that it was a false economy as poor discharge procedures often 
resulted in readmission. 
Community nurses were sympathetic to hospital nurses and understood the 
pressures under which hospital staff operated, many having previously worked 
in a hospital environment. 
was the same when I worked in a hospital. Everything's done in the 
interests of earliest possible discharge. You think, 'They're sort of OK. 
Discharge them and let someone else deal with them' (district nurse 4) 
This incident was evidently not an isolated one. Interviews repeatedly reflected 
a context driven by an almost desperate scramble to free up hospital beds 
which sometimes took priority over patient safety as well as over the long- 
term interests of the hospital. Community-based health professionals all 
described instances of short-sighted and hasty hospital discharge. Without the 
right care and support at home for a patient, discharge was frequently 
followed by readmission to hospital, with the attendant disorientation and 
trauma for the patient, and wasted resources and time for the hospital. 
This was a clear example of recurrent collaborative failure, driven by a context 
in which pressures of resources led to misaligned goals and Interests. 
Lack of communication and understanding of other groups' roles 
The 'scattergun' approach to referrals reflected a desire to free up hospital 
beds as quickly as possible, but also a lack of effective communication and 
understanding of the roles of other professional and occupational groups. This 
pointed to a potential role for the PCG/T In Improving awareness and 
understanding in other organisations, and Input to protocols for appropriate 
referrals. 
Information sharing around hospital discharge was reported to be Inconsistent, 
unreliable and untimely. The amount, quality and timeliness of communication 
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between disciplines and professionals in hospital and In the community was 
variable and a source of frustration and inconvenience expressed by 
community staff in particular. Several district nurses complained that the 
primary healthcare team was not routinely informed of a patient's discharge 
from hospital, sometimes even when there was a clear nursing need, and 
certainly the information was not always received In good time. Most agreed 
that it would be helpful if they were informed in advance of a patient's 
discharge, even in the absence of an obvious nursing need, just so they were 
alerted to potential problems. 
Community nurses and therapists reported that hospital staff frequently 
misunderstood how community staff work; for example, they might ask a 
district nurse to check the dressings of a mobile patient who would in fact be 
expected to come into the practice and be seen by a practice nurse. They 
commented on the effects of the high proportion of bank nurses and high staff 
turnover on hospital staffs grasp of what professionals in the community have 
to offer. 
This district nurse reflected many others' experiences of misguided requests 
from hospital staff, and a tendency to stereotype them. 
I think there's still a lot of hospital nurses that think district nurses Just 
go round bathing people and doing a few leg ulcers. They don't actually 
realise the complexities of some of the cases that we will take on. So 
that leads to inappropriate referrals because they don't actually 
recognise our true goal, and sort of qualities in care that we can give. 
They think you're a lesser nurse, actually - you get that distinct 
impression sometimes. You're only in the district 'cause you couldn't 
make it in the hospital sort of thing, rather than the fact that you've 
actually chosen to come in to the community, do an extra degree or 
certificate and you know, you are quite a good nurse really, and you're 
quite capable of taking on other things. (district nurse 3) 
Others described difficulties in persuading staff on hospital wards to make 
referrals to them at all. Two voluntary sector organisations, Age Concern and 
the Carers Centre, were keen for their services to be used by those who could 
benefit from them. Both had made efforts to promote the potential roles of 
their staff and volunteers when patients were discharged from hospital, but 
take up of these services had been disappointing. The Carers' Centre reported 
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that while they had achieved some level of success In raising the profile of 
their services in general, securing appropriate referrals from the acute hospital 
was a particular and ongoing challenge. A social services unit manager also 
reported a large number of inappropriate referrals from the hospital. All three 
participants attributed this to the large number of bank nurses and high staff 
turnover, which meant they did not learn what services were available and how 
they fit together. Social services employed a discharge planning co-ordinator 
to inform nurses about how to make appropriate referrals, but this appeared 
not to have solved the problem. 
Simple, unskilled things could be done by volunteers. It would require a 
cultural shift for statutory organisations to think laterally and Involve 
voluntary organisations. We've tried giving project leader talks to GP 
practices. They're enthusiastic, but we wait for referrals and they don't 
come. (Director of Age Concern, Oxfordshire) 
What they've absorbed is that information about the Carers' Centre Is 
part of discharge procedure. What we want it to be is part of the 
admission procedure because to do the most good we need to know 
about it the day they turn up to set these things in line for when they 
are discharged. (Carers' Centre Manager) 
We do get a huge amount of inappropriate referrals as people don't 
understand what we do. There's a lot of bank nurses, there's a lot of 
turnover of staff, which means people are not long term members of 
staff, they don't know about the services. They don't know what the red 
cross scheme provides, they don't know what the Intensive support 
schemes provide, they don't know what we provide, they don't know how 
it all fits together. We looked at it once before about how to Inform 
nursing staff particularly to enable them to make the appropriate 
referrals. Not just to us but to other disciplines - OT, physlo and the 
various schemes really. (social services hospital unit manager) 
As a locality based primary care organisation, the PCG and PCT could play a 
role in improving communication and awareness of services. But the problems 
were more systemic. As its commissioning role developed, it could also 
intervene at a more strategic level to address the staffing and retention 
problems which led to the high number of bank staff. No evidence of influence 
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over secondary care through commissioning was evident by the end of the 
fieldwork period. 
Lack of understanding of patients' needs on their return home 
Other referral problems resulted from a lack of understanding of the problems 
faced by patients when they left hospital. One nurse described her experiences 
of the gaps in discharge planning and another described her problematic 
attempts at communication with ward nurses. 
Time and time again there is a lack of understanding of how people will 
cope at home. They [hospital staff] are too optimistic, and Inevitably you 
have a crisis on your hands. (district nurse 2) 
People don't know what we need. We chase them and leave messages for 
them and just hope one gets written down. (health visitor 1) 
Accounts of the levels of communication between different agencies were not 
always consistent. A hospital care manager, for example, felt that they did 
make every effort to communicate with their community-based colleagues and 
that their efforts were not reciprocated. 
We try really hard. We leave messages on the district nurses' phone. 
Where's the two-way communication? (social services hospital unit 
manager) 
Referrals: community 
Hospital discharge was not the only point at which referral processes were not 
effective. Patterns of referral between community practitioners to particular 
services were not uniform across the city. A domiciliary physiotherapist 
described differences in referrals between practices, between GPs within 
practices and their Inconsistency over time. 
think if you were to peg out the pattern of referrals from one surgery 
to another, it'd be quite interesting. Certain surgeries, certain GPs 
within surgeries even, refer, and somebody else doesn't. Or you'll see a 
pattern where a GP will refer several people all of a sudden, and then 
it'll go very quiet, and it's as if something has reminded them that there 
is a service and they see a few people and they refer everybody. Then 
that tails off again. Or you'll end up writing them a letter about 
something, and this letter with this heading appears, and they think 'Ah, 
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went to see Mrs so-and-so yesterday, perhaps I could refer her there, ' 
and that starts that cycle off again.. (Domiciliary physiotherapist) 
The outreach occupational therapist (OT) service which relied on referrals, had 
actively worked at developing links with colleagues, other OTs in particular, to 
ensure good quality referrals. One of their staff explained that, since they had 
been established for less than two years, some inappropriate referrals were to 
be expected. 
The outreach OT service and the domiciliary physiotherapist reported both 
inappropriate referrals and their concern that people also get missed. 
Frustration resulted from situations in which the waiting time for a referral to 
OT or physiotherapist was as much as two months, and once they arrived 
sometimes the problem would turn out to be a medical one and one which they 
were unable to help with. 
Summary: This section investigated the significance of the PCG's and PCT's 
locality-wide base for collaboration to address the two HImP priorities. It 
argued that power differentials between GPs, managers and other clinicians, as 
well as GPs' professional autonomy, presented Impediments to developing a 
collective will to provide services across the city. These Impediments were 
largely overcome by the PCG's appointment of a 'specialist generalist'. The 
PCG's locality-wide base positioned it well to facilitate better understanding of 
roles and to improve referral procedures around hospital discharge across the 
geographical area. 
7.5 Clinical governance, board composition and budgetary 
arrangements 
. In this section I take together three key themes which Implied potential as 
mechanisms to facilitate collaboration within the primary care community to 
develop and deliver services: clinical governance, board composition and 
budgetary arrangements. These were experienced as a complex and 
interwoven network of influence which to some extent went towards revealing 
the nature of the "vision" behind the PCG/T: a corporate culture that 
emphasised collective responsibility (Wilkin et al, 2001). 
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7.5.1 Substance misuse 
Tackling substance misuse was endorsed as a local HImP priority, yet It rarely 
featured on the agenda of the board meetings, and received relatively little 
support or interest from the board. When a proposal for the development of 
substance misuse services in primary care was eventually brought to the PCG 
board in July 2002, its response was defensive, emphasising the pressure that 
primary care was under. The board formally accepted the proposals but, 
crucially, only on the condition that extra work would not be Incurred by GPs. 
Insofar as this approach was predominantly medical and Individually oriented, 
it might have been expected to be understood by, and to appeal to GPs. 
However, the board/PEC GPs themselves were not prepared to enter Into the 
shared care scheme or to 'champion' it. In this case, the Inclusion of clinicians 
on the governing bodies of PCGs and PCTs was not an effective means to lend 
credibility to PCG policy or to facilitate its rolling out across the primary care 
community. 
Budgetary and clinical governance responsibilities 
Many GPs saw the costs of accepting heroin users onto their lists as 
unacceptable. As independent contractors, the majority of GPs were paid a per 
capita fee of E17 per year for each young adult on their list, the basic 
capitation figure based on the assumption that most young people see their GP 
approximately three times per year. One aspect of the development of 
substance misuse services was to make the costs (financial and other) to GPs 
more tolerable by providing drug worker support and remuneration. At the 
time of the GP Interviews, the remuneration level being mooted by the PCG was 
£100 per drug user per year. This was seen as inadequate to outweigh the 
financial disincentives to take on patients who were likely to make weekly 
appointments rather than the three appointments per year on which the per 
capita payment was estimated. 
What it'll take to persuade GPs to look after these people Is massive 
support, massive financial incentives and I'm not convinced that either 
of them are there in big enough quantities to really change the culture. 
(GP5) 
GPs reported feeling acutely overworked and lacking capacity to carry out 
additional work. Several GPs expressed forcefully a sense that they were being 
asked to take on more and more, but that this was not reflected In their pay. 
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The fear was also voiced that acquiring a reputation as a practice sympathetic 
to drug users would somehow open 'floodgates' and lead to being 'swamped'. 
In relation to drug addicts, it feels like there's a floodgate. We see the 
statistics on the news all the time and we know that it's true because we 
come across the 13-year-olds in [area of Oxford] who are using. There's 
a sense that the floodgates will open and we're already feeling fairly 
overworked and overwhelmed in my practice... So adding drug addicts, 
who are very demanding, or perceived as that, is not something 
anyone's voluntarily going to take on. (GP3) 
Getting GPs to [treat drug users] is obviously hard work, but I think In 
principle any GP could do it. It's not complicated or difficult. It's 
emotionally very draining; the psychological drain of the work Is such 
that I can really see why most GPs wouldn't want to get involved. (GP5) 
Virtually all the GPs interviewed commented on money-related issues, 
including one GP who worked very little with drug users who illustrated the 
significance of the financial disincentives, and another who had a 
disproportionately high number of drug users on his list and who emphasised 
the financial unviability of his work: 
If we ended up having fifty drug users that would increase my workload 
by 30%. You just can't do that. And of course it's for no remuneration at 
all really. I know you get a yearly amount but that covers three 
consultations. The figure they were suggesting, 1100 per patient per 
year, is better than nothing, but I don't think it still matches the sort of 
workload we're talking about. (GP4) 
Some people have no idea of the energy or time you need to expend 
where you could be earning other money. You have to expend time 
which makes you a vast loss on the accounts... But If you see a 
methadone user forty plus times per year, often for long appointments, 
one can understand that the funding basis has to be completely 
reviewed for this category of patients... lf you assume 12 hours' face"to- 
face contact with a patient per year, plus a further five hours on related 
matters such as liaising with probation officers, social workers, writing 
letters to court etc, this would be £850. In many ways this Is on the low 
side given the huge impact on the surgery that every heroin addict 
makes... If you believe people are worth looking after you do lt, but 
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essentially it's something you do outside the NHS and totally unfunded. 
If you do there are enormous ramifications of unfunded work because of 
time, energy and financial implications to the practice and personally. 
(GP5) 
On another occasion, GP3 suggested that such a payment would constitute a 
very baseline remuneration which would make treating drug users as lucrative 
as "treating sore throats in a leafy suburb as a newly qualified locum. "This 
view was endorsed by the intermediate practitioner who reported that, in her 
previous post, the clinical assistant rate she had been paid for running 
methadone clinics was roughly this amount. Variations in the estimated costs 
are a function of a combination of factors, and arise partly from differences in 
the level of GP input. However, it was conceded that prescribing for drug users 
was time consuming, stressful at times, required a particular expertise and 
clinical commitment and was, for these reasons, costly. L100 seemed, to GPs 
and PCG staff alike, to represent a token recognition of this rather than a 
reflection of the true cost. 
Funding for these services came from Oxfordshire Drug Action Team which 
combined representatives from local authorities (education, social services, 
housing) health, probation, the prison service and the voluntary sector. It 
worked across the county and had a pooled budget to spend on drugs services 
across the board, including prevention, treatment and reducing supply. The 
funding of the services, then, was not from the PCG which may explain why a 
corporate approach to the problem was not forthcoming. It was not a 
budgetary concern to the board, or a matter of clinical governance, so their 
incentives to tackle the problem were small. 
Given that a major factor limiting the remuneration of GPs was the overall 
resource allocation, and that, arguably, treatment could be justified by Its 
evidence-base in a way that 'limiting availability' could not, It was argued that 
such resource allocation incurred an opportunity cost. However, there was no 
evidence that the PCG attempted to exert Influence 'upwards' on central 
government policy (which dictated that half of all drugs spending over the 
following four years would be on 'reducing availability'). According to a 
participant on the UK Harm Reduction Agency (UKHRA) discussion list (anon 
2001), "DATs like that in Cleaveland have started to show that this can be a 
two-way process and that government policy can be questioned when it does 
not accord with local needs. " 
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Local ambassadors 
Commitment to and ownership of the work was initially polarised. Some GPs 
were forcefully opposed to doing the work, and others were passionately 
committed to it. The latter were good ambassadors for the rewards of working 
with drug users. 
We've had people who were desperate, near death, on benzos and heroin 
and alcohol, and crime and every nasty illness that's possible, abscesses. 
Really ill people who've done amazingly well, come off not only heroin 
but also alcohol and the benzos. You can see them become alive again. 
When they get back into work, meet someone, have a child, and their life 
begins to work it's nice to see. (GP5) 
There are a lot of medical issues that confront substance misusers and 
in order to get the whole thing sorted and for them not to fall inbetween 
various stools and various specialists, I think GPs are perfectly placed. 
We've certainly found that here. (GP6) 
I think it's a very very good idea for a few different reasons. For one it 
makes it less stigmatising. It's much easier for a drug user to admit to a 
problem in the privacy of a GP surgery rather than having a separate 
agency. It means that the GP can deal with the whole problem 
holistically; they're not just looking at the drug problem in Isolation, 
they're looking at the emotional problem that caused It In the first place. 
The third thing is they can pick up on all the preventive health work that 
you need to do with drug users like hepatitis Immunisation and looking 
at injection sites, advice on safe injecting. That can be done at the drugs 
team. Sexual health, particularly among women is a big thing ... and a 
drugs agency which is just looking at the drugs wouldn't look at that. 
(GP7) 
think in principle prescribing methadone in primary care Is a good 
thing. My view on it has changed, having worked here and seen it In 
action. I think it's a relatively simple replacement therapy for a chronic 
disorder and should be viewed as such. It's purely the context In which 
you prescribe it that makes it so difficult in terms of the kind of patient, 
what's got them into that situation In the first place, their own troubles 
and problems, the legal issues, the fact that it's a high risk group 
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anyway for dying, basically. Where you've got young people dying it's a 
frightening area. (GP6) 
The limitations of methadone maintenance treatment were documented and 
acknowledged. Clearly, substitute prescribing in general practice Is not a 
panacea for drug misuse generally. It is not a suitable treatment for all heroin 
users, and the importance of specialist psychiatric, medical or voluntary 
expertise in the treatment of patients with physical or psychiatric co- 
morbidity, or with other complex needs is undisputed (Gerada, Barrett, 
Betteron & Tighe, 2000). 
Training day 
Another effort to encourage GPs to work with drug users was to set up a 
training day, run jointly between oxford City PCG and a neighbouring PCG. All 
primary care team members were invited, and a GP (and a keen proponent of 
methadone maintenance treament) from a primary care-based drugs clinic in 
Sheffield spoke. She was an effective ambassador for the scheme, and had 
credibility with her GP peers and other clinicians. She outlined the evidence 
base for methadone maintenance and described her overwhelmingly positive 
clinical and professional experiences of working with drug users using 
substitute prescribing in a shared care setting. The event was very popular, 
indeed oversubscribed, yet the extent to which this sort of event could be 
expected to reach PHCT members without a particular Interest In the field, or 
positively resistant to it, was met with a small element of scepticism: 
The event was very useful, but maybe some people would say 'You've got 
someone who's an advocate for methadone there. If you'd got somebody 
from another treatment philosophy then perhaps we'd have had Just as 
convincing an afternoon with somebody saying, "Don't bother with 
methadone, use an abstinence approach and wheel In the therapy. " 
think the evidence is that the usefulness of methadone maintenance has 
clearly been demonstrated. (PCG substance misuse services 
development officer) 
On balance, however, it was considered to have been more than an exercise In 
preaching to the converted. Feedback suggested a number or 'waverers' were 
convinced of the benefits of the treatment, enhancing the GP community's 
commitment to and ownership of the shared care model. 
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Intermediate practitioner 
A 'specialist generalist' or 'intermediate practitioner' was appointed to support 
GPs in their work with drug users and to take referrals of complex cases. 
Although it is difficult to be certain of the causal mechanisms at work, 
significant, if reluctant, changes in GPs' practice and in the the Specialist 
Community Addiction Service's (SCAS) treatment philosophy took place over 
the course of the study. The number of GPs signed up to the shared care 
scheme reached 54 by early 2003, and the SCAS team shifted from their non- 
evidence based treatment position to taking a more favourable view of it. 
These changes were due at least in part to three elements: the specialist 
generalist, the shared care lunches and national guidance. 
Mistral and Velleman (2001) note the paucity of teaching at medical school on 
the subject of substance misuse. Given that a contributing factor to many GPs' 
reluctance to work with drug users was their lack of confidence In so doing, a 
further way to engender ownership of and commitment to shared care work 
with drug users was to enhance their skills in the area and, thus, their 
confidence. 
The 'intermediate practitioner' played a key role in this respect. She had trained 
originally as a GP but had developed a special interest and experience In 
treating drug users and could act as an expert resource for GPs. She was 
employed by the MHT and jointly funded by the city PCG and another PCG, and 
her role was to work with primary care teams in the city, providing training, 
supervision and support to PHCTs, and to bridge the gap between primary and 
secondary care. The effectiveness and accessibility of the training and support 
she could offer to PHCTs was probably enhanced by her GP background. 
The Specialist Generalist made a significant contribution here, playing a 
'bridging' role where trust had been difficult to nurture. By virtue of her 
professional status, her experience of working In a shared care setting along 
with her personal characteristics of assertiveness and confidence, she was well 
placed and well equipped to build bridges between the primary care 
community and the specialist drugs team and to Influence the drugs workers' 
practice. As non-clinicians, the PCG managers found It difficult to tell clinicians 
how they should practice. 
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Tensions between organisational groups 
Between GPs and drugs workers, who were mostly psychiatric nurses, some 
lack of clarity about treatment aims and philosophy led to misunderstandings, 
but this was not primarily an issue of trust. Tensions were particularly high 
between the two organisations, the PCG and SCAS. The relationship between 
the development officer whose role it was to negotiate on behalf of the PCG, 
and his opposite number in SCAS was fractious. 
find it [SCAS] very difficult to work with. Even [senior clinician] I find 
disappointing to work with, and I think they feel similarly about me. The 
mutual sense of uncertainness of what's going to come out of any 
partnership work... It's very difficult to get any sense of what they're 
doing. They don't have Service Level Agreements, they don't have 
monitoring that I'm able to get hold of, they don't release any 
information. I'll be trying to bring in monitoring and I just don't know 
how that's going to be received. (PCG substance misuse services 
development officer) 
Despite lengthy negotiations about how, and how many, drugs workers would 
be deployed to support GPs in Oxford City, agreement was elusive. Further, 
while consistency of approach and philosophy between the professionals 
responsible for the shared care of a patient is essential, the treatment model 
(based on substitute prescribing where appropriate, in line with the national 
guidelines) as advocated by the PCG, ran counter to the more abstinence- 
based treatment philosophy of the SCAS team. 
This had knock-on consequences at practitioner level, as was Illustrated by 
anecdotes from GPs. One, having attended the training event at which the 
effectiveness of methadone maintenance had been forcefully driven home, was 
surprised to learn that her intention to follow this treatment model with one of 
her own patients, and with the support of a SCAS drugs worker, was met with a 
distinct lack of enthusiasm by one of the SCAS team. Another recalled 
occasions when he'd received phone calls from the consultant at the specialist 
team to "tell him off' for inappropriate prescribing, although he claimed It had 
been in line with the current evidence base and guidelines. 
Interestingly, despite PCTs being technically the commissioners of the SCAS 
services, their influence on their practice was Imperceptible. Admittedly, 
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Oxford City PCG's /T's leverage was arguably diluted as this commissioning 
role was taken on by one of the other PCG/Ts on behalf of the county. 
The PCG took on responsibility for (co-ordinating) the city's Methadone 
Prescribers Group, whose meetings later became known as 'shared care 
lunches'. It was attended by a range of professionals including GPs, drugs 
workers, pharmacists who met at 6-weekly intervals to share experiences, 
support and information about working with drug users. They provided a 
useful forum for practitioners to increase their understanding of each other's 
roles and perspectives which, in turn, fostered inter-professional trust. 
Sometimes a speaker was invited for a more formal session, which constituted 
low-key multi-disciplinary training. These meetings almost certainly 
contributed to the convergence in the treatment philosophies of SCAS workers 
and PHCT members. 
Professional, vocational approach vs managerialism 
One source of animosity between managers and professionals is said to be 
their different motivations: the stereotypical professional Is motivated by 
altruism and an ethical commitment to their expertise while managers are 
conformist, career motivated and self-interested (see 2.5.4). Indeed, the GPs 
who actively worked with drug users spoke frequently of a significant ethical 
and moral dimension related to the principle of tackling Inequalities in health 
and significantly improving the health, in the broadest sense, of some of the 
most socially excluded members of society. 
It's to do with the intrinsic value of the users, and to do with living in 
that reality rather than thinking that middle class undergraduates are 
more worthy of our time and energy than junkies are. There is a quality, 
a value there, and to refuse them is to live on a value scale that says 
they're less valuable. lt makes me upset when I look at other GPs 
refusing them because they're actually making a value judgement about 
a human being which I think is invalid ... I If a similar number were dying 
of AIDS in Oxford every year, or breast cancer, there would be a huge 
outcry. Everyone would be wearing ribbons. (GP5) 
don't agree with GPs who might say "we're not treating them because 
it's self inflicted, " because ultimately most heroin use is a band-aid on a 
huge emotional wound inflicted by another person, often a parent or a 
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carer when they're in care, often sexual abuse. The root cause of heroin 
addiction is almost never self-inflicted. (G P6) 
However, the majority of GPs in Oxford, apparently not sharing this conviction, 
chose not to work with drug users. The manager who developed the services, 
however, was motivated by the similar concerns about reducing inequalities in 
health. 
There's a bunch of people there who, just because they're not polite 
middle class people like most GPs are it's a bit scary for GPs to work 
with them... But just because that person's being driven by something 
that doesn't make them say please and thank you and make them 
behave in the sort of way that I'm maybe used to, with the social 
niceties, should not exclude them from getting good healthcare. They 
fall foul of the inverse care law too often, when they're exactly where 
services are most needed. (PCG substance misuse services development 
officer) 
7.5.2 Care of older people 
The PCG worked with the SSD to develop specific services, in particular 
Community Rehabilitation Services (CRS) and Intensive Community Support 
Services (ICSS). The SSD representative on the PCG/T board and PEC was not 
influential in the development of these services, but they are reported 
nonetheless because they demonstrate collaboration between the two 
organisations which were important in addressing the issues of referral and 
discharge above. They were not developed exclusively for older people, but 
tended to be used predominantly by them. They were originally Introduced as 
elements of a somewhat fragmented Intermediate Care Strategy to reduce 
pressures on acute services. 
Community Rehabilitation Service (CRS) 
The Community Rehabilitation Service (CRS) was developed locally and funded 
through the Social Services Partnership Grant, set up to fund psychological, 
social and environmental rehabilitation. It comprised a physiotherapist, an 
occupational therapist (OT) and a care manager working explicitly as a team 
with a single point of access, whereas previously they had been 
organisationally separate. 
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The line manager of physiotherapists in the city described a clear vision of the 
team, and expressed commitment to investing in team-building before it was 
on the ground. She placed great importance on that the team: 
talking the same language and not caring who's paid by health and 
who's paid by social services (CRS physiotherapist) 
Team members would have their own skills but also shared skills, and would, 
in theory, serve the patient or client rather than their employing organisation. 
Intensive Community Support Service (ICSS) 
The ICSS team, run jointly by the Health Authority and social services 
department, was set up initially in 2000 as a pilot project. It provided services 
to prevent hospital admission and promoted early discharge from hospital, 
getting people back into their homes with extra care and support, again with 
an emphasis on easing the pressure on hospital beds and waiting lists. As such 
they were an integral part of the PCG's wider proposals for developing 
intermediate care across Oxford City (Primary and Community Services Update 
paper 24/01). Each team comprised a liaison nurse, an OT and a care 
manager/care co-ordinator. Demand for physiotherapy was not great enough 
to employ one as part of the team, but physiotherapy services were spot- 
purchased where needed. 
In duly 2001, twenty staff from Oxfordshire social services department 
transferred under TUPE (Transfer of Undertakings and Protection of 
Employment) to Oxford City PCT. These social care staff joined the wider PCT 
ICSS team using Health Act flexibilities, which enabled health and local 
government organisations to pool budgets for services. It became a permanent 
part of the local health community when a partnership agreement between 
social services and Oxford City PCT was signed In October 2001 (Primary and 
Community Services Update paper 24/01). In addition to Oxford City staff, 
other social care staff transferred to other Oxfordshire PCTs. Oxford City PCT 
held a "Partnership Agreement" with Oxfordshire County Council social services 
department on behalf of all Oxfordshire PCTs, to transfer money for the 
services from social services and to ensure delivery of agreed outcomes via 
joint monitoring arrangements. 
This team took steps to avoid the lack of communication which was Identified 
as problematic at hospital discharge. Communication between the ICSS team 
and other relevant players was taken very seriously: 
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On our assessment form we have 'Who have you notified? ' -a list of 
about-six, and there's a box for 'other', so you can put down who you've 
talked to and record if you've discussed something. We do really need to 
talk to an awful lot of different people: the family, the CP, the nurses, 
the referring care manager, the new care manager, all sorts of people - 
if they've got care management that is. We communicate extremely well. 
They might not agree but I think we do. (ICSS liaison nurse) 
Summary: This section focused on the impact of clinical governance, board 
composition and budgetary aspects of health improvement priorities on 
collaboration. It argued that having clinicians on the governing body of the 
PCG was not effective in implementing 'official' PCG policy. The Identity of the 
`specialist generalist' as a former GP meant her arguments were more 
persuasive to GPs than those of the PCG manager. 
This section argued that the intermediate care services set up to reduce 
pressure on acute services by reducing the number of hospital admissions 
amongst older people and to facilitate effective and timely discharge from 
hospital did not arise as a result of SSD representation on the governing bodies 
of the PCG/T, but were rather brought about by new collaborative 
relationships at senior levels of SSD and PCT management, and were facilitated 
by the Health Act Flexibilities. 
7.6 Summary 
This section returns to the fifth research question set out In section 3.7 and 
draws conclusions about how it can be answered in the light of data from 
chapter seven. 
RQ5: Did the PCG's and PCT's collaborative capacity manifest in collaborative 
processes and outcomes at operational levels to tackle substance misuse and 
to promote independent living In older people? 
it argued that the shared care model developed for tackling substance misuse 
was less collaborative than its name suggested, and presented a less upstream 
approach to the problem than the HImP Implied. The PCG and PCTs' substance 
misuse services were treatment-oriented, the role of the GP and 
pharmaceuticals being central. At the patient level, each case required Input 
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from four individuals, but their collaboration was based not on trust, 
reciprocity and loyalty, but on a contract. The collaborative arrangements 
specified by the shared care protocol were more formal than the network 
relationships implied by New Labour's rhetoric. 
Elements of the PCG's services to promote independence in older people, in 
contrast, took a distinctly upstream approach, developing non-medical, 
collaborative interventions designed to reduce hospital admissions and speed 
hospital discharge. The PCT claimed its relationship with the SSD (renamed the 
Department of Social and Health Care) would be more strategic than the PCG's 
had been but the intention to adopt a preventive approach to promoting 
independence in older people was retained. There was evidence that the 
increasingly centrally-driven target culture impeded upstream work to promote 
independence in older people. 
It argued that the history of drug service provision locally and national policy 
was key to understanding the significance of the PCG/T's locality-wide base to 
its efforts to tackle substance misuse. Prior to the PCG, service provision had 
been patchy and secondary care services were being withdrawn. The GPs who 
worked with drug users felt isolated and unsupported, and fears of 
'floodgates' opening discouraged other GPs from working with drug users. A 
key challenge for the PCG was to redistribute the workload more fairly. PCG 
managers hoped that, to this end, the locality-wide base of the PCG would help 
to foster a sense of collective responsibility for the problem. GPs' autonomy 
impeded efforts to redistribute the workload In a context of low support and 
disapproval from colleagues. Once support was established in the form of a 
shared care model, power differentials between GPs and the others in the 
shared care team, and between GPs and the PCG/T manager responsible for 
Implementing the scheme, presented further Impediments. 
These impediments were overcome, largely by the appointment of an 
"intermediate practitioner, " a former GP who acted as a boundary-spanner 
between GPs and the PCG and the support workers. With this support In place, 
the shared care protocol engendered clear and robust collaborative working 
with drug users which was effective but more formal than relationships Implied 
in the Third Way's rhetoric of networks. 
A major challenge in the promotion of independence in older people was to 
tackle problems surrounding hospital discharge. This required that different 
professional groups improved their understanding of each others' roles and 
230 
that appropriate discharge procedures and protocols were put in place. This 
chapter argues that the PCG's locality-wide base positioned it well to facilitate 
better understanding of roles and to improve referral procedures around 
hospital discharge across the geographical area. 
This chapter argued that some GPs and a PCG/T manager felt passionately 
that the shared care of drug users was a valuable area of work, but this view 
was not represented on the PCG/T governing bodies. Although a substance 
misuse services development officer was appointed, and the board eventually 
ratified proposals to introduce shared care for drug users, many of the board 
GPs were themselves hostile to the idea that heroin users should be treated in 
primary care so were not motivated to bring their GP colleagues with them in 
taking on this area of work. In this case, having clinicians on the governing 
body of the PCG was not effective in implementing 'official' PCG policy. 
Individual doctors' resistance to working with drug users stemmed from issues 
related to levels of remuneration and fear of being overwhelmed by demand if 
"floodgates" were opened. The PCG/T's corporate reluctance to prioritise it 
derived from the fact that it were not centrally performance managed on 
substance misuse services, and the funding for it came not from their budget, 
but from the local Drug Action Team. The factor which was most effective in 
bringing GPs on board with shared care was the appointment of the 'specialist 
generalist. ' Her identity as a former GP made her arguments were more 
persuasive to GPs than those of the PCG manager. She was also better able to 
influence the drugs workers. 
However, this section argues that the managers and clinicians deviated 
significantly from their respective stereotypes. Managers did not always behave 
like "bean-counters. " In the PCG, they were manifestly motivated by social 
justice and public-spiritedness. Controversy surrounding remuneration of GPs 
bore testament to the degree to which they were financially motivated. It also. 
illustrated the contractual, rather than network-based, nature of collaborative 
working. 
The inclusion of a local authority SSD representative on the PCG/T governing 
bodies was designed to facilitate closer working between primary care and 
social services on the planning and delivery of services. This section argues 
that the intermediate care services set up to reduce pressure on acute services 
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by reducing the number of hospital admissions amongst older people and to 
facilitate effective and timely discharge from hospital did not arise as a result 
of SSD representation on the governing bodies of the PCG/T, but were rather 
brought about by new collaborative relationships at senior levels of SSD and 
PCT management, and were facilitated by the Health Act Flexibilities. 
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Chapter eight: Discussion and conclusions 
8.1 Overview 
The overall aim of this study was to investigate whether and how the PCG and 
PCT developed, promoted, facilitated and enhanced collaboration within 
primary care and between it and other NHS and non-NHS bodies. It also aimed 
to identify the factors which enabled and inhibited its collaborative capacity. 
This was important for at least two reasons. First, PCGs and PCTs were a key 
element of New Labour's radical reforms of the NHS and held a pre-eminent 
position within the new collaborative agenda. They were expected to facilitate 
collaboration within elements of their primary care community, with other 
parts of the NHS and with other organisations whose work related to health in 
the broadest sense. Collaborative working was presented as a remedy for 
complex social problems and the fragmentation of public services. It was 
Important that the effects of these initiatives were examined, particularly in the 
context of the third way emphasis on pragmatism and 'what works'. 
Second, the effectiveness of these policy reforms were of theoretical as well as 
practical interest. New Labour explicitly distanced itself from Old Labour 
hierarchies and Conservative markets, while wedding their policies rhetorically 
to notions of altruism, trust and co-operation, the key characteristics of a 
network mode of governance. In doing so, they invited political scientists to 
draw and evaluate parallels between their 'third way' and a network mode of 
governance. 
This chapter brings together the evidence and theory accumulated over the 
course of this study. Section 8.2 draws together the key findings from the 
empirical research presented in chapters five, six and seven. From these, 
conclusions are drawn in relation to the two main research questions to 
evaluate Oxford City PCG and PCT as mechanisms for collaboration. It argues 
first that some aspects of organisational form facilitated collaboration for 
health improvement, and others for primary care development. Second, it 
argues that, on balance, the PCG was more effective than the PCT in bringing 
about collaboration aligned with a network mode of governance. 
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Factors which facilitated collaboration for health improvement were a policy 
environment conducive to tackling complex social problems, the organisation's 
explicit health improvement remit, coterminosity between the PCG and the City 
Council, and the work of skilled and committed boundary-spanners. The 
factors which facilitated collaboration for the development of primary care 
were the election of clinicians by their peers to the governing bodies and their 
collective responsibility for budget and clinical governance. 
This section goes on to argue that organisational turbulence during the 
transition from PCG to PCT damaged nascent collaborative ventures initiated 
by the PCG. This was true particularly where they depended on individual 
boundary spanners whose roles were not continued from PCG to PCT, most 
frequently in upstream health improvement. The political context further 
compromised the collaborative capacity of the PCT where policy directives from 
central government undermined its rhetoric of collaboration based on trust 
and co-operation, and which were more resonant of hierarchical modes of 
governance. 
Section 8.3 reconsiders the theoretical framework in the light of the evaluation 
of the PCG and PCT. This framework highlighted the influence of organisational 
form and contextual factors, particularly shifts in modes of governance, on 
organisations' collaborative capacity and practice. This section argues that the 
framework was supported by the findings, but suggests it be modified by 
accounting explicitly for the effects of organisational turbulence itself on 
collaborative capacity and practice. 
The differences between the PCG's and PCT's form made for some differences 
In their respective collaborative capacity. However, the most radical features of 
the PCG's and PCT's organisational form (the locality-wide base, the election of 
clinicians to their governing bodies, local authority representation, and their 
responsibilities for clinical governance, budget and health improvement) were 
common to both. A greater difference between the two organisations was the 
national political context in which they operated. Over the course of the study, 
the association of New Labour policy with a quasi-network mode of 
governance became increasingly dubious. Despite maintaining a strong 
rhetoric of collaboration, Government policy undermined the development of 
policy networks suggesting symbolic politics. 
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Section 8.4 considers the strengths and limitations of the study. It reflects on 
the design and methodology of the study, and the implications of carrying out 
research in such a rapidly changing policy environment. 
8.2 Critical evaluation of the PGC and PCT as mechanisms for 
collaboration 
PCGs were established In 1999 with the policy objectives of developing primary 
care by working across practices, working collaboratively with a range of other 
organisations to improve the local population's health, and commissioning 
secondary care (Secretary of State for Health, 1997). Two of these remits - 
health improvement and primary care delivery and development - required 
collaboration between different groups and with different goals and purposes. 
They were expected to play a major role in "a move from primary medical care 
(general practice) to primary health care with a public health focus" (Peckham & 
Exworthy, 2003: 238). 
PCG and PCT governing bodies included GPs, nurses and an SSD 
representative. They had to learn to apply managerial skills to areas which had 
traditionally been devoid of management, to create a sense of a single 
organisation working towards specific goals, and to co-ordinate disparate 
groups into a coherent organisation (Glendinning, 1998). 
This case study of one PCG and PCT set out to answer the following key 
research questions: 
RQ1. How far did Oxford City PCG and PCT act as collaborative mechanisms 
to develop and deliver primary care and to improve the health of their 
population? 
RQ2: Which factors enabled collaboration to come about and which inhibited 
collaboration? 
This section draws together the key findings from the empirical research 
presented In chapters five, six and seven. From these, conclusions are drawn In 
relation to the two main research questions to evaluate Oxford City PCG and 
PCT as mechanisms for collaboration. It argues first that different aspects of 
organisational form facilitated collaboration for health improvement than for 
primary care development. Second, it argues that, on balance, the PCG was 
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more effective than the PCT in bringing about collaboration aligned with a 
network mode of governance. 
8.2.1 Factors which facilitated collaboration for health improvement in the 
PCG 
As chapter five demonstrated, the composition of the PCG board was not an 
aspect of its organisational form which effectively facilitated collaboration for 
health improvement. The SSD representative board member did not act as a 
conduit between the PCG and parts of the local authority (City or County) 
whose remits were related to improving health. The domination of the board 
by practising clinicians neither lent credibility to the PCG's upstream health 
improvement work amongst their fellow clinicians in the city, nor brought 
about a shift from a medically-dominated to an upstream approach to health 
care. 
The board endorsed a ringfenced budget for the HImP group, but took little 
active interest in it compared to their interest in financial and clinical 
governance matters. The general disengagement of the board GPs and the 
primary care community generally from the work of the HImP group, 
demonstrated that changes in organisational structures are not sufficient to 
bring about change to deeply embedded cultural values and practices. This 
finding is consistent with findings of Chinamasa et al (2002), who contend that 
primary care professionals struggle with the concepts involved in public health, 
and that the shift from a medical model-based approach to a broader 
population-based approach may create uncertainty and confusion. Heller et al 
(2002) Identified a paucity of work on the public health role in primary care, 
and a need to build human resource capacity in public health at the primary 
care level. 
One aspect of the PCG's form which was effective in facilitating collaboration 
was its explicit mandate to improve the health of its population, which 
bestowed credibility on previously less valued upstream approach to health. 
Oxford City PCG's HImP group took New Labour's rhetoric at its word and 
developed collaborative strategies for health improvement. This was reflected 
first In the PCG's adoption of its own local, outstandingly non-medical HImP 
priorities and the inclusive process by which they were identified. The 
operation of this group under the aegis of a mainstream NHS body gave their 
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sometimes quite radical health improvement work a legitimacy it had not 
previously enjoyed. 
A second aspect of the PCG's form which was effective in facilitating 
collaboration was its locality-wide base, coterminous with the City Council. 
The PCG's coterminosity with the City Council facilitated collaboration with the 
parts of the local authority most in touch with their public health 
underpinnings. This gave rise to the joint funding of two health development 
managers (HDMs), which signalled a strong measure of shared vision and trust 
between the PCG and City Council, and a commitment to the goal of reducing 
health inequalities. The management structure of the locality-wide 
organisation supported the health improvement function and the HImP group 
and staff. 
The combination of a mainstream NHS body's mandate for upstream health 
Improvement, and Its coterminosity with the City Council, was conducive to the 
activity of boundary-spanners. Strong links were developed and maintained by 
boundary-spanners between the PCG and the health promotion department of 
the City Council. The health development managers (HDMs) were highly 
effective at bridging organisational, sectoral and cultural divides to develop 
collaborative relationships based on trust, co-operation, loyalty and 
reciprocity. 
Thus, even In the absence of clinician buy-in, collaboration for health 
Improvement took place and, In many ways, the PCG HImP group and HImP 
activity was a model of network collaboration. A palpable sense of camaraderie 
pervaded the HImP group: its activities were based on the identification of 
complementary Interests, and its internal and external relationships on trust 
and reciprocity. Following the initial departure of the GPs and chief executive, 
the HImP group maintained a loyal and committed membership which was 
maintained throughout the lifetime of the PCG and into the first months of the 
PCT. 
A drawback to the voluntary, organic nature of these collaborative 
relationships was that they depended heavily on individual people acting as 
boundary-spanners. Where boundary-spanners did not operate, collaborative 
gaps occurred (for example, between the PCG and the housing department of 
the City Council) Illustrating the unstrategic nature of the development of 
collaboration where it depended on the ad hoc presence of individual 
boundary-spanners. 
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8.2.2 Factors which facilitated collaboration for primary care development 
and delivery in the PCG 
The inclusion of clinicians on the governing bodies of PCGs and PCTs was more 
effective for developing and delivering primary care than for health 
improvement. Board clinicians were very much more engaged with issues of 
clinical governance and budget than they were in the HImP process. 
PCG/Ts' budgetary and clinical governance responsibilities introduced a new 
interdependency between GPs in a locality. In the PCG, policies for primary care 
were developed by clinicians who were elected by their peers, and were 
implemented through a facilitative processes which appeared not to be an 
unacceptable threat to doctors' professional autonomy. The closeness of the 
board members to their clinical constituencies made for an accessible and 
transparent local policy process. It proved to be an effective mechanism to 
Influence GPs' spending and clinical practice, despite their independent 
contractor status and their long tradition of professional autonomy. An 
outcome of the collaboration was that the prescribing spend in primary care 
was reduced. 
One area of primary care development with which the board GPs did not 
willingly engage was the development of substance misuse services. It was 
unattractive to them for various reasons as set out in chapter seven and they, 
therefore, did not endorse it amongst their colleagues in the city. Developing 
them was the responsibility of a non-clinical manager who understood the 
value of bringing in the support of other clinicians to act as ambassadors for 
the services. By the end of the study, 54 GPs signed up to shared care drugs 
services. 
The processes of primary care delivery and development were based on a 
sense of mutual professional identity and were network-like in some respects. 
They were built on trust, reciprocity and a sense of corporacy and mutual 
responsibility. 
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8.2.3 The effects of organisational turbulence during the transition from 
PCG to PCT on collaboration 
Although the Secretary of State for Health had proclaimed in 1997 that neither 
NHS staff nor patients had an appetite for more organisational change in the 
NHS, such change over the period of this study was almost ubiquitous. The 
transition from PCG to PCT meant a period of great organisational turbulence. 
The prolonged transition meant a period of great uncertainty for staff and even 
redundancies. The changes in organisational structure, in the composition of 
the working groups and in policy emphasis disrupted existing collaborative 
relationships, particularly in the area of health improvement. 
In a context where there exists considerable uncertainty, policy overload 
and major organisational turbulence, the process for implementing 
policy and reaching sustainable decisions are likely to become more 
difficult to put in place successfully. Sustainability is of particular 
concern when it comes to addressing inequalities in health, given the 
accumulation of disadvantage over the life course, and the time required 
to demonstrate changes in health outcomes. (Hunter & Killoran, 2004: 
5). 
Pressure was put on the PCT to prioritise the more downstream targets defined 
In the NHS Plan (Secretary of State for Health, 2000). Many of the elements of 
the PCG's HImP group work did not fit with these targets and were dropped 
from the agenda of the PCT's PH&I group. Upstream health improvement was 
further undermined by the departure of key boundary-spanners who were 
made redundant or moved away. The strongest thread of continuity from the 
PCG to the PCT was the clinicians, many of whom moved from PCG board to 
PCT PEC. As chapter five demonstrated, the PCG's upstream approach to health 
improvement was not embedded in the culture of these clinicians. Changes in 
policy and structure not only disrupted nascent collaborative relationships, but 
did considerable damage to the reputation of collaboration with non-statutory 
bodies whose trust was hard-won and had been painstakingly nurtured. 
As chapter six showed, PCG board clinicians played a stronger role in primary 
care development and delivery than they had in health improvement. The 
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continuity of clinicians from PCG board to PCT PEC preserved some stability in 
this area of work. It was also less disrupted by central government policy. 
8.2.4 Effects of changes in context on PCT's collaborative capacity 
As chapter five showed, the PCG had many of the characteristics of an effective 
network collaboration, most notably in its health improvement work. The PCT's 
Public Health and Inequalities group composition, structures and processes 
changed almost beyond recognition in response to a context which bore a 
much closer resemblance to hierarchy than networks. The PCT's approach 
differed from the PCG's informal, organic collaborative ways as it developed 
more strategic relationships with the most senior level of other statutory 
organisations. Where an approach to health improvement is developmental and 
experimental promoting innovation to Influence mainstream change: 
... a command and control approach to policy and 
its delivery, pursued 
through vertically organised performance management and inspection 
arrangements, may be wholly inappropriate and run counter to the 
developmental ethos (Hunter & Killoran, 2004: 7) 
The complexity of the PCT structure, the enhanced status of lay people and the 
separation of the board from the PEC suggested to threaten the status and 
Influence of the elected health professionals. It rendered the organisation more 
bureaucratic and less responsive to local issues. It made it more difficult to 
nurture a sense of cohesion and common purpose and identity. The added 
organisational complexity distanced elected practitioners from their peers and 
threatened the sense in which clinicians felt they could influence and trust the 
PCT. 
The differences between PCG's and PCT's collaborative capacity and practice 
can also be understood in terms of the shifts in the modes of governance, and 
the inconsistencies within central government policy. Rhetoric which promoted 
the tackling of complex social problems through the devolution of power to 
the front line suggested a network-like hands-off approach to governance. 
However, this was undermined by an increase in national targets, performance 
monitoring and central control. 
Summary: This section drew together the key findings from the empirical 
research presented in chapters five, six and seven and drew conclusions in 
240 
relation to the two main research questions to evaluate Oxford City PCG and 
PCT as mechanisms for collaboration. It argued first that different aspects of 
organisational form facilitated collaboration for health improvement than for 
primary care development. Factors which facilitated collaboration for health 
Improvement were a policy environment conducive to tackling complex social 
problems, the organisation's explicit health improvement remit, coterminosity 
between the PCG and the City Council, and the work of skilled and committed 
boundary-spanners. The factors which facilitated collaboration for the 
development of primary care were the election of clinicians by their peers to 
the governing bodies and the collective responsibility for budget and clinical 
governance. 
Second, it argued that, on balance, the PCG was more effective than the PCT in 
bringing about collaboration aligned with a network mode of governance. 
Organisational turbulence damaged nascent collaborative ventures, particularly 
where they depended on individual boundary spanners whose roles were not 
continued from PCG to PCT, most frequently in upstream health improvement. 
The political context further compromised the collaborative capacity of the PCT 
where policy directives from central government undermined its rhetoric of 
collaboration based on trust and co-operation, and which were more resonant 
of hierarchical modes of governance. 
8.3 Theoretical framework 
This section reconsiders the theoretical framework in the light of the 
evaluation of the PCG and PCT. This study used a realist theoretical framework 
(figure 1), adapted from Sullivan & Skelcher (2002). The critical realist 
approach is In keeping with Pettigrew et al's (1992) call for research which is 
sensitive to the inner and outer context in which organisational change 
happens. Chapter two identified, as a key feature of the outer context, the 
resonance between New Labour's third way rhetoric and the defining features 
of a network mode of governance: trust, loyalty, reciprocity and voluntariness. 
Section 2.6 Identified three broad tensions and contradictions within New 
Labour's collaborative policy: between voluntarism and imposed collaboration; 
between centralisation and devolution; and between the need for network 
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relationships to develop trust and loyalty over time, and the pace of 
organisational change within the NHS. 
The findings chapters demonstrated that differences in form of the PCG and 
PCT made for some differences in collaborative capacity. However, the most 
radical features of the PCG's and PCT's organisational form (the locality-wide 
base, the election of clinicians to their governing bodies, local authority 
representation, and their responsibilities for clinical governance, budget and 
health improvement) were to some extent common to both. Over the course of 
the study, the alignment of the third way with a quasi-network mode of 
governance became increasingly tenuous. Despite maintaining a strong 
rhetoric of collaboration, New Labour policy undermined the development of 
policy networks. This wider political context accounted for significant 
differences between the PCG's and PCT's collaborative capacity and practice. 
A feature which emerged strongly from the findings chapters, were the effects 
of organisational turbulence on collaborative capacity and practice. They may 
present opportunities for improved collaborative relationships, the case that 
was made for the more strategic relationships planned between the PCT and 
local authority. The study ended before they could be evaluated. However, the 
study demonstrated that the effects of staff turnover, uncertainty of strategic 
direction, additional bureaucracy, and the disruption of boundary-spanning 
activity had an adverse effect on collaboration. It also undermined the trust of 
voluntary organisations, and others who were not usually included by the 
mainstream, In the sincerity of NHS bodies' invitations to collaborate. 
This study has demonstrated how organisational turbulence, along with 
tensions and contradictions in policy disrupted collaboration in practice. While 
ministers' formal commitment to upstream, collaborative approaches to public 
health became ever stronger, the conflicting forces of performance 
management and centralised policy making similarly increased. These conflicts 
and contradictions calls into question the sincerity of New Labour's efforts to 
align its third way discourse with a networks mode of governance. It suggests 
'symbolic politics' were at work: that what was presented as a rational 
response to complex social problems and fragmentation of public services was 
in fact largely a pragmatic political manoeuvre designed to distance itself from 
the perceived failure of previous administrations' hierarchy and market modes 
of governance. 
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Summary: The theoretical framework highlighted the influence of contextual 
factors, particularly shifts in modes of governance, as well as organisational 
form, on organisations' collaborative capacity and practice. This section argued 
that the framework's emphasis on outer context was supported by the 
findings, but suggests that the framework be modified to account explicitly for 
the effects of organisational turbulence itself on collaborative capacity and 
practice. 
8.4 Strengths and limitations of the study 
Section 8.4 considers the strengths and limitations of the study. The 
implications of carrying out research in such a rapidly changing policy 
environment are considered. It reflects on the design and methodology of the 
study. 
8.4.1 Design and methods 
This case study provides a detailed account and analysis of collaboration 
within the Oxford City PCG and PCT. The use of a realist framework and 
multiple qualitative methods, allowed a detailed examination of the 
implementation of policy, allowing a rich and nuanced understanding of the 
interactions between changing organisational forms and rapidly shifting policy 
contexts. 
The study of these two organisations and the process of transition between 
them allowed theoretical generalisations to be made about the effects of 
different contextual driving forces, and organisational change, for and against 
collaboration. 
8.4.2 Effects of organisational change on the research process 
It was clear from early stages of the study that the policy environment was 
likely to change over the course of the research, but I did not anticipate the 
pace of the changes. The shift from PCG to PCT nationally came about more 
quickly than was expected, and in Oxford the PCG, which had been the 
intended object of my study, became a PCT in April 2001. What set out as a 
case study of one organisation (a PCG) became a case study of two (the PCG 
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and the PCT). This opened up valuable opportunities for the comparison of two 
organisations and the process of organisational change, which became a 
strength of the study. The organisational context in which this research was 
carried out was short lived, but the findings have more enduring relevance. 
However, another effect of the organisational turbulence was to make data 
collection more difficult. The PCG chief executive supported the study from the 
beginning and was prepared to negotiate my access to PCG subgroup meetings 
and to support my access to participants. Over time I developed a trusting 
relationship with people in the PCG and other local organisations. However, 
organisational change and the rapid turnover of staff meant my relationships 
with key staff were disrupted, and access to their successors (where they could 
be identified at all) was more difficult to negotiate. 
8.4.3 Challenges of evaluating collaboration 
Collaboration research has a tendency to focus on the process of collaboration, 
treating the collaborative mechanism as an end in itself. A strong argument 
can be made for the Inclusion of outcome measures which reflect the benefits 
of collaboration (or lack of them) for service users (Dowling et at, 2004) in 
evaluations of collaboration If Its purpose Is to contribute to an evidence base 
to Inform policy. 
However, the challenges In Identifying and measuring outcomes of 
collaboration are serious, and they are exacerbated in contexts of rapid 
organisational and policy change. Collaborative relationships take time to 
become established and, In cases where their aim is to improve health, the 
benefits are often diffuse and long term. The outcomes of collaborative 
ventures cannot be assessed If they are disrupted before they were expected to 
deliver. An absence of outcome evidence of success, therefore, does not 
necessarily signal an Ineffective collaborative mechanism, but often reflect 
simply that outcomes had not come to fruition during the fieldwork period. 
In a rapidly changing policy context, measuring outcomes which are distant 
and diffuse is not a viable way to evaluate collaboration. While bearing in mind 
that collaboration is not an end in itself, it is legitimate to measure 
collaborative processes which can reasonably be considered as precursors to 
outcomes. The case study design and multiple qualitative methods allowed a 
sensitive examination of the 'softer' elements of collaboration which can only 
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be understood through the analysis of in-depth generated and naturally 
occurring data. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Sample letters of invitation 
Oxford City Primary Care Group: 
A case study of interagency collaboration 
Principal Researcher: Alison Chisholm 
AQREC Study Number: A00.036 
[name] 
Practice Manager 
[name] Health Centre 
[address] 
Oxford 
Dear [name] 
2 August 2000 
Further to our telephone conversation this morning, I am sending you some written 
information about the study in which the staff at [name] Health Centre are invited to 
take part. I would be very grateful if you would bring it to the staff's attention at your 
practice meeting on 14 August. 
I am a PhD research student in the School of Social Sciences and Law at Oxford 
Brookes University, studying the impact of Oxford City Primary Care Group on 
interagency collaboration. The project will last for three years, and has the support of 
Oxfordshire Health Authority, Oxfordshire County Council and Oxford City Council as 
well as the full co-operation of the PCG itself. It is expected to assist policy 
development in the city and to help evaluate the impact of the HImP. 
I would like to interview a range of professionals from the practice including, ideally, at 
least one GP, a practice nurse, a community nurse (if any are attached to the practice) 
and a receptionist. My research focuses on two of the City PCG's HImP priorities: 
promoting independent living in older people and tackling substance misuse, so I 
would be particularly keen to talk to anyone with an interest in either of these issues. 
Interviews will take place over the next two months and the interview schedule would 
be sent in advance. Broadly speaking, I would like to ask about the impact of the PCG 
to date and its potential strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, especially in 
relation to joint working with other health and social care organisations. 
I appreciate that health professionals are very stretched so I would negotiate a time and 
place convenient to the interviewee and aim to keep each interview to half an hour. 
Thank you very much for giving this project your consideration. As we agreed, I will 
call you again after 14th August to collect the names of any interested staff members 
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before I contact them directly. If you or they have any queries in the meantime, my 
telephone number is Oxford 484942, or you can email amchisholm@brookes. ac. uk. 
I look forward to speaking to you again. 
Yours sincerely, 
Alison Chisholm 
Research Student 
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[Name] 
Housing and Revenue Department 
Oxford City Council 
St Aldates Chambers 
Oxford 
OX1 1DS 
Dear [name], 
8 March 2000 
Further to our telephone conversation this morning, I am sending you some written 
information about the study in which you are invited to take part. 
I am a CASE research student at Oxford Brookes University, studying the impact of 
Oxford City Primary Care Group on interagency collaboration. The project will last for 
three years, and has the support of Oxfordshire Health Authority, Oxfordshire County 
Council and Oxford City Council as well as the full co-operation of the PCG itself. 
As you know, one of the City PCG's stated priorities, in accordance with the HImP, is to 
promote independent living in older people. The study will focus on people who have 
had a hip fracture. Care provision for these people potentially involves the whole system 
of health and social care and the involvement of many organisations, so if the PCG is to 
have an impact on interagency collaboration, it should be apparent in the treatment of 
this care group. 
I plan to interview people from a range of agencies and organisations whose work 
concerns older people in Oxford, between April and June this year and again in the 
spring of 2001, to monitor the impact of the PCG on interagency collaboration from a 
variety of perspectives. I would very much like to talk to you about the way housing 
services are currently provided for older people, how the PCG engages other 
organisations, and the likely impact and actual impact of the PCG on their care from 
your point of view as Head of Strategic Housing Services. If you agreed to take part in 
the study, the interview schedule would be sent to you in advance, and I anticipate that 
the interview should take no more than an hour. With your permission I would like to 
tape record it, on the understanding that no-one outside the research team will listen to 
the recording. 
Thank you very much for giving this project your consideration. I will follow this letter 
with a phone call in about a week. If you would like to take part in the study we can 
arrange a mutually convenient date and time for the interview. If you have any queries 
in the meantime, please do not hesitate to contact me; my number is Oxford 484942, or 
you can email amchisholm@brookes. ac. uk. 
I look forward to speaking to you again. 
Yours sincerely, 
Alison Chisholm 
Research Student 
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Appendix 2: Sample interview schedule & covering letter 
Oxford City Primary Care Group: 
A case study of interagency collaboration 
Principal Researcher: Alison Chisholm 
AQREC Study Number: A00.036 
[Name] 
Health Development Manager 
Oxford City PCG 
Warneford Hospital 
Wameford Lane 
Oxford 
OX3 7JX 
6th February 2001 
Dear [Name], 
Thank you very much for agreeing to take part in the study. I enclose an information 
sheet and a consent form (which I would ask you to bring with you when we meet), as 
well as an outline of the areas I would like to cover during the interview. This is 
intended as a guide to be picked from rather than as a prescriptive list of issues to be 
discussed. I appreciate that your time is precious so I will aim to limit the interview to 
45 minutes. 
The project is an evaluation of Oxford City PCG, focusing particularly on interagency 
collaboration. It will monitor its progress through two of the city's HImP priorities: 
promoting independent living in older people and tackling substance misuse. 
The purpose of this interview is to explore: 
the extent of partnership working that exists between different professions and 
organisations 
the barriers to, and benefits of, such joint working 
the impact of the PCG on partnership working 
The study will continue over three years, and I plan to conduct follow-up interviews 
next year to examine whether and how the PCG/T has changed the nature of 
collaboration between primary care and other organisations. With your permission I 
would like to tape record the interview, on the understanding that no-one outside the 
research team will listen to the recording. 
If you have any questions about the interview, or would like to speak to me before it, 
you can contact me on Oxford 484942. I look forward to seeing you at 9.30am on 
Wednesday 14th February. 
With best wishes, 
Alison Chisholm 
Research Student 
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Areas for discussion 
" Existing links between the city PCG and other organisations whose work is relevant 
to the HImP process 
" Structures in place to facilitate joint working 
The HImP Group - membership, accountability, and the influence of its meetings and 
policies 
" Benefits of and barriers to joint working (e. g. language, geography, culture, 
priorities, seamlessness, etc) 
" Effect of organisational change on joint working 
The influence of the history and experience of individual staff members on progress 
in joint working 
"A shift in the culture of primary care? 
" Potential strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of a PCT 
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Appendix 3: Sample information sheet 
Information sheet 
Oxford City Primary Care Group: Addictions Service. 
Principal Researcher: Alison Chisholm 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide, it is important that you 
understand why it is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully and discuss it with your relatives, friends and GP if you wish. If there is 
anything that is not clear, or if you would like more information, please ask. Take time to 
decide whether or not you would like to take part. 
This study is part of a larger 3-year independent research project being carried out at Oxford 
Brookes University, to evaluate Oxford City Primary Care Group (PCG). The PCG is led by a 
board of GPs and community nurses, a lay member, Oxfordshire Social Services and 
Oxfordshire Health Authority. PCGs are expected to work in partnership with local councils, 
the social services and voluntary organisations (like Libra) so that the care and support people 
receive is improved. 
One of the PCG's priorities is to address problematic drug use in the city. It is in the early 
stages of setting up a community drugs service for Oxford. This study will explore how 
appropriate the service is from the perspective of the service user, and how well organisations 
are working together to ensure that the user's journey through treatment and support is 
simplified. 
You have been chosen because we are interested in the experiences of people who already use 
drugs agencies. Another five people will also be interviewed. 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be 
given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take 
part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. This will not affect 
the standard of care you receive. 
Taking part would involve one interview which should last between 20 minutes and an hour. A 
researcher would interview you at Libra. She would ask you questions about your experiences 
and perceptions of the support you have received from any agencies you have come into contact 
with in relation to your drug use. 
The interview would, with your permission, be tape-recorded. This recording would be heard by 
the research team and no-one else. When the report is written up, nothing you said would have 
your name attached to it and no-one would be able to identify you from it. 
The results of the research will be published in 2002. If you would like to receive a summary of 
the findings of this part of the study, we will be happy to send you one. 
If you would like any more information about the study, please contact Alison Chisholm at 
Oxford Brookes University on 01865 484941. 
Thank you for reading this. 
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Appendix 4: Sample consent form 
Oxford City Primary Care Group: 
A case study of interagency collaboration. 
Principal researcher: Alison Chisholm 
AQRECstudy number: A00.036 
CONSENT FORAf 
I have read and understood the information sheet for the above study. I have 
had the opportunity to ask questions about the study and have received 0 
satisfactory answers to them. 
I agree to take part in the above study. I understand that my participation is 
voluntary and I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason. o 
I agree that the interview may be tape recorded, and that any words I say 
during the interview can be used, anonymously, in the presentation of the 
research. 
Q 
Name of participant date signature 
Researcher date signature 
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Appendix 5: List of participants 
PCG/PCT 
PCG chief executive 
PCT chief executive 
PCG board/ PCT PEC chair 
PCG board/PCT PEC nurse 
PCG board/PCT PEC GP 
PCG/PCT lay member 
Health development manager 2 
Health development manager 1 
PCG Substance misuse services development officer 
Non-PCG/T clinicians 
GP 1 
CP2 
GP 3 
GP 4 
GP 5 
GP 6 
GP 7 
CHT Community Development Nurse 
District nurse 1 
District nurse 2 
District nurse 3 
District nurse 4 
Health visitor 1 
Health visitor 2 
Health visitor 3 
Practice nurse 
point Investment Plan co-ordinator 
Outreach Occupational Therapist 
Domiciliary physiotherapist 
CRS physiotherapist 
ICSS liaison nurse 
271 
City Council 
City Council Officer: health promotion 
City Council Officer: housing 
City Council Officer: social inclusion 
Social Services Department 
SSD Care Manager 1 
SSD Care Manager 2 
Social Services hospital Unit Manager 
PCG SSD Link 
Voluntary sector 
Carers' Centre Manager 
Director of Age Concern, Oxfordshire 
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